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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the social construction of risk in trustworthy digital repository 
(TDR) certification. It focuses on the Trustworthy Repositories Audit and Certification (TRAC) 
process, which is administered by the Center for Research Libraries and governed by the ISO 
16363 standard. This research seeks to understand how standard developers, auditors, and 
repository staff members construct their understanding of risk, a foundational concept in digital 
preservation and TDR certification, in the context of a TRAC audit.  
In this dissertation, I have developed an analytical framework of risk that draws on eight 
social factors that influence how people and groups construct their understandings of risk in the 
context of digital preservation: communication, complexity, expertise, organizations, political 
culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. I argue that although digital preservation has been 
examined as a technical, economic, and organizational phenomenon, it is also social. I also argue 
that while the digital preservation community has regarded the concept of risk as a discoverable, 
calculable value, it is in fact socially constructed, and as such research is needed that considers 
the social context in which the repositories exist and the ways in which social factors may 
influence how participants understand and behave in response to risk information. 
This research employs a mixed methods research design combining in-depth semi-
structured interviews with document analysis to examine: (1) how participants in three groups 
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(i.e., standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members) construct their understanding 
of risk in the context of a TRAC audit, and (2) to what degree the eight factors from my 
analytical framework come into play in the audit process.  
My findings reveal the TRAC audit process is one in which the actors involved agree on 
a definition of risk, but differ about whether an audit process based on this definition can 
determine trustworthiness with regard to long-term digital preservation. My findings demonstrate 
that while standard developers, auditors, and repository staff generally share an understanding of 
the major sources of potential risk that face digital repositories, they disagree about whether an 
how these risks can be mitigated and how mitigation can be proven. Individuals who are more 
removed from the day-to-day work of the repositories undergoing an audit are more likely to 
accept well-documented risk identification and mitigation strategies as sufficient evidence of 
trustworthiness, while repository staff are skeptical that documentation is sufficient evidence of 
risk assessment and mitigation and thus question whether this will translate to actual 
trustworthiness for long-term digital preservation. 
My findings support the argument that digital preservation should treat risk as a socially 
constructed phenomenon and consider how social factors contribute to an understanding of risk 
by participants in the audit and certification of TDRs. I found that communication, expertise, 
uncertainty, and vulnerability were particularly strong factors that influenced how auditors and 
repository staff members understood risk in the context of TRAC audit processes. 
This research has brought empirical methods to an emerging discipline and has created a 
set of baseline data about the first wave of TRAC certifications that will lay a foundation for 
future research.	
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
Every year the National Science Foundation spends billions of dollars on research. For 
example, in 2017 the NSF had a budget of approximately $7.5 billion and supported the work of 
359,000 people (The National Science Foundation, 2018). Since 2011 the NSF has required that 
all proposals include data management plans including information about plans to deposit data 
with a repository in order to ensure that it will be disseminated and preserved (National Science 
Foundation, 2011). Despite these efforts to ensure the longevity of this valuable digital 
information, it remains fragile:  
“Gone is the promise of preserving knowledge forever. We are replacing books, 
maps, and audiovisual recordings with computer code that is less stable than 
human memory itself. Code is rapidly overwritten or rendered obsolete by new 
code. Digital data are completely dependent on machines to render them 
accessible to human perception. In turn, those machines are completely 
dependent on uninterrupted supplies of energy to run the server farms that store 
and serve digital data.” (Smith Rumsey, 2016, p. 8)  
Yet, access to digital information is a critical underpinning of core values and functions 
in our society, from open government, to individual rights, to research and scholarship. Digital 
preservation is about ensuring the viability, sustainability, and accessibility of that digital 
information over time (Berman, 2008). 
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Digital preservation involves more than simply avoiding loss. Repositories preserving 
digital assets need to develop a sustainable organizational structure and financial stability as well 
as create robust processes to ensure the viability and accessibility of file formats and the long-
term storage and management of data. Digital repositories must have the ability to manage risk in 
all of these areas (C. Anderson, 2005; Garrett & Waters, 1996; Hey, Tansley, & Tolle, 2009). It 
is important to understand whether the repositories entrusted with valuable digital information 
are trustworthy because the content that they are responsible for preserving includes valuable and 
unique governmental data, cultural artifacts, and research data.  
Digital preservation consists of a complex set of activities, managed by individuals acting 
in organizations (S. Hitchcock, Brody, Hey, & Carr, 2007), which take place continuously over 
time. In 1996, in the Report of the Task Force on Archiving of Digital Information, John Garrett 
and Donald Waters (“Garrett and Waters”) found that long-term preservation of digital 
information will require the development of new infrastructures to support “trusted organizations 
capable of storing, migrating and providing access to digital collections” (Garrett & Waters, 
1996, p. 40). Garrett and Waters also found that “a process of certification for digital archives is 
needed to create an overall climate of trust about the prospects of preserving digital information” 
(Garrett & Waters, 1996, p. 40). This report proposed two possible models for certification of 
digital repositories: third party audit and certification, and the standards model. 
“There are at least two models of certification. On the one hand, there is the audit 
model used, for example, to certify official depositories of government documents. 
The depositories are subject to periodic and rigorous inspection to ensure that 
they are fulfilling their mission. On the other hand, there is a standards model 
which operates, for example, in the preservation community. Participants claim to 
adhere to standards that an appropriate agency has certified as valid and 
appropriate; consumers then certify by their use whether the products and 
services actually adhere to the standards. In its call for certified digital archives, 
the Task Force has not judged the relatives merits of applying either of these 
particular kinds of models of certification.” (Garrett & Waters, 1996, p. 49) 
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 Of the two models, third party certification has prevailed in the more than 20 years since 
the Garrett and Waters report. Since that time, the digital preservation community has sought to 
implement their recommendations, and to develop a structure for certification of trusted digital 
repositories (TDRs) (e.g., Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2011, 2012; Data 
Seal of Approval, 2014a; McHugh, Ross, Innocenti, Ruusalepp, & Hoffman, 2008; “nestor Seal 
for Trustworthy Digital Archives,” 2013). As of 2018, a limited number of repositories have 
sought to demonstrate their ability to preserve information through one of these emerging 
certification processes. Those that are certified are deemed “trustworthy” or “trusted.” Implicit in 
the certification process is the assumption that repositories have demonstrated their ability to 
manage risk.  
One such certification is the Trustworthy Repositories Audit and Certification: Criteria 
Checklist (TRAC) (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012). This certification 
process is governed by a formal standard, which forms the basis for the audit and certification 
process (ISO 16363). A second standard (ISO 16919), Requirements for Bodies Providing Audit 
and Certification of Candidate Trustworthy Digital Repositories (PTAB), governs the process by 
which individuals can become auditors who are authorized to administer the TRAC standard 
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2011). A repository becomes TRAC certified 
through a formal process in which external auditors assess evidence provided by the repository. 
Once certified, the repository can call itself a TDR. The TRAC standard forms the principle 
subject for this dissertation, which asks how stakeholders in the TRAC certification process 
construct their understanding of risk for digital preservation. 
In this dissertation, I focus on TRAC for several reasons. First, as a formal ISO standard 
TRAC has been developed through a rigorous and transparent process involving input from 
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experts and community members. The formality of the ISO standard, coupled with the fact that 
all but one of the audits to date have been conducted by the same organization (i.e., the Center 
for Research Libraries (CRL)), suggests that the results should be consistent and comparable 
across CRL TRAC certified repositories. Second, the TRAC audit process is extensive and 
rigorous. The requirements for this certification are more detailed and strict than other 
certifications, such as Data Seal of Approval (DSA), which consisted of a 10-point checklist that 
was reviewed by peers and community members rather than auditors from an external 
organization. Finally, TRAC is shifting toward a less controlled model. The newly approved 
PTAB standard and recent training sessions for auditors indicate that CRL is no longer the only 
organization certifying repositories as trustworthy. Examining the CRL TRAC audit and 
certification process now will generate baseline data against which future research in this area 
can be compared. The formality of the standard, coupled with the rigor of the audit process and 
the timing of this study combine to make TRAC the most appropriate certification process for 
this research. Further research, as well as alternative audit and certification processes, will be 
built on TRAC and our understanding of it. 
Scholars, including Brian Lavoie and Lorcan Dempsey (2004) have laid out many ways 
to examine digital preservation, including focusing on digital preservation as a technical, 
economic, organizational, or social challenge (Lavoie, 2008; Lavoie & Dempsey, 2004). Many 
in the digital preservation community, however, consider digital preservation to be primarily a 
technical challenge (e.g., Jantz & Giarlo, 2007). Digital preservation research has focused on 
specific technical aspects of preservation, such as file formats (Lawrence et al., 2000), system 
architecture (Barateiro, Antunes, & Borbinha, 2012), the reliability of storage media (Baker et 
al., 2006), mechanisms for managing distributed backup systems (Maniatis, Roussopoulos, Giuli, 
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Rosenthal, & Baker, 2005), and the development of technical standards (e.g., Dobratz & 
Schoger, 2007; Harmsen, 2008). Given this focus on the technology, it is not surprising that 
much of the literature is composed of practitioner reports. These reports are largely case studies 
of individual organizations, focusing on how organizations address these technical challenges in 
hopes of achieving trustworthy status at some point in the future (e.g., Houghton, 2015; Schultz 
& Gore, 2010).  
Within the context of technical threats to digital preservation, a portion of this literature 
addresses risk. Risk is conceptualized in probabilistic terms and the literature focuses on 
identifying and categorizing threats or vulnerabilities that particular repositories face, and 
developing technical solutions to address them (e.g., Barateiro, Antunes, Freitas, & Borbinha, 
2010). The existing research in this area, which has focused primarily on technical factors with 
regard to TDR certification and risk management, highlights important aspects of digital 
preservation. However, these approaches fail to adequately address social factors that can 
influence the behavior of the individuals and groups carrying out the work. 
 There has also been some work addressing the economic challenges in preserving digital 
information over time. Economic sustainability is a key element of digital preservation (Berman, 
2008), and includes “building an economically viable infrastructure, both social and technical, 
for maintaining valuable data without significant loss or degradation. This includes the whole 
socio-technical composition of the repository, the short- and long-term value of the material, the 
costs of undertaking an action, and the recognition that technologies do not sustain digital 
objects: institutions do, using the available technology” (Bradley, 2007, p. 157). Existing 
research in this area has focused on the ability of digital repositories to financially support their 
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work, assessment of financial models, and the long-term viability of their funding sources (e.g., 
4C Project, 2016; Berman, 2008; Berman et al., 2010; Bradley, 2007; Lavoie, 2008). 
 TRAC goes beyond the current funding environment of a repository and also asks that 
repositories provide, for example, evidence of a succession plan to ensure the viability of their 
collections beyond the life of the repository itself (Consultative Committee for Space Data 
Systems, 2012). Existing research about repository certification addresses economic and 
organizational stability as important elements of risk management for digital repositories, but 
approaches research in this area at an organizational level rather than considering the roles of 
individuals within those organizations. Indeed, studies of digital preservation often focus on the 
repository as a single entity rather than a collection of individual actors (e.g., Dappert & 
Farquhar, 2009), and much of the literature in this area consists of case studies (e.g., Schultz & 
Gore, 2010). Approaching digital preservation as an organizational challenge highlights the fact 
that the work of digital preservation takes place within organizations and that emphasizes the 
high levels of cooperation and coordination needed to manage a digital repository, but research is 
needed that considers the social context in which the repositories exist and the ways in which 
social factors may influence the individuals in a digital repository, whether those individuals are 
all positioned within one organization, or across member organizations in a consortium. 
What we see from these studies on the technical and organizational challenges and 
economic sustainability is that risk management is a conceptual foundation for digital 
preservation, an idea with currency for at least the past 20 years (Conway, 1996). These 
approaches to digital preservation as risk management depend upon the ability of people and 
organizations to accurately and effectively assess risk. While some of the risks associated with 
digital preservation activities, such as media deterioration and file format obsolescence (e.g., 
 7 
Ohshima, 2010), storage failures (e.g., Vermaaten, Lavoie, & Caplan, 2012), and disasters, 
attacks, and economic failures (e.g., Barateiro et al., 2010), are known and understood, we know 
that even when risks are known people are generally poor at judging how to act in response to 
those risks (Kahneman, 2013). This poor judgment is based in part on the fact that risk is socially 
constructed and different actors have differing perceptions of risk. Factors that influence these 
differing perceptions of risk include communication (e.g., Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996), 
complexity (e.g., Perrow, 1999), expertise (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), organizations 
(e.g., Hutter & Power, 2005a), political culture (e.g., Jasanoff, 1986), trust (e.g., Nelkin, 1989), 
uncertainty (e.g., van Est, Walhout, & Brom, 2012), and vulnerability (e.g., Olofsson et al., 
2014). These varying perceptions lead individuals and organizations to behave differently in 
response to risks depending on whether their perception amplifies or attenuates those risks 
Digital preservation as an academic discipline has engaged with the concept of risk as a 
knowable, quantifiable figure that technical systems must be designed to overcome (Barateiro et 
al., 2010). This approach to digital preservation relies on positivistic perspectives and is heavily 
influenced by computer science (e.g., Barateiro, Antunes, & Borbinha, 2011). Digital 
preservation scholarship addressing the concept of risk consists mainly of identifying and 
classifying types of vulnerabilities or threats, and individual case studies describing actions taken 
by a particular repository (e.g., Vermaaten et al., 2012). Literature in this area, which consists 
largely of self-produced case studies about specific organizations, treats risk as an objective 
value and does not engage meaningfully with the notion that perceptions of risk, rather than the 
risk itself, drive decision-making and action with regard to digital preservation (Ross & 
McHugh, 2006a). These positivistic attitudes about risk in digital preservation form the basis for 
an underlying assumption among many digital preservation researchers and practitioners: that the 
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stakeholders involved in repository audit and certification processes have the same perceptions 
of risk and therefore interpret the audit documentation in the same way (RLG-OCLC Working 
Group on Digital Archive Attributes, 2002).  
Digital preservation research regarding TDR certification has focused on technical, 
economic, and organizational factors. This is not sufficient to account for a complex view of the 
world. As such, a new approach is needed. In this dissertation I have examined TRAC 
certification as a process that is carried out by individuals within organizations, who are 
influenced by social factors. Digital preservation challenges, or risks, cannot be considered as 
merely technical, economic, or organizational. Rather, digital preservation is also a social 
process in which risks are interpreted by individuals. Their subsequent actions are influenced by 
social factors that shape their perception. I will focus specifically on the social construction of 
risk and the factors that influence perceptions of risk among individual stakeholders in the TRAC 
certification process.  
There are several stakeholder groups that are involved in the TRAC certification process: 
repository staff members, repository leaders (e.g., members of the Board of Directors), leaders of 
repository parent institutions, auditors, repository users, data depositors, and the developers of 
the TRAC standard itself. This study will focus on the standard developers, auditors, and 
repository staff members, as these three groups are most directly involved in the audit process. 
Standard developers created and maintain the ISO 16363 standard, which governs the audit 
process. Auditors assess repositories against the criteria in the standard. And repository staff 
members provide evidence to auditors, primarily in the form of documentation, that their 
repository’s policies and practices meet the criteria described in the standard. The term 
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stakeholders will be used throughout to refer to these three groups (i.e., standard developers, 
auditors, and repository staff members) with regard to the TRAC audit and certification process.  
If these stakeholders – standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members – do 
not share the same perceptions of the risks that the repository must manage in order to become a 
TDR, it is important that the certification process enables those differences to be surfaced and 
addressed. If not, the outcomes of certification are likely to lack consistency. The goal of TRAC 
certification is to assess and provide metrics for repositories to gauge their trustworthiness in 
several areas, enabling comparison of TRAC certified repositories across all dimensions of the 
standard. The consistency of scoring is critical in order to facilitate this type of comparison. 
Indeed, TRAC is just one example of a digital preservation audit process focused on risk 
management. Data Seal of Approval (DSA) and the nestor Seal for Trustworthy Digital Archives 
(nestor) also focus on risk management or digital repositories (Data Seal of Approval, 2014a; 
nestor Certification Working Group, 2013). DSA is an audit and certification process that, like 
TRAC, asks repositories to respond to a checklist in order to demonstrate trustworthiness 
through risk management. The certification process is community-based. Members of the DSA 
community affiliated with existing DSA-approved repositories assess repositories. nestor is an 
assessment for digital repositories that is based on the DIN 31644 standard (nestor Working 
Group Trusted Repositories - Certification, 2009). Like TRAC, the nestor assessment process is 
based on the OAIS model, and audits are conducted by a group of auditors (Consultative 
Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012a, 2012; Keitel, 2012).  
Each of the processes discussed above, TRAC, DSA, and nestor, treat risk as something 
to be identified, quantified, and managed through structural, financial, or organizational 
mechanisms. Researchers who examine risk assume that once identified, people will understand 
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and respond to particular risks in predictable ways (e.g., Fischhoff, 1983; Royal Society (Great 
Britain) & Study Group on Risk, 1983). This attitude, which is implicit throughout the digital 
preservation scholarship around risk management (Innocenti, McHugh, & Ross, 2008; McHugh, 
2012), largely fails to incorporate well-established theories of risk perception, judgment, and 
decision-making from other disciplines (e.g., Kahneman, 2013; Slovic, 1987), which argue that 
even when risks are well-known, social factors influence perception of those risks. This variation 
in risk perception leads people to behave differently in response to risks. While risk 
identification is an important step for repositories seeking to demonstrate and improve their 
ability to preserve information, it is only part of the process. Equally important is the ability to 
consider how people and groups construct and process risk information and behave in response 
to that information. This is where this dissertation lies. I assert that digital preservation is a 
continuous process of managing risk that is driven by social as well as financial, organizational, 
and technical issues. Understanding the ways in which social factors influence perceptions of 
risk is key to understanding the ways in which risks are perceived by repository managers and 
auditors in the TRAC certification process. 
In this dissertation I examine the social dimensions of risk. I analyze conceptualizations 
of risk by repository staff and auditors, and assess how these affect a TRAC audit and, in turn, 
the consequences for application of the TRAC standard. I examine whether three groups of 
stakeholders – standard developers, auditors, and repository staff - share the same perceptions of 
risk, a foundational concept that underlies the TRAC standard.  
In studying the social construction of risk, this dissertation does two unique things. First, 
it changes the focus from the technical, financial, and organizational aspects of risk management 
to one that incorporates social aspects of risk management as well. And second, it refocuses 
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digital preservation discussion on the people involved in the process – not to uncover human 
error per se, but to acknowledge that people underlie all digital preservation processes.  
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
Theories of risk perception form the basis for this study. These theories hold that risk has 
different meanings for different actors (Renn, 2008), and that social factors influence perceptions 
of risk (Wilkinson, 2001). Considering risk as a socially constructed concept that influences 
decisions and actions taken by individuals allows me to consider TDR audit and certification as a 
socially constructed process (Burgess, 2015). This facilitates an understanding of the audit 
process as subjective and dependent on the perceptions of the individuals involved. 
This framework is crucial to my argument in that people, including repository staff and 
auditors, whose individual perceptions of risk may influence their actions with regard to audit 
and certification, conduct the TRAC audit process. One way to understand the process is through 
the lens of social construction, by considering the social factors that may be influencing the 
actors involved and how these interact with the organizational, financial, and technical factors 
(Gergen & Gergen, 2008). Using this lens, I have examined the TRAC certification process in 
order to critically examine whether the participants in the process (standard developers, auditors, 
and repository staff) share the same understanding of risk or whether their risk perceptions differ. 
If perceptions of risk vary across participants (e.g., within a repository, across different 
repositories, between repository staff and auditors, across different auditors), then the outcomes 
of the TRAC audits may lack consistency.  
A theoretical framework based on factors that influence the social construction of risk 
would facilitate an examination of the TRAC audit process that is person-centered rather than 
organizationally-centered and/or materials-centered. Although there are elements of the TRAC 
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standard that focus on organizational elements (e.g., Section 3: Organizational Infrastructure) or 
material elements (e.g., Section 5: Infrastructure and Security Risk Management), during the 
audit process these elements are still addressed by individuals within the organization, who bring 
their own understandings of risk to bear on the process (Consultative Committee for Space Data 
Systems, 2012).  
In this dissertation, I have developed an analytical framework of risk that draws on eight 
social factors that influence how people and groups construct their understandings of risk that 
have been identified in the literature which are relevant for digital repositories: communication, 
complexity, expertise, organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. The 
results of this research show that repository staff members disagreed with standard developers 
and auditors about whether the risk identification and mitigation strategies prescribed in the 
TRAC standard would translate to actual trustworthiness with regard to long-term digital 
preservation. These findings have demonstrated that each of the eight factors from the model 
below contributed to the construction of risk in the TRAC audit and certification process, and 
that communication, expertise, uncertainty, and vulnerability were the most prominent factors. 
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• Expertise: Both expertise and lack of expertise can influence perceptions of risk. Experts 
may have particular knowledge that allows them to understand risk in a particular area, 
but they have been found to have a narrow focus based on their specialized knowledge, 
which can influence their perception of risk. Individuals who lack expertise in a particular 
area may not have the same nuanced understanding of particular areas that experts do, but 
they have been found to have a greater sense of the broad social context within which 
they are operating (e.g., E. Vaughan & Seifert, 1992; Wynne, 1992). 
• Organizations: Organizations both produce and manage risk, and perceptions of risk vary 
for people depending on their position within an organization. Risk assessment and 
management activities take place within the context of organizations, and are therefore 
influenced by the organizations themselves as well as the roles of the individuals within 
the organizations who participate in those activities (e.g., Hutter, 2005; D. Vaughan, 
1996).  
• Political Culture: National context influences how risks are defined. Perceptions of risk 
are shaped not only by the political culture within which individuals exist, but also by 
their place or role within that culture. These factors can elevate or reduce perceptions of 
risk depending on the position of an individual within the culture. Decisions about how to 
manage and respond to risks are shaped by political culture as well (e.g., Dake, 1991; 
Jasanoff, 1986). 
• Trust: Organizations and processes that involve cooperation by people and groups with 
different types of knowledge and expertise require trust among those actors. Perceptions 
of risk can vary depending on the amount of trust that these individuals and groups have 
for one another (e.g., Nelkin, 1989; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). 
• Uncertainty: In many situations it can be difficult to determine and understand risk and 
its components (hazard, probability, consequences). People and groups operating under 
conditions of uncertainty may perceive risks differently depending on their level of 
uncertainty (e.g., Starr, 2003; van Est et al., 2012). 
• Vulnerability: Risk exposure, or vulnerability, influences perceptions of risk. People and 
groups who are able to limit their risk exposure may have different perceptions about risk 
than those who lack the ability to manage their exposure to risks. Greater vulnerability 
has been shown to increase perceptions of risk, while privilege and the ability to limit or 
select risk exposure has been shown to decrease perceptions of the severity of risks (e.g., 
Murphy, 2006; Olofsson et al., 2014).  
This study applies theories of risk perception and social construction to the TRAC audit 
and certification process for digital repositories. These theories suggest that the individuals and 
groups involved in this process may have different perceptions of risk, a concept that is 
constructed through social processes (Burgess, 2015), and that these different understandings 
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influence the consistency of TRAC certification. This is important to consider because TRAC 
certification is one way that the digital preservation community determines whether repositories 
are trustworthy with regard to the claims that they make about their ability to preserve digital 
content long-term. 
1.3  Research Questions 
My study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
1. How do standard developers, auditors, and repository managers conceptualize risk in 
the context of a TRAC audit? 
2. What are the differences and similarities by which standard developers, auditors, and 
repository managers understand risk as it has been communicated by the TRAC 
standard? 
a) In what ways do these differences and similarities become manifest in the TRAC 
audit process? 
3. To what degree do the following eight factors which influence risk perception come 
into play in the audit process: communication, complexity, expertise, organizations, 
political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability? 
a) In what ways and why do they emerge when staff and auditors consider risk 
factors articulated in the TRAC standard? 
b) What additional factors, if any, emerge which also influence perceptions of risk in 
relation to the TRAC standard?  
1.4 Research Design Overview 
In order to address these questions, which were generated from a deep analysis of risk 
factors in the literature, I conducted a qualitative study to analyze how the concept of risk was 
constructed in the TRAC audit process. I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
three groups of stakeholders: standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members in 
order to determine whether they share the same perceptions of risk, a foundational concept that 
underlies the TRAC standard. I critically examined the text of the TRAC standard (ISO 16363), 
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as well as the audit findings reports published by CRL and other documentation, in order to 
understand how risk was considered in relation to the standard and applied in the audit process.  
1.5 Significance 
This research furthers knowledge regarding risk assessment and risk management, and 
certification processes as applied to digital preservation, data curation, and TDRs. By applying a 
qualitative design, research findings will (1) bring empirical research to an emerging discipline 
where scholarship has consisted mainly of case studies produced by practitioners, (2) provide 
theoretical contributions about how risk perceptions influence assessment of trustworthy digital 
repositories, (3) develop a theoretical model of factors that influence perceptions of risk with 
regard to digital preservation, (4) offer insights translatable into the technological, 
organizational, and economic aspects of any digital repository, thus creating a stronger 
framework for the long-term preservation and curation of data for reuse, and (5) offer insights 
translatable into digital preservation policy, including audit and certification processes for 
trustworthy digital repositories.  
This research generates original theoretical contributions to about the social construction 
of risk in digital preservation. This study expands the ways that we approach digital preservation 
research by introducing theories of risk perception to the audit and certification process for 
trusted digital repositories. Existing research in this area has focused on technical definitions of 
risk that seek to classify types of threats (e.g., Rosenthal, 2010; Vermaaten et al., 2012); an 
expanded understanding that treats risk as a social construct and includes social and 
organizational factors is needed. This dissertation extends research about the TRAC audit and 
certification process by examining the ways in which individual actors may have different 
perceptions of risk within the process, including standard developers, auditors, and repository 
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staff. Additionally, existing research in this area has focused on understanding the TRAC audit 
and certification process at the organizational level (e.g., Kirchhoff, Fenton, Orphan, & 
Morrissey, 2010; Reilly, Jr. & Waltz, 2013), an understanding of the TRAC process that 
considers how social factors influence the individual actors involved in the process is needed. 
Furthermore, this dissertation has produced and applied a theoretical model for the social 
construction of risk in digital preservation. While previous research has examined digital 
preservation as a technical, economic, and organizational phenomenon, this dissertation shows 
that risk in digital preservation should also be considered as a social phenomenon.  
1.6 Structure  
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. In Chapter 0 I have outlined the 
background and summarized the theoretical framework for the study. I have presented my 
research questions, outlined my research methods, and discussed the significance of this study. In 
Chapter Chapter 2: I review the literature around three key areas of relevance for this study: the 
social construction of risk, digital preservation, and trusted digital repository certification. This 
chapter critically examines existing research in these three areas and identifies a gap in research 
about trusted digital repositories. Namely, the need for empirical research about TDR 
certification that considers the ways in which social factors may influence the risk perception of 
individuals who are involved in the audit and certification process. In Chapter Chapter 3: I 
describe my research methods, including the analytical focus for the study, methods for data 
collection and analysis, a description of the population, and a discussion of limitations. In 
Chapter Chapter 4: I present my findings and argue that although the digital preservation 
community has regarded the concept of risk as a discoverable value, it is in fact socially 
constructed. My findings demonstrate that individuals involved in the TRAC audit process view 
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risk in terms of specific threats, and I explore the five categories of threats that I have identified: 
finance, legal, organizational governance, repository processes, and technical infrastructure. I 
also examine two specific aspects of the TRAC audit process in order to understand how the 
factors from my theoretical model contribute to the social construction of risk. In Chapter 
Chapter 5:, I discuss how each of the factors from the model for the social construction of risk in 
digital preservation contributed to the social construction of risk in the TRAC audit process and 
discuss implications for research, policy, and practice. I conclude by discussing future directions 
for research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature 
In Chapter Chapter 2:, I introduce relevant literature across three areas: the social 
construction of risk; digital preservation and risk; and trustworthy digital repository audit and 
certification processes. In section 2.1, I will contrast the classical risk approach with the social 
construction of risk. This section describes the differences between a classical definition that 
characterizes risk as a numeric value determined by considering the probability and magnitude of 
an adverse event, and a definition of risk which argues that people interpret risks differently as a 
result of social factors that influence their perceptions. I then discuss the research identifying 
eight factors that influence perceptions of risk that are particularly relevant for trusted digital 
repository audit and certification processes, such as TRAC. These are: communication, 
complexity, expertise, organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. The 
social construction of risk forms the foundation of the theoretical framework for this study. I 
have chosen this focus rather than a classical definition of risk because even when risks are 
known and well-understood, people are poor at judging how to act in response to those risks, and 
it is the actions of the individual stakeholders in the TRAC audit and certification process that 
determine the outcomes (Kahneman, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Section 2.2 examines how the concept of risk has been addressed in the digital 
preservation literature. While risk is commonly described as being foundational to the field of 
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digital preservation (e.g., Conway, 1996), it has largely been understood through the classical 
definition as described in section 2.1.1. Literature in this area has been overwhelmingly 
practitioner-based, and heavily features practitioner reports rather than empirical research, and 
has focused on identifying, describing, and classifying particular risks or threats in order to 
create solutions to manage them. Section 2.3 addresses the concept of trusted digital repositories 
in the digital preservation literature, beginning with the foundations of TDR certifications in the 
Garrett & Waters report (Garrett & Waters, 1996). In this section I describe four models for TDR 
certification: TRAC, nestor, Data Seal of Approval (DSA), and CoreTrustSeal (CTS). As with 
risk in digital preservation, literature in this area heavily features practitioner reports rather than 
empirical research. While the four models for TDR certification are all based on the concept of 
risk, literature in this area tends to rely on the classical definition of risk rather than to engage 
with the social construction of risk and the notion that risk perception can be influenced by social 
factors. 
This literature review demonstrates that the field of digital preservation and TDR 
certification has thus far engaged with the concept of risk perception in only a cursory way. 
Rather, risk has been understood as a fixed concept that can be objectively known and 
understood, and scholarship in this field seems to assume that responses to risk will not vary 
between individuals. This dissertation applies theoretical framework based on the social 
construction of risk to examine the ways in which responses to risks vary depending on a variety 
of social factors that have been shown to influence perceptions of risk in the TRAC audit and 
certification process. 
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2.1  Social Construction of Risk  
In this section, I explore the social construction of risk, drawing from research in the 
areas of science and technology studies, organizational behavior, public policy, and risk analysis. 
This topic forms the basis for the theoretical framework of this study. Research in this area has 
found that people’s actions are influenced by their perceptions of risk in addition to the objective 
and quantifiable value of a particular risk. These perceptions of risk are influenced by social 
factors, several of which are described in section 2.1.2 below. In fact, even when risks are known 
and understood people are poor at judging how to act in response to them.  
I have chosen to focus on a subset of the risk literature – the social construction of risk 
and factors that influence risk perception – because this segment of the research explores risk as 
a socially constructed phenomenon rather than treating it only as a discrete, quantifiable figure. 
Section 2.1 will begin by discussing different definitions of risk, and then establishing a more 
nuanced definition of risk. This is followed by a critical review of the ways that risk perception is 
constructed by individuals and organizations (2.1.1). In section 2.1.2 I investigate several types 
of factors addressed in the research that have been hypothesized or shown to influence risk 
perception, and then apply those factors to the processes of risk analysis and risk mitigation in 
section 2.1.3. In sections 2.2 and 2.3 I will address digital preservation and risk as well as TDRs. 
These sections will show that existing research around digital preservation and TDRs has relied 
on a classical definition of risk, positioning a theoretical framework focused around risk 
perception and the social factors that influence perceptions of risk to make a unique contribution 
to the field. 
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2.1.1 Definitions: Risk and Risk Perception 
A classical definition of risk comes from the Royal Society and includes elements that are 
common throughout the literature: “the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a 
stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge. As a probability in the sense of 
statistical theory, risk obeys all the formal laws of combining probabilities” (Royal Society 
(Great Britain) & Study Group on Risk, 1983). This report defines risk as the probability of some 
adverse event. Risk has also been defined as “the potential for realization of unwanted, negative 
consequences of an event” (Rowe, 1977, p. 24). Other definitions of risk include the magnitude 
of the negative consequences of that adverse event: “[r]isk is the combination of the likelihood of 
an event and the consequences of that event” (Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009, p. 230). 
And taking this definition one step further, “[d]efinitions of particular risks include at least three 
conceptual elements: an object deemed to ‘pose’ the risk, a putative harm, and a linkage alleging 
some form of causation between the object and the harm” (Hilgartner, 1992, p. 40).  
As these examples demonstrate, risk is generally described as some combination of 
probability and magnitude of consequence relating to a hazard or adverse event (Gardoni & 
Murphy, 2013; Hilgartner, 1992; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Leveson et al., 2009; Rowe, 1977; 
Slovic, 1987). The assumption is that both probability and magnitude can be reduced to 
measurable quantities and calculated as a numeric value (Fischhoff, 1983; Fischhoff, Hope, & 
Watson, 1990; Fox, Gardner, Lees, Green, & Andrews, 1981; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Starr, 
1969). Each of these definitions includes the common elements of an adverse event or harm, and 
the probability that the event will happen. Cumulatively, these resources produce a definition of 
risk that assumes that both the probability that an adverse event will occur and the magnitude of 
the consequences of this adverse event are knowable, discoverable, and calculable, and that any 
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reasonable person would reach the same conclusion when calculating a given risk (Kaplan & 
Garrick, 1981). These definitions of risk rely upon the concept of a rational actor, and fail to take 
into account the idea that social factors might influence the way that individuals perceive risk 
(including probability, magnitude, and/or the object of risk):  
“The classical risk approach assumes that it is possible to define and assess risks. 
The assumption that risks can be objectified and calculated has met with a lot of 
criticism. Notions like complexity and uncertainty to characterize the risk 
situation have played a central role in clarifying the limits of the classical risk 
approach.” (van Est et al., 2012, p. 1075) 
Bayesian statistics allow for differences in risk perception in the context of incomplete 
information (Silver, 2012; Viscusi, 1985). However, this approach deals with the limits of our 
knowledge rather than the different ways in which people respond to the same information 
(Silver, 2012). This approach also assumes that as more information is known, predictions of risk 
will become more accurate.  
In contrast, Renn argues that “risks are created and selected by human actors” (Renn, 
2008, p. 11). And, given the fact that risks are fundamentally human creations, he defines risk 
perception as “the outcome of processing, assimilation and evaluation of personal experiences or 
information about risk by individuals or groups in society” (Renn, 2008, p. 64). Risk perception 
assumes that “the concept ‘risk’ means different things to different people” (Slovic, 1987, p. 
283). Theories of risk perception hold that different people have differing understandings of the 
probability and adverse consequences of events, and that these differing understandings are the 
result of social, organizational, and/or political factors (Lachlan, Burke, Spence, & Griffin, 2009; 
Nelkin, 1989; Nickel & Vaesen, 2012; van Est et al., 2012; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). It should 
also be noted that while there are many competing theories that seek to explain risk perception, it 
is still very much “a phenomenon in search of an explanation” (Sjöberg, 2000, p. 1). 
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The following sections will explore how eight factors influence risk perception: 
communication, complexity, expertise, organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and 
vulnerability. These eight factors are relevant for digital preservation because the ecosystem of 
TDRs is one in which complex factors combine under conditions of uncertainty. Multiple 
stakeholders across the different systems have varying levels of expertise, trust, and vulnerability 
that influence their perceptions of risk, and multiple overlapping organizations require that 
individual actors communicate both within and across groups.  
2.1.2 Factors That Influence Risk Perception  
2.1.2.1 Communication: Amplification/Attenuation  
Risk perception can be influenced by the ways in which risks are communicated 
(Bostrom, 2014; Chung, 2011; Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Konheim, 1988; Lachlan et al., 
2009; Renn, 1991; Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992). Theories of risk 
amplification and attenuation argue that risk is socially constructed and that, "the human 
experience of risk is simultaneously an experience of potential harm and the ways by which 
institutions and people process and interpret these threats" (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996, p. 
96). That is, information about risk is communicated in different ways and that, in turn, 
influences information processing and interpretation by people and organizations.  
The amplification (or attenuation) of risk information can take place in a myriad of ways, 
and can involve many different types of actors and organizations, including media, government, 
political actors, scientists, or other experts (Arvai, 2007; Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Lachlan 
et al., 2009). Different individuals, if given the same risk information from the same source, will 
not necessarily perceive risks in the same way, and so it is important to consider both the 
audience and the mode of communication any time risk information is communicated (Arvai, 
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2007). For example, Lachlan et al. (2009) found that risk messages about Hurricane Katrina were 
effective for some groups but not others, based on race. The effectiveness of risk communication 
about Katrina influenced decisions about whether or not to evacuate ahead of the storm, and the 
result of this difference in how risk messages were received led African American respondents to 
evacuate at lower rates than Caucasian respondents. One of the factors influencing perception of 
risk in this case is the source of the risk communication and whether the messages are coming 
from information sources that are relevant to the recipient (Lachlan et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, "[r]isk analysis, then, requires an approach that is capable of illuminating 
risk in its full complexity, is sensitive to the social settings in which risk occurs, and also 
recognizes that social interactions may either amplify or attenuate the signals to society about 
risk" (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996, p. 96). Risk analysis or assessment processes can have 
unintended consequences on risk perception that arise not from the information itself but rather 
from the social factors surrounding the risk, the assessment process, and the ways in which all of 
those things are communicated. Risk perception can be amplified or attenuated as a result of the 
ways that technical information about risk is communicated.  
This suggests that the discourse at several levels influences risk perception in digital 
repositories. Communications between repository staff regarding risk may result in either 
amplification or attenuation of risk depending on the mode of communication, the way in which 
the risk message is communicated, and the relationship between the source and recipient of the 
message. These factors may also influence the risk perceptions with regard to communication 
between repository staff and auditors in the TRAC process. Professional discourse around digital 
preservation and TDRs may also influence perceptions of risk for different types of stakeholders 
depending on their connections to the digital preservation community, and the ways in which the 
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communication norms of this community either match or diverge from the communication norms 
of their own professional communities. 
2.1.2.2 Complexity 
The second factor, complexity, has also been found to influence risk perception. Research 
shows that high levels of complexity in technical and social systems can make it difficult to 
identify probabilities, consequences, and hazards (Fischhoff, 1983; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997; 
van Est et al., 2012). Wilkinson (2001) argues that “[a]ny attempt to mask the complexity of the 
social experience of risk perception in rigid conceptual abstractions may lead us further away, 
rather than towards a more intimate understanding of the day-to-day reality in which people 
recognize and negotiate with ‘hazards’ as ‘risks’” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 11).  
Charles Perrow (1999) concludes that in complex and tightly-coupled systems, accidents 
are inevitable. He presents the example of a nuclear power plant, and demonstrates that 
complexity results in interactions between seemingly independent features (Perrow, 1999). 
Others, including Jos A. Rijpma (1997), have maintained that complexity may neutralize the 
benefits of redundancy, and also impair organizational learning. In other words, complexity 
introduces problems while also counteracting measures that are meant to offset those problems.  
The research presented above indicates that perceptions of risk can be influenced by the 
complexity of technical and/or social systems. This suggests that the differing levels of 
complexity of digital repositories and in the organizations within which they are situated may 
lead to varying perceptions of risk for different stakeholders depending on their level of 
familiarity with different aspects of the repository. Additionally, digital repositories engage in 
complex tasks including the technical work of preserving digital information.  
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In the TRAC audit and certification process, repository staff face complexity in terms of 
the technical work of digital preservation, and also in terms of organizational and economic 
factors relating to the repository. Auditors may assess each repository differently depending on 
the complexity of the repository environment, the complexity of their own organization, and/or 
the complexity of the audit process itself.  
2.1.2.3 Expertise 
The third factor that has been found to influence perceptions of risk is expertise. A great 
deal of literature about risk perception focuses on the differences between experts and lay people 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Hilgartner, 1992; Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Konheim, 1988; 
Perrow, 1999; Slovic, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; E. Vaughan & Seifert, 1992; 
Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Wynne, 1992). It was once thought that experts had more accurate 
understandings of risk because they had greater levels of knowledge about the factors that 
contribute to risk and that their understanding of risk was more objective and/or rational than the 
understanding that lay people had of risk (Otway, 1992; Starr, 1969; Wynne, 1992).  
However, as researchers have developed a deeper understanding of risk perception and 
the ways that experts and lay people differ in their perception of risks, research has come to 
support the idea that risk assessment and management efforts should include both perspectives: 
"[p]erhaps the most important message from this research is that there is wisdom 
as well as error in public attitudes and perceptions. Lay people sometimes lack 
certain information about hazards. However, their basic conceptualization of risk 
is much richer than that of the experts and reflects legitimate concerns that are 
typically omitted from expert risk assessments. As a result, risk communication 
and risk management efforts are destined to fail unless they are structured as a 
two-way process. Each side, expert and public, has something valid to contribute. 
Each side must respect the insights and intelligence of the other." (Slovic, 1987, p. 
285) 
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Research has found that the distinction between experts and lay people is misguided, and 
that individuals with different experiences and types of knowledge bring different types of 
expertise to bear on assessments of risk (Pidgeon, 1998). Rather than a clear division between 
experts and laypeople, a digital repository consists of people with varying levels of expertise in 
different aspects of the repository. Broadly speaking, repositories generally consist of people 
with administrative expertise, digital preservation expertise, and IT expertise, and each of these 
types of people are involved in the TRAC audit and certification process. Each of these types of 
people have deep, focused knowledge in some areas of repository management but may be 
considered laypeople with regard to others. This knowledge, paired with a lack of similar 
expertise in other areas of repository management, has the potential to influence perceptions of 
risk by opening their eyes to some types of risk and closing them to others. With regard to the 
TRAC process, these varying levels of expertise may influence the process differently depending 
on how involved each person is in the process, and on how much they rely on and trust the 
expertise of others. 
Expertise as described in this section above and trust are closely linked with regard to 
risk perception. With regard to risk management for digital repositories, and TRAC audit and 
certification specifically, participation is required from a variety of people who have different 
types of expertise. Trust in the expertise and knowledge of others is necessary in order to 
complete the documentation required, and research has shown that trust is a factor that can 
influence perceptions of risk.  
2.1.2.4 Organizations 
Fourth, organizations are “both centres for processing and handling risks and potential 
producers and exporters of risk” (Hutter & Power, 2005b, p. 1). Bridget Hutter and Michael 
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Power (2005b) argue that risk analysis and risk management are both activities that take place 
within organizations, and that these activities rely on social constructions of risk knowledge that 
are framed within the structure of the organization.  
Vaughan provides two examples of organizations shaping risk perception – the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Air Transportation System 
(NATS) (D. Vaughan, 1996, 2005). In these examples, Vaughan argues that decisions about the 
acceptability of risk are shaped by the culture of the organizations in which these decisions take 
place. For these two organizations, levels of uncertainty play a significant role in determining 
acceptable levels of risk, albeit in distinctly different ways. NATS operates in a highly 
standardized environment in which error and mistake are not tolerated, while NASA operates 
with high levels of uncertainty, normalizing deviance and creating an environment that is 
accepting of anomalies (D. Vaughan, 2005). Whether risk is acceptable or not, both NASA and 
NATS have cultures that work to ensure that individuals within the organization have a shared 
understanding of risk, which is promoted partly through the enforcement of formal operating 
procedures. In both cases, this organizational understanding of risk is critical for carrying out the 
everyday activities of the organization. 
An alternative perspective on how organizations shape risk perception is that rather than 
constructing a shared perception of risk for all members, individuals within an organization will 
perceive risk differently depending on their roles (Hutter, 2005). This view holds that, “[w]hile 
some risks will be common to everyone in an organization and understood in broadly similar 
ways, other risks may be differentially experienced and managed” (Hutter, 2005, p. 67). 
Understandings of risk “tend to be situated so that how we see, what we see, how we interpret 
what we see, and our ability to respond are all to some extent determined by our organizational 
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locus” (Hutter, 2005, p. 73). This view of risk perception corresponds to the section above, 
which argues that vulnerability and privilege can affect risk perception – because different roles 
within an organization have varying amounts of power, control, vulnerability, and exposure to 
risk.  
For TRAC certification, each repository is a separate organization that may shape 
perceptions of risk for its members in different ways. Auditors also belong to organizations that 
may shape their perceptions of risk in ways that differ from the repositories that they are 
assessing. It is also possible that individuals or groups within organizations will have varying 
perceptions of risk based on their position in the organization, in a manner similar to the 
influence of expertise or trust as described in sections 2.1.2.3 and 2.1.2.6 in this chapter. Position 
within an organization is, in some cases, related to expertise because people are likely to be 
situated within groups based on their expertise (e.g., IT, digital preservation, etc.). However, 
lines of communication within organizations do not always follow these functional lines. 
Organizations with matrixed reporting structures, for example, may influence perceptions of risk 
in different ways than more traditional or siloed organizations.  
2.1.2.5 Political Culture 
Political culture, the fifth social factor that influences risk perception, argues that national 
context influences how risks are defined (Beck, 1992; Jasanoff, 1986; Parthasarathy, 2007). Karl 
Dake (1991) argues that “mental models of risk are not solely matters of individual cognition, 
but also correspond to worldviews entailing deeply held beliefs and values regarding society, its 
functioning, and its potential fate” (Dake, 1991, p. 62). This argument is based on the assumption 
that individuals exist within social, cultural, and political spheres, that they perceive risks within 
those contexts, and that their perceptions of risks are influenced by those contexts (Dake, 1991). 
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Indeed, Shobita Parthasarathy (2007) argues that political culture shapes practices and artifacts in 
ways that vary across political boundaries, and that the differences among political cultures can 
explain some of the challenges to transnational technology transfer. This may account for the 
slow uptake of the TRAC standard outside of the United States. 
Perceptions of risk are shaped not only by the political culture within which individuals 
exist, but also by their place or role within that culture (Beck, 1992). For Ulrich Beck (1992, 
1999), relative power within political culture influences perceptions of risk in that individuals, 
organizations, or groups with greater power are able to reduce their exposure to risk. Much like 
theories of vulnerability described in section 2.1.2.8 above, risk perception depends in part on 
whether an individual has control over their own level of exposure to risk. 
In addition to the fact that political culture shapes perceptions of risk, Sheila Jasanoff 
(1998) contends that, “Theories of risk perception are inherently political because they carry 
within them implicit understandings about how to organize and implement policies for managing 
risk … people's attitudes toward risk partly reflect their feelings of power, or lack thereof, in 
relation to the sources of risk” (Jasanoff, 1998, p. 93). Individuals perceive risks within their own 
cultural and political context, and it is within this same context that decisions about how to 
respond to those risks are formulated and implemented. In the case of digital preservation, 
repository managers may be influenced in their perceptions of risk by political events such as the 
de-funding of heritage organizations on a national scale (CBC News, 2012).  
The view that political culture influences risk perception is relevant for the TRAC audit 
and certification process because of the strong ties between political culture and policymaking 
(Jasanoff, 1998; Parthasarathy, 2004; Wohlers, 2010). Thus far, all of the CRL TRAC certified 
repositories are in North America (two in Canada, four in the United States). It is possible that 
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perceptions of risk within the audit and certification process will vary across national boundaries. 
This may arise as differences in repository management between the Canadian and American 
repositories, and may also surface in the interaction between Canadian and American auditors.  
2.1.2.6 Trust 
Sixth, trust influences risk perception. The notion that risk assessment and management 
processes are limited by the focus of experts whose perception of risk lacks valuable information 
that can only be provided by non-experts is reflected in Wynne’s case study of radioactivity and 
Cumbrian sheep farmers (Wynne, 1992). Wynne found that the judgment of officials relied on 
generalizable scientific principles and failed to consider the important local knowledge of the 
farmers (Wynne, 1992; Yearley, 2000). This case provides an example of different types of 
knowledge contributing meaningfully to a risk management process, including the traditionally 
recognized expertise of the scientists, as well as the local expertise of the farmers. It also 
demonstrates the importance of trust for risk perception. In the case of the farmers, the 
“insensitivity of official scientific agencies to the complexity of any and all local circumstances 
and to the (usually) corresponding richness of local knowledge” negatively affected the 
relationship of the farmers to the officials, resulting in a lack of trust (Yearley, 2000, p. 106). 
Yearly’s research is also an example of actors with different types of expertise. The scientists 
and farmers each relied on different types of knowledge, based on their own expertise. The gap 
in knowledge resulted in their inability to trust one another. 
Wynne argued that “public experiences of risks, risk communications, or any other 
scientific information is never, and can never be, a purely intellectual process, about reception of 
knowledge per se” (Wynne, 1992, p. 281). Rather, “the trustworthiness and credibility of the 
social institutions concerned are basic to people’s definitions of risks” (Wynne, 1992, p. 300). 
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Information about risks cannot be separated from its context. In the case of the Cumbrian 
farmers, risk information was communicated by officials who demonstrated a lack of knowledge 
about, and respect for, particularities about the location and groups involved. The farmers 
disagreed about the assessment of risk and resulting policies because they did not trust the 
individuals and institutions involved, and the external officials had failed to establish trust with 
the farmers in part by failing to respect their knowledge and expertise. The two groups – 
scientists and farmers – had very different perceptions of risk, both of which were informed by 
the norms around knowledge production within their communities.  
Similarly, Aaron Wildavsky and Karl Dake (1990) found that “the great struggles over 
the perceived dangers of technology in our time are essentially about trust and distrust of societal 
institutions, that is, about cultural conflict” and that "risk perceptions and preferences are 
predictable given individual differences in cultural biases" (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990, pp. 56, 
57). Dorothy Nelkin argues that not only does trust affect perceptions of risk, but that trust (or 
mistrust) can be a guiding factor in how risk is defined: “[d]efining risk can become a way of 
explaining the failure of existing political or social relationships, of voicing mistrust, of 
delegating blame” (Nelkin, 1989, p. 98). Findings from Brian Wynne (1992), Wildavsky & Dake 
(1990), and Nelkin (1989) indicate that relationships exist between individuals and institutions, 
and among people with different types of expertise, and that trust is an important factor in these 
relationships. Lack of trust both influences and can be influenced by risk perception, and can 
impact efforts to assess and manage risk. 
TDR certification, and TRAC in particular, is all about demonstrating that repositories 
can be trusted. The goal of the TRAC checklist is for repository staff to demonstrate their ability 
to manage risk in a number of areas. As with expertise, the management of digital repositories 
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depends upon different stakeholders within the organization having trust in others. The push for 
transparency in the TRAC audit and certification process is meant to foster trust among 
repository staff and with external stakeholders such as auditors. Perceptions of risk may be 
influenced by the levels of trust across individuals and groups within each repository. In the audit 
and certification process for TDRs, trust between the repository and the auditors may also 
influence perceptions of risk. This suggests that perceptions of risk for digital repositories may 
be influenced in part by relationships among people and groups both within and across 
organizations. 
2.1.2.7 Uncertainty 
Seventh, uncertainty has been identified as a factor that influences risk perception, “in 
many circumstances, it is not self-evident to define what the hazards, their probabilities, and the 
consequences precisely are” (van Est et al., 2012, p. 1076). Scholars have characterized risk 
calculations that take place under conditions of both speculation and ignorance as representing 
uncertainty about either the probability or magnitude of consequences of an event (Starr, 2003; 
van Est et al., 2012). More recently, scholars have argued that the dichotomy between probability 
and magnitude is flawed and that it is more productive to talk about risks themselves as uncertain 
rather than uncertainty in particular elements of risk: “current risk assessment is mostly future-
oriented. The basis for risk assessment, therefore, has shifted from probability, based on 
experience in the past, to possibility, based on expectations about the future” (van Est et al., 
2012, p. 1077). In this view, probability and magnitude cannot really be separated when 
considering uncertainty for risk. Rather, these elements combine to make risks themselves 
uncertain. 
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The research presented here indicates that perceptions of risk can be influenced by the 
existence and recognition of uncertainty. This factor may affect different types of people in 
different ways, as levels of expertise or knowledge about particular events, systems, or risks can 
influence the degree of uncertainty that a given person perceives. Digital repositories in 
particular face uncertainty with regard to organizational stability and funding.  
Uncertainty may influence the TRAC audit and certification process because the 
repository staff members who take part in the process are likely to have varying levels of 
expertise and knowledge about the repository. Additionally, auditors are likely to have varying 
levels of knowledge about the repository and may experience uncertainty based on their own 
knowledge and expertise about activities relating to digital preservation. 
2.1.2.8 Vulnerability 
Eighth, risk perception may also be influenced by factors that heighten vulnerability or 
risk exposure, such as gender or socioeconomic status. Research in this area argues that lived 
experience, including exposure or vulnerability to risk, can influence risk perception (Konheim, 
1988; Olofsson et al., 2014). In an article seeking to expand risk perception research in the area 
of gender differences, Hitchcock makes the point that people who benefit less from high-risk 
technology, and who lack control over their own exposure to those technologies, live in a more 
dangerous or risky world than people who benefit from these technologies or who are able to 
limit their own exposure to them (J. L. Hitchcock, 2001). Another study which focused on 
gender, race, and risk perception with regard to environmental risks concluded that, “perhaps 
women and nonwhite men see the world as more dangerous because they benefit less from many 
of its technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and control” (Flynn, 
Slovic, & Mertz, 1994, p. 1107).  
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These researchers argue that groups of people who lack privilege may face greater 
exposure to risks, and that this exposure may be thought of as independent of will or choice. 
When viewed alongside Chauncey Starr’s (1969) findings that “the public is willing to accept 
‘voluntary’ risks roughly 1,000 times greater than ‘involuntary’ risks,” this suggests that risk 
perception will fluctuate as privilege and the ability to control one’s risk exposure varies (Starr, 
1969, p. 1237). Individuals who lack the ability to control their environment, and who do not 
benefit from the sources of risk, may perceive greater risk in any given situation than individuals 
who occupy positions of relatively greater privilege. In other words, choice matters and the 
ability to choose one’s risk exposure influences how much risk a person is willing to accept in 
any given situation. 
Michelle Murphy’s “Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty” (2006) 
provides an in-depth examination of how office workers – mainly women – were exposed to 
risks. This work is not framed as an examination of risk perception, but rather as an examination 
of the production of uncertainty. Nevertheless, Murphy argues that “[s]ociety is set up to protect 
the privileged from toxic events” and goes on to explain that government agencies, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency, generated “suspensions of perception” with regard to risks 
from harmful chemical exposure (Murphy, 2006, pp. 111, 124). In this case study we see an 
example of a vulnerable group being exposed to harm/risk, and of a powerful group refusing to 
recognize that exposure. The level of vulnerability influenced the risk perception of each group, 
with more vulnerable individuals perceiving greater harm or risk associated with the risk object 
than those in positions of greater power.  
Understanding how vulnerability can influence risk perception is important for TDRs 
because different repositories and stakeholders have varying levels of vulnerability to external 
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factors (based on location, financial resources, etc.), which influence the risk perception of 
stakeholders in the TDR system. For example, decisions about the geographic location of 
primary and backup storage sites are made for many different reasons, some practical and some 
political. Repository staff may have different perceptions of risk depending on their own 
involvement in the selection of sites. Similarly, repositories that lack economic security (e.g., 
heavy reliance on ‘soft money’) may also have different perceptions of risk than repositories 
with more financial stability. For the TRAC audit and certification process, perceptions of risk 
may vary among repository staff depending on their awareness of these vulnerabilities. 
Perceptions of risk may also vary between repository staff and auditors, as awareness of 
vulnerability (auditors) and exposure to risk (repository staff) do not influence perceptions of 
risk to the same degree (Starr, 1969). 
The elements described above represent eight social factors that have the potential to 
influence perceptions of risk within the TRAC audit and certification process: communication, 
complexity, expertise, organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. 
Uncertainty and complexity may influence perceptions of risk held by repository staff and 
auditors because of the complex nature of digital repositories and the challenges associated with 
understanding the probability or magnitude of future events. Repository staff and auditors may 
have expertise in a variety of areas and these varying levels of expertise may heighten awareness 
of some risks and diminish awareness of others. The TRAC process requires input from people 
across many different functions and roles in a repository, and perceptions of risk may be 
influenced by levels of trust across those different people. Trust between repository staff and 
auditors may also influence perceptions of risk. Perceptions of risk may vary across repository 
staff and auditors depending on their awareness of, and exposure to, vulnerabilities. And finally, 
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communications among repository staff and auditors may amplify or attenuate perceptions of 
risk depending on how the message is communicated. 
2.1.3 Risk Assessment & Management 
Risk assessment and risk management processes both influence and are influenced by 
risk perception (Hutter & Power, 2005b; Pearce, Russell, & Griffiths, 1981; van Est et al., 2012). 
The goal of understanding risk is to find ways to manage or mitigate risk for individuals and 
groups. In order to do that, we must first assess risk. Risk assessment “is about assessing 
(technical) risks” and providing “input into the risk management process, that is, the political 
decision-making process about how to deal with risk” (van Est et al., 2012, p. 1070). Risk 
assessment under the classical interpretation of risk was a (relatively) simple matter of 
calculating the probability and magnitude of an adverse event. As understandings of risk 
expanded to include greater amounts of uncertainty, social factors, and varying perceptions, the 
process of risk analysis became increasingly complicated. 
Risk assessment and management processes may include people with different types of 
expertise. Research by van Est et al. (2012) regarding the unique perspective that each type of 
stakeholder has about risk are reflected in studies addressing the need for broad participation in 
risk analysis and management processes (Pearce et al., 1981; Renn, 1999). Thus, a risk 
assessment conducted solely by technical experts will be narrowly-focused and will possibly lack 
broad contextual information that is necessary for implementation of a full risk management plan 
(Wynne, 1992). For TDRs this means that at the repository level, the development of risk 
management plans should include input from individuals throughout the organization. For 
example a risk management plan created by the technologists might focus too specifically on the 
technology and not on the financial or organizational issues impacting technology.  
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Most formal risk assessment and management takes place within organizations; “[i]f 
selection of risk is a matter of social organization, the management of risk is an organizational 
problem” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 198). The ways that the organization and/or its 
members might share or have differing perceptions of risk can influence the outcome of the risk 
assessment or management activities (Hutter, 2005; Hutter & Power, 2005b; Renn, 2008; D. 
Vaughan, 1996, 2005). Similarly, outcomes can be affected by whether the individuals 
conducting the assessment are a part of the organization or if they are outsiders, as this will also 
influence their likelihood of sharing the risk perception of the organization being assessed (D. 
Vaughan, 1996). 
Organizations that are highly complex, or that operate with high stakes, may have rigid 
risk assessment processes (Leveson et al., 2009; Perrow, 1999; D. Vaughan, 1996, 2005). One 
example of an organization that is highly complex and faces high stakes is NASA. Vaughan’s 
examination of the way that risk was managed around the Challenger disaster illustrates how risk 
assessment and management take place in a highly complex organization, and shows that 
problems can arise when stakeholder groups do not have a shared understanding of the activities 
that are being assessed (D. Vaughan, 1996). 
Multiple organizations may be involved in a particular repository. For example, 
Chronopolis consists of a partnership between three organizations: UC San Diego Library 
(UCSDL), National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), and University of Maryland 
Institute for Advanced Computer Studies (UMIACS) (“About Chronopolis,” 2016). In the case 
of the Challenger disaster, cultural differences between NASA and Morton Thiokol, Inc. on one 
hand, and the auditors who assessed the incident after the fact, resulted in interpretations that 
differed greatly (Feynman, 1988; D. Vaughan, 1996). For repositories with organizational 
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partnerships such as Chronopolis, cultural differences among repository staff may contribute to 
the complexity of the risk assessment process, both among members of the organization and for 
external auditors. 
2.2 Digital Preservation and Risk 
In this section I explore the topic of risk in the digital preservation literature. I begin by 
establishing a definition of digital preservation in order to establish the boundaries of the 
scholarship that will be reviewed in section 2.2.1. Section 2.2.2 critically reviews the ways that 
research in digital preservation has addressed risk and risk perception. What we will see in this 
literature is that risk is a foundational element of digital preservation (Conway, 1996). Despite 
this strong relationship between risk and digital preservation, research in this area has tended to 
treat risk as synonymous with vulnerability or threat, and focuses on identifying or classifying 
those risks, vulnerabilities, and/or threats for the purposes of risk assessment and management. 
Digital preservation policies tend to focus on this approach to risk, attending to those that have 
the potential to cause harm.  
2.2.1 Definition: Digital Preservation 
In order to understand TDRs, it is necessary to also examine digital preservation, as the 
goal of the TDR is to preserve digital information. “Digital preservation is the conservation of all 
digital materials, whether they were born digital . . . or whether they have been digitized from 
analog materials” (Routhier Perry, 2014). Digital preservation consists of those actions that 
ensure the viability and authenticity of digital objects over time, “[d]igital preservation can 
encompass a range of activities, from simple replication and storage to more complex 
transformation, depending on the assessed value and risk to the target content” (S. Hitchcock et 
al., 2007, p. 1). Francine Berman states that preservation actions are those “undertaken to ensure 
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the long-term viability and availability of the authoritative nature of digital material. Preservation 
actions should ensure the material remains authentic, reliable, and usable while its integrity is 
maintained; such actions include validation, assigning preservation metadata, assigning 
representation information, and ensuring acceptable data structures and file formats” (Berman, 
2008, p. 55). These definitions all depict digital preservation as an ongoing activity, or set of 
activities, that ensures the viability of digital objects over time, and the definition of digital 
preservation that I will employ here includes such concepts as digital curation and digital 
stewardship (Lazorchak, 2011). 
 Risk is also an element of digital preservation. Conway (1996) characterized digital 
preservation as an ongoing process of risk management. Some definitions characterize digital 
preservation as a type of risk assessment (Conway, 1996; Vermaaten et al., 2012) or risk 
management (Barateiro et al., 2010), and others describe digital preservation as consisting of 
actions or practices that include risk assessment and/or risk management (Barateiro et al., 2010; 
Ross & McHugh, 2006a, 2006b; Strodl, Becker, Neumayer, & Rauber, 2007). Across these 
characterizations, there is broad acceptance of the notion that the preservation of digital objects 
and risk assessment or risk management practices are related.  
Since digital preservation is the primary goal of TDRs (Garrett & Waters, 1996), and the 
concept of digital preservation must be considered within a context of risk, it follows that 
research about TDRs should consider the concept of risk.  
2.2.2 Risk in the Digital Preservation Literature 
Despite the prominence of the word risk in literature about digital preservation and 
TDRs, I was able to locate only one article that gave a definition of the term. Barateiro et al. 
(2010), uses a classical definition of risk: “where risk is defined as the combination of the 
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probability of an event and its consequences” (Barateiro et al., 2010, p. 6). The authors explain 
that the goal of risk management is to provide a model for risk assessment and to find ways 
address risk for specific activities and objects (see Figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 2: Risk Management Process (Barateiro, et al., 2010) 
Barateiro et al.’s model (2010) includes activities shown to influence risk perception, 
such as communication, but makes no mention of how varying perceptions of risk might impact 
this process. This is all the more interesting because they propose a risk management based 
approach to the design and assessment of digital preservation environments. A risk management 
solution which assumes that everyone will perceive the same risks and will respond to them in 
the same way fails to take into account the fact that there are many factors which can influence 
perceptions of risk which, in turn, can influence the ways in which they respond to the risks that 
they perceive. Additionally, a risk management approach that doesn’t take into account the 
external factors that influence digital preservation processes presents an unrealistic view of the 
ways in which digital repositories carry out their work. 
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This is not surprising, as none of the digital preservation literature reviewed for this 
dissertation presented any acknowledgment that social factors might influence perceptions of 
risk, or any references to the large body of risk and risk perception research from other 
disciplines such as psychology or science and technology studies. More importantly these social 
factors have not been considered in the context of TDR audits. 
Other discussions of risk management and digital preservation include the creation and 
testing of models to determine what evidence would be sufficient in order to demonstrate that a 
repository can effectively manage risk (Ross & McHugh, 2006a, 2006b). This course of research 
is directly related to TDRs as the goal is to understand what evidence repositories should present 
during an audit for certification as a TDR. Barateiro et al. (2010) have criticized this approach 
arguing that risk assessment and management should be built into the digital preservation 
systems themselves rather than applied after the fact as assessment criteria. 
Despite this criticism, digital preservation literature continues to treat risk as synonymous 
with vulnerability or threat, and focuses on identifying or classifying those risks, vulnerabilities, 
and/or threats for the purposes of risk assessment and management. The terms vulnerability 
and/or threat are used here in a way that is more consistent with a computing/systems approach 
than with the risk perception research discussed above. Vermaaten et al. have identified three 
approaches to digital preservation and threats: typologies of threats associated with a single 
aspect of digital preservation (e.g., ingest), case studies of the application of threat typologies, 
and general digital preservation threat typologies (Vermaaten et al., 2012, p. 3). Aside from 
Vermaaten et al. (2012), articles about threats associated with particular aspects of digital 
preservation are numerous (De Vorsey & McKinney, 2010; Lawrence et al., 2000; Wright, 
Miller, & Addis, 2009).  
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Literature that addresses risk by developing typologies (Barateiro et al., 2010; Clifton, 
2005; Dappert, 2009) has significant limitations for digital preservation and risk management. 
While the framework of treating risk as a statistical expectation is not inconsistent with 
managing and responding to risks, it does not necessarily address the fact that those responses 
will also depend on how those risks are perceived. Typologies of risk assume that different 
people will perceive risks in the same way and fail to take into account factors that can influence 
perceptions of risk. McHugh (2012) argued that, “[c]riteria lists are by their nature somewhat 
ineffective in illustrating the interconnectedness of infrastructural facets that can increase or limit 
risk exposure in various ways” (McHugh, 2012, p. 3). Digital repositories are complex systems; 
a listing of criteria or threats, even if it is supported by research, is not sufficient to capture the 
various factors that can influence risk exposure. This perspective, that complexity in systems can 
affect risk exposure, is supported by research in the area of risk management (Leveson et al., 
2009; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997).  
Given our understanding of the ways that complexity can influence risk and risk 
perception, and the interconnectedness of the technical and infrastructural elements of systems 
such as TDRs, it follows that research about risk and digital preservation that emphasizes listing 
threats and/or criteria does not capture the full picture. In addition to this type of approach, 
research that investigates risk and TDRs in the area of digital preservation while seeking to 
understand risk as a complex system that includes technical and social elements is needed. 
2.3 Trusted Digital Repositories  
In this section I explore the topic of trustworthy digital repositories (TDRs). I begin with 
a critical examination of literature regarding digital repositories and trust (2.3.1), which is 
followed by a review of three different standards for TDRs in section 2.3.2. This is important 
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when examining risk perception because the audit and certification processes described below 
are carried out by groups of people whose actions are influenced by their perceptions of risk. 
2.3.1 Understanding Digital Repositories and Trust 
In 1996 the Report of the Task Force on Archiving of Digital Information described 
digital archives “strictly in functional terms as repositories of digital information that are 
collectively responsible for ensuring, through the exercise of various migration strategies, the 
integrity and long-term accessibility of the nation’s social, economic, cultural and intellectual 
heritage instantiated in digital form” (Garrett & Waters, 1996, p. 8). This report found, among 
other things, that “long-term preservation of digital information on a scale adequate for the 
demands of future research and scholarship will require a deep infrastructure capable of 
supporting a distributed system of digital archives” and that this infrastructure will require a 
sufficient number of “trusted organizations” with the capabilities needed to carry out activities 
related to preservation and access for digital information (Garrett & Waters, 1996, p. 40). Garrett 
and Waters (1996) also called for a certification process in order to create a climate of trust with 
regard to the long-term preservation of digital information. 
The Garrett and Waters report highlighted several ideas that have been expanded upon 
since 1996. Namely, long-term preservation of digital information is now understood to require 
ongoing work, preservation will rely on infrastructures that did not exist at the time, and the 
concept of trust will take a prominent place in questions of digital preservation and digital 
repositories.  
Trust in organizations has been studied in many different disciplines, such as 
organizational studies and management (e.g., Bryce, 2007; Pirson & Malhotra, 2011; Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Tyler & Kramer, 1995), sociology (e.g., Fenton, Passey, & 
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Hems, 1999), psychology (e.g., Kramer, 1999), and business (e.g., Nolan, 2007). In the area of 
digital preservation, Day (2008) draws upon these different areas of research, arguing that “trust 
is at least partly about participants accepting a level of vulnerability in exchange for certain 
perceived benefits” and also that “trust is developmental, as it usually builds up as organizations 
work together over time” (Day, 2008, p. 21). In an article discussing the development of TDRs, 
Dale and Gore (2010) argue that, “long-term digital preservation [can] not occur in a vacuum but 
instead exist[s] within a larger organizational ecosystem” (Dale & Gore, 2010, p. 17). These 
definitions of trust for digital repositories include factors identified as relating to risk perception, 
such as organizations and vulnerability although the authors fail to make this connection. This 
suggests that trust and trustworthiness can vary depending on the risk perception of the person or 
group. 
In the domain of digital preservation, discussions about trust have focused on online 
environments (e.g., Berman, Kozbial, McDonald, & Schottlaender, 2008; Colati & Colati, 2009; 
Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2003; De Santis, Scannapieco, & Catarci, 2003; Dryden, 
2011; Kelton, Fleischmann, & Wallace, 2008; MacNeil, 2000; Mutula, 2011; Yoon, 2014) , and 
also on the development of criteria for the evaluation of digital repositories (e.g., Becker & 
Rauber, 2011; Day, 2008; RLG-NARA Digital Repository Certification Task Force, 2007). This 
scholarship relies upon the idea that “[t]rust is instrumental for the preservation of digital media” 
(Hart & Liu, 2003, p. 95). Given that trust is necessary for the preservation of digital 
information, and that this preservation takes place in digital repositories, we must consider how 
trust is conceptualized for digital repositories. Ronald Jantz and Michael Giarlo (2007) note that 
digital repositories are unique amongst the various types of digital organizations (such as for-
profit businesses conducting e-commerce), and as such “for the digital repository, trust involves 
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scholarship, authenticity, reliability, and persistence over time and has little relationship to 
immediate financial rewards” (Jantz & Giarlo, 2007, p. 197). 
This line of inquiry – scholarship about digital preservation and trust – leads to the 
concept of the trustworthy digital repository. While there are several different standards for 
TDRs, common elements of these standards include a commitment to providing reliable long-
term access to digital information, and the desirability that repositories demonstrate that they are 
able to do so (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012; Dale & Gore, 2010; Data 
Seal of Approval, 2014a; Keitel, 2012; McHugh et al., 2008). Trustworthy digital repositories are 
“trusted, reliable, sustainable digital repositories capable of handling the range of materials held 
by large and small research institutions” (Dale & Gore, 2010, p. 16). The Garrett and Waters 
report (1996) was the first to establish a framework of attributes and responsibilities for 
trustworthy digital repositories, and several standards for TDRs draw upon this framework 
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012; Dale & Gore, 2010; McHugh et al., 
2008; nestor Certification Working Group, 2013). 
2.3.2 Audit Processes for Trustworthy Digital Repositories 
In response to the need for digital repositories to demonstrate trustworthiness with regard 
to their ability to preserve and provide access to digital information over time, major 
organizations in the United States and Europe have developed processes to assess and certify 
digital repositories as trustworthy. Four prominent certification processes are TRAC, nestor, 
Data Seal of Approval (DSA), and CoreTrustSeal (CTS). TRAC and nestor are both based on the 
ISO 16363 standard, and are administered by external auditors, while DSA and CTS audits are 
conducted by members of the DSA and/or CTS community.  
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In the context of these processes for certification, trustworthy indicates that the repository 
has demonstrated that is has a strong technological base for a robust digital curation lifecycle, a 
viable organizational framework including a succession plan should the organization cease to 
exist, and a firm economic plan that supports all curation activities (RLG-OCLC Working Group 
on Digital Archive Attributes, 2002). Yet, we do not know if these audit and certification 
processes have plausible routes to being effective in the long run, nor how successfully this 
normative practice has been communicated by the creators of the standards to the auditors and to 
repository leaders. 
Each of the processes described below approaches risk probabilistically as something that 
can be identified and managed, and assumes that trustworthiness can be determined through a 
process of risk assessment. This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
2.3.2.1 ISO 16363: Trustworthy Repositories Audit and Certification (TRAC) & ISO 
16919: Requirements For Bodies Providing Audit And Certification Of Candidate 
Trustworthy Digital Repositories (PTAB) 
TRAC is a certification process whose origins can be traced to a 2002 report from the 
Research Libraries Group (RLG) and Online Computer Library Center, Inc. (OCLC) and is 
partially a reaction to the Garrett and Waters report’s emphasis on trust in the repository as an 
important element of digital preservation (RLG-OCLC Working Group on Digital Archive 
Attributes, 2002). This report expresses a need for a formal certification process to assess digital 
repositories, and in response to this call the Trustworthy Repositories Audit and Certification: 
Criteria Checklist was developed (RLG-NARA Digital Repository Certification Task Force, 
2007). TRAC was approved as an ISO standard in 2012 (ISO 16363) (Consultative Committee 
for Space Data Systems, 2012). “TRAC describes approximately 90 characteristics that must be 
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demonstrable by repositories that aspire to a certifiable, trustworthy status” (McHugh et al., 
2008, p. 132). 
The TRAC standard was developed jointly by the digital preservation community and the 
space data research community, specifically by representatives from the Research Libraries 
Group (RLG), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Center for 
Research Libraries (CRL), and the Consultative Committee for Space Data Standards (CCSDS) 
(Yakel, 2007). The groups that currently maintain the standard and administer the audits to 
determine certification are distinct and separate.  
The TRAC standard explains that a TDR “will understand threats to and risks within its 
systems” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 19). TRAC also discusses 
financial risks, infrastructure risks, and security risks, and calls for repositories to identify 
preservation risks and provide strategies for dealing with them (Consultative Committee for 
Space Data Systems, 2012). The standard treats risks as concrete and identifiable and 
addressable, suggesting an alignment with the classical definition of risk as a quantifiable value 
based on the probability and consequences of a negative event, as described in section 2.1 above. 
The standard provides lists of suggested forms of evidence to document different items listed in 
the checklist, but speaks primarily to specific types of policy documents rather than defining 
high-level concepts such as risk and does not provide any indication that perceptions of risk may 
vary between and/or among the standards developers, auditors, and repository leaders. 
In addition to the standard and the organizations that contributed to its development, the 
Primary Trustworthy Digital Repository Authorisation Body (PTAB) is another part of the 
sociotechnical system that comprises TRAC. The organization that aims to play “a major role in 
training auditors and repository managers” in the implementation of ISO 14721 (the OAIS 
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model), ISO 16363 (TRAC), and ISO 16919 (a standard that specifies the competencies and 
requirements on auditing bodies) (ISO-PTAB, 2011). PTAB appears to have arisen in response 
to the need for auditors who administer the TRAC standard to be trained in a consistent way. It 
also represents a concerted effort to broaden the base of auditors for the TRAC standard beyond 
the United States and CRL, as the training sessions for PTAB have been focused on international 
audiences, with previous training sessions having taken place in Greenwich, UK, and Pasadena, 
CA, and future courses scheduled for Den Haag, CERN, Washington D.C., Italy, India, and 
China (“PTAB Courses,” 2015). 
Currently (as of July 2018) four comprehensive repositories have been certified as 
trustworthy digital repositories by CRL: Portico, HathiTrust, Chronopolis, and Canadiana.org 
(Center for Research Libraries, 2010, 2011, 2012; Free, 2011; Kirchhoff et al., 2010). Two other 
repositories, Scholars Portal and CLOCKSS, have been certified as trustworthy repositories by 
CRL for solely their e-journal content, meaning that only a portion of each repository is certified 
(Center for Research Libraries, 2013, 2014). One repository has been certified as trustworthy by 
PTAB: The National Cultural AudioVisual Archives (NCAA), hosted by the Indira Gandhi 
National Centre for the Arts Audio/Visual Repository (Giaretta, 2018; Primary Trustworthy 
Digital Repository Authorisation Body Ltd., 2018). Additionally, the U.S. Government Printing 
Office (GPO) has declared an intent to become TRAC certified by CRL, and has announced that 
they have begun work to prepare for the audit and certification process (Federal Depository 
Library Program, 2014). 
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2.3.2.2 DIN 31644: nestor Seal for Trustworthy Digital Archives  
The nestor Seal for Trustworthy Digital Archives (nestor) is an assessment for digital 
repositories that is based on the DIN 31644 standard1 (Keitel, 2012; nestor Certification Working 
Group, 2013). The nestor process can be used by repositories for self-assessment and can also be 
used to obtain certification (Keitel, 2012). Like TRAC, the nestor assessment process is based on 
the OAIS model (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012a, 2012; Keitel, 2012) 
and can be applied to a variety of different types of repositories. The nestor working group was 
founded in 2002, and extended certification began in 2013 after a pilot certification of the 
German National Library (Keitel, 2014). As of July 2018, four repositories have received nestor 
certification: TIB Technische Informationsbibliothek Hanover, ZBW Leibniz-
Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Data Archiving and Networked Services 
(DANS), and Deutsche Nationalbibliothek (nestor-Siegel, 2018). 
The nestor checklist refers to risk only in the criteria relating to security and integrity, 
with explanatory notes instructing repository leaders to provide risk management plans as 
evidence during an audit (nestor Working Group Trusted Repositories - Certification, 2009). As 
with TRAC, nestor appears to treat the concept of risk as identifiable. nestor is described as 
falling in the middle of a spectrum of certification options, as it “is more elaborate and its results 
offer greater accuracy than that of a simple self-assessment, yet it is less elaborate and is less 
accurate than an intensive audit conducted by external experts as part of a formal certification 
procedure” (nestor Certification Working Group, 2013, p. 3). 
                                                
1 The full text of DIN 31644 is available in German only at this time. 
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2.3.2.3 Data Seal of Approval  
The Data Seal of Approval (DSA) assessment consists of sixteen guidelines, which 
“recognize that responsibility for archival quality data is shared amongst three groups: producers 
for the quality of the research data themselves, the repository for the quality of data storage and 
availability, and consumers for the quality of data use” (Ball, 2010, p. 31). The DSA 
documentation describes itself as a “trust-based accreditation” but does not position itself as a 
risk assessment or management process (Data Seal of Approval Board, 2013b, p. 4).  
DSA is administered by Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS), and was 
established by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research in 2005. DSA has evolved to become an international 
certification process that is administered and managed by an international board. The first edition 
of the DSA guidelines was presented and officially handed over to an international board in 2009 
(Data Seal of Approval, 2014a). The DSA guidelines are a basic set of criteria that were designed 
to facilitate awareness and serve as a first step toward a “heavier” assessment and certification 
(Harmsen, 2008, p. 2).  
There are currently (as of July 2018) 86 repositories that are DSA certified. The Data 
Seal of Approval is a seal which can be displayed on a repository’s website indefinitely once 
acquired (Data Seal of Approval, 2016). DANS describes the DSA certification as a step on the 
way to other, more onerous certifications; the audit process involves the repository conducting a 
self-audit which is then reviewed by a Data Seal auditor, a process that is relatively lightweight 
and low-cost in comparison to the TRAC certification process (Data Seal of Approval, 2014b). 
The DSA certification system is quite large, with several stakeholder groups in addition 
to the standards developers and repositories described above. The DSA is governed by the DSA 
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General Assembly (Data Seal of Approval, 2015), which is the group that elects the DSA Board. 
The Board is drawn from the General Assembly, and is responsible for overseeing DSA business 
and communicating with the General Assembly and DSA Community (i.e., organizations with 
DSA-certified repositories). The DSA system also contains a group of peer reviewers who are 
responsible for assessing DSA applications. For DSA, peer reviewers are required to have gone 
through at least one successful DSA self audit. In this case, the stakeholder groups of auditors 
and repository managers have substantial overlap, as being a repository manager is a prerequisite 
to qualifying as an auditor. 
The concept of risk is foundational to DSA certification. While the DSA documentation 
focuses on the concepts of quality and sustainability throughout, implicit in this discussion is the 
notion that in order to support the sustainability of digital information and to ensure the quality 
of that digital information, a repository must be able to identify and mitigate risk (Data Seal of 
Approval Board, 2013a). The audit process in which members of the DSA community serve as 
auditors once their own repository has achieved certification assumes that all members of the 
community will both understand and respond to risk in the same way.  
In July 2017 DSA suspended new applications and shifted applicants to the newly formed 
CoreTrustSeal certification process. As DSA-certified repositories come up for certification 
renewal, they will be directed to CoreTrustSeal, which is described further in section 2.3.2.4 
immediately below. 
2.3.2.4 CoreTrustSeal 
A new repository certification organization launched in 2017: CoreTrustSeal 
(CoreTrustSeal, 2017). This new organization has replaced both DSA and the ICSU World Data 
System (WDS) organizations by merging the requirements of each into one new certification, the 
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CoreTrustSeal Data Repository certification (Dillo & De Leeuw, 2018). Focused on data 
repositories, this certification is managed under the umbrella of the Research Data Alliance 
(RDA), and CTS certification will supersede both DSA and WDS certifications from 2018 
onward (CoreTrustSeal, 2017). As of July 2018 there are 28 CTS certified repositories, and 109 
repositories with legacy DSA, WDS, or DSA and WDS certifications that are expected to renew 
certification with CTS within the next few years (“Core Certified Repositories,” 2017; Dillo & 
De Leeuw, 2018). 
Certification criteria for CTS fall into three categories: (1) organizational infrastructure, 
(2) digital object management, and (3) technology (CoreTrustSeal, 2016). These criteria are in 
accordance with other repository certifications such as nestor, DRAMBORA, and TRAC (Dillo 
& De Leeuw, 2018, p. 165). As with DSA, CTS audits are conducted by a review board 
consisting of individuals from CTS certified repositories as well as CTS board members 
(CoreTrustSeal, 2018).  
2.3.2.5 The European Framework 
TRAC, DSA (now CoreTrustSeal), and nestor represent a spectrum of certification 
options for digital repositories in which the scale of certification options is intentional. Together, 
these three standards now form the European Framework for Audit and Certification of Digital 
Repositories (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, Data Seal of Approval Board, & 
DIN Working Group “Trusted Archives - Certification,” n.d.; Giaretta et al., 2011). The 
framework came together after each of the certification processes had already been established, 
and was formed through a memorandum of understanding signed by representatives from each 
organization (Giaretta, Harmsen, & Keitel, 2010). 
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This framework places repository assessments on a scale from least rigorous (DSA/CTS) 
to most (TRAC), with level of rigor being determined by such factors as amount of evidence 
required to support claims, and the intensity of the audit conducted (Giaretta et al., 2011; nestor 
Working Group Trusted Repositories - Certification, 2009). This framework allows the three 
certifications, which are largely based on the same foundational concepts and documents (e.g., 
OAIS), to exist alongside one another without having to compete directly. Each certification has 
a niche, and meets a slightly different need. These different levels of rigor also provide 
repositories both a lower cost path to certification for repositories, as well as a stepwise process 
to move from DSA/CTS certification to full TRAC certification.  
Literature addressing TDR audit and certification processes is lacking in empirical 
research. Most of the scholarship in this area consists of case studies by practitioners and 
descriptive overviews of the standards. The research methods I describe in Chapter Chapter 3: 
are intended to address the need for empirical research in this area. 
2.4  Conclusion 
Risk has been understood by digital preservationists primarily through a classic lens, 
focusing on the concept as a calculable, discoverable value, in the area of digital preservation. 
Research regarding risk perception has shown that risk is a socially constructed concept that can 
be influenced by social and organizational factors. Since standards for TDR audit and 
certification processes are based on the concept of risk, it follows that the outcomes of these 
audits may vary depending on the perceptions of risk held by different stakeholders.  
Research examined in each of the areas described in this chapter is mainly qualitative, 
with the exception of risk perception, which consists of both qualitative and quantitative 
research, including laboratory experiments. Case studies and model building are the two most 
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commonly represented research methods, appearing across the digital preservation and risk 
literature. Other research methods used include historical studies, ethnographies, surveys, 
interview-based qualitative research, and laboratory experiments. Research about risk perception 
in a laboratory setting has produced consistent, replicable results that can make strong causal 
claims about factors affecting risk perception, but these findings are not necessarily applicable 
outside of a laboratory setting because much of the real-world context is stripped away in order 
to conduct this type of research (Bernard, 2012; Creswell, 2009). On the other hand, 
ethnographic research and in-depth case studies may produce results that examine risk perception 
in a real-world setting, allowing the researcher to understand how social context can affect risk 
perception, but the findings from these types of studies are not necessarily transferrable to other 
cases (Denzin, 1997; Yin, 2003). 
Research methods across all areas tend toward case studies and model building. In each 
instance, the researchers are focusing narrowly on a particular system, organization, or 
phenomenon and either studying it in-depth, or using it to build a model that can theoretically be 
applied to other situations. While many of the models developed were carefully planned, and 
some were presented with evidence of pilot tests, I have found very little evidence of researchers 
testing models that were developed by others. The literature indicates that researchers are aware 
of the models being developed by others, as many models are presented with extensive reviews 
of the state of the field (Vermaaten et al., 2012), but that the development of models happens 
within silos of collaborators (Barateiro et al., 2011, 2012, 2010; Barateiro & Borbinha, 2012; 
McHugh et al., 2008; Ross & McHugh, 2006b, 2006a). In contrast to the literature reviewed 
regarding risk perception, the models developed in digital preservation have been tested and 
interrogated through other methods of research, including case studies and surveys. However, the 
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models are often based on technical reports or practitioner experience rather than empirical 
research (Dobratz & Schoger, 2007). The models in this discipline (such as OAIS, TRAC, 
nestor, DSA, and CTS) are well developed and have typically been accepted by the community.  
While all of the research areas include scholarship that presents literature reviews or 
overviews of a field, the TDR and digital preservation areas in particular lack empirical research. 
Literature that is also represented prominently, but that does not rise to the level of research, 
includes policy documents, standards documentation, technical reports, literature reviews, 
practitioner reports, and position papers. The case studies in this space are often conducted by 
practitioners who are describing their own experiences (e.g., Kirchhoff, Fenton, Orphan, & 
Morrissey, 2010; Minor et al., 2010; The Data Seal of Approval Board, 2011). While case study 
research from the perspective of a member of the organization being studied is not inherently 
problematic, there are issues that can arise as a result of the researcher being a stakeholder in the 
case. Robert Yin (2003) has noted that researchers conducting case studies must understand the 
issues that they are studying beforehand, and as such are prone to developing preconceived 
positions. As someone who is not only familiar with the issues, but who has a stake in the 
organization, a case study researcher studying her own organization is likely to be susceptible to 
this type of bias. None of the case study research examined above acknowledged or addressed 
possible researcher bias. 
The need for empirical, rigorous research about digital preservation and TDRs 
demonstrates a gap in the research. The research methods described in Chapter Chapter 3: below 
address this deficit by presenting a qualitative study that relies on a theoretical framework based 
on the social construction of risk and theories of risk perception in order to understand how 
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differences in risk perception may influence the outcomes of TDR audit and certification 
processes.  
This study addresses the gaps identified above by examining the TRAC audit and 
certification process in order to understand how stakeholders in the process (i.e., standard 
developers, auditors, and repository staff) understand risk and what factors influence their 
perceptions of risk. This addresses both the need for empirical research about TDR certification 
as well as the need to broaden understandings of risk and risk perception with regard to digital 
preservation activities. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methods 
In this qualitative study, I critically examined how individuals in three target participant 
groups, standard developers, auditors, and repository staff, understand the concept of risk for 
digital repositories in the context of a TRAC audit. 
This study is motivated by the following research questions: 
1. How do standard developers, auditors, and repository managers conceptualize risk in 
the context of a TRAC audit? 
2. What are the differences and similarities by which standard developers, auditors, and 
repository managers understand risk as it has been communicated by the TRAC 
standard? 
a) In what ways do these differences and similarities become manifest in the TRAC 
audit process? 
3. To what degree do the following eight factors which influence risk perception come 
into play in the audit process: communication, complexity, expertise, organizations, 
political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability? 
a) In what ways and why do they emerge when staff and auditors consider risk 
factors articulated in the TRAC standard? 
b) What additional factors, if any, emerge which also influence perceptions of risk in 
relation to the TRAC standard?  
As described in section 2.3.2.1 above, ISO 16363 is based on the idea that a trustworthy 
repository must demonstrate that it is able to anticipate/identify, assess, manage, and mitigate 
risk. If the developers of the standard, the auditors who enforce the standard, and repository staff 
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members do not share the same perceptions of the risks that they are attempting to identify, 
assess, manage, and mitigate, then the outcome of the certification process lacks meaning and 
weight. Certification assumes that standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members 
share common ground with one another; the outcome of the process depends on them all sharing 
conceptual clarity. If they are not conceptualizing core concepts in the same way, then the 
outcomes of the assessments are unreliable. 
In this dissertation, I examine whether standard developers, auditors, and repository staff 
share the same perceptions of risk in the TRAC audit process. Through interviews with standard 
developers, auditors, and repository staff, and document analysis of the ISO 16363 standard, 
repository prepared responses to the TRAC checklist, CRL certification reports, and publications 
written by repository staff, I examine perceptions of risk in order to gauge whether those groups 
share the same understanding of risk and identify factors that may influence their perceptions of 
risk with regard to TRAC audit and certification. 
This focus on understanding how standard developers, auditors, and repository staff 
involved in the TRAC audit and certification process define and understand risk, and what 
factors influence their perceptions of risk, called for a qualitative approach (Newman & Benz, 
1998). As noted in the previous chapter, research about risk perception is primarily qualitative 
because of the nature of the inquiry, which focuses on understanding phenomena within their 
cultural context and building theories based on data rather than testing hypotheses (Newman & 
Benz, 1998). A qualitative approach is most appropriate in this case because of the small 
population size (there were, at the time of data collection, six TRAC certified repositories), and 
because the research questions that I asked focused broadly on the perceptions of risk within the 
TRAC audit and certification process (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative research emphasizes “the 
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collection of data in a natural setting sensitive to the people and places under study, and data 
analysis that is inductive and establishes patterns or themes” (Creswell, 2013, p. 37). 
Additionally, this is an exploratory study, which calls for qualitative methods to elicit all of the 
factors that may influence perceptions of risk (Creswell, 2013), rather than a study seeking to test 
hypotheses about risk perception or quantify the TRAC audit process (Newman & Benz, 1998).  
John Creswell (2013) has identified several characteristics of qualitative research that 
apply to this study. First, qualitative research design embraces the idea of multiple realities, 
exploring the subjective experiences of all participants in the study in order to provide evidence 
from different perspectives. This is key for studying the multidimensional concept of risk 
perception. Second, qualitative research also encourages the researcher to conduct studies in the 
field, getting to know the participants on their own terms and in the contexts within which they 
usually operate. This enables a deeper understanding of the TRAC audit process. Third, 
qualitative research acknowledges the biases and values of the researcher as well as the 
participants, and allows for examination of how those actors may influence or shape the results 
of the research. Fourth, qualitative research allows the researcher to define important concepts as 
they arise through the course of research, rather than relying on rigid predetermined definitions. 
This fourth characteristic was particularly important for this study. I began with eight factors that 
have been shown to influence how individuals construct their understanding of risk, but allowed 
for the possibility that additional factors would emerge during data collection and analysis. Fifth 
and finally, qualitative research emphasizes studying phenomena within their own contexts, 
beginning with particular details (such as specific questions about the TRAC audit process) and 
then gradually moving out to generalizations. 
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3.1 Pilot Study 
In December 2015 and January 2016, I conducted a pilot study with an organization that 
closely resembles the target population for this dissertation. This pilot study consisted of 
interviews, a survey, and document analysis of an organization that participated in a TRAC test 
audit, but was not TRAC certified. This particular organization was selected as it was the best fit 
for my target population without having to use one of the six TRAC certified repositories and 
thus limit the options for the full dissertation. 
I interviewed four individuals from this repository, including one administrator, a digital 
preservation manager, a digital preservation intern, and an IT manager. Each interview lasted 
approximately one hour, and questions focused on the timeline and logistics of the audit process, 
interaction with auditors, and risk perception with regard to specific areas of the TRAC audit 
checklist.  
Each interview was followed by a survey questionnaire that asked participants to rate 
their perception of the levels of risk associated with specific parts of the audit checklist. The 
survey was introduced at the end of the interview, and the survey questionnaire was sent via 
email to each participant immediately following their interview. Three of the four participants 
completed the survey, and one failed to complete the survey after multiple reminders, with a 
partial response recorded.  
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis. The transcripts were 
analyzed using the qualitative data analysis software package NVivo. The code set used to 
analyze this data was developed based on concepts from the literature, themes that emerged 
during the interviews, and themes that arose during analysis.  
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The research methods described below were developed and refined based on the results 
of this pilot study. 
3.2  Analytical Focus 
The analytical focus for this study was guided by the social construction of risk, and 
focused on eight factors that have been shown to influence perceptions of risk: communication, 
complexity, expertise, organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. 
Although these factors formed the basis for this analysis, I was mindful that additional factors 
could emerge through the research process. 
CRL announced it would begin certifying repositories in 20062, and the first repository to 
receive TRAC certification from CRL was Portico in 2010 (Center for Research Libraries, 
2010). I focused on audits that occurred from 2010-2015, (Canadiana.org, Chronopolis, 
CLOCKSS, HathiTrust, Portico, Scholars Portal), and also on individuals who were affiliated 
with PTAB. 
3.3  Data Collection & Analysis 
I employed a qualitative research design, incorporating semi-structured interviews and 
document analysis. Interviews were carried out with standard developers, auditors, and 
repository staff. These individuals were situated within organizations, but variations in 
perceptions of risk have been shown to exist at the individual level, even within the same 
organization (D. Vaughan, 1996). While this research design was influenced by case study 
methods (i.e., multiple methods of data collection, looking at the TRAC standard as one case, or 
                                                
2 https://www.crl.edu/archiving-preservation/digital-archives/certification-assessment 
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at the six TRAC certified repositories as comparative case studies), the analytical focus is at the 
individual rather than the organizational level (Yin, 2003).  
Semi-structured interviewing is considered best in situations where the researcher will 
only be able to conduct one interview with each participant, which was the case for this study 
(Bernard, 2012). This type of interview allows the researcher discretion to follow leads as they 
arise in the course of the interview, while providing a general guide that will ensure that the data 
generated are reliable and comparable (Bernard, 2012, p. 182). While interviews have the 
advantages of allowing the researcher control over the line of questioning, the quality of data 
collected may vary due to the presence of the researcher, the fact that not all respondents will be 
equally articulate and perceptive, and the information gathered will be filtered through the views 
of the interviewees (Creswell, 2009). A semi-structured interview addressed some of these 
limitations by allowing me to probe for additional information when appropriate during the 
interviews (Babbie, 2010, p. 277).  
I complemented the semi-structured interviews with document analysis. Documents 
contain text but should also be considered as situated products created in social settings (Prior, 
2003). Document analysis emphasizes not only the content or text of the documents, but also the 
context in which a document was produced, as well as the ways in which a document functions 
in specific circumstances (Prior, 2003). While many of these documents were created with the 
intention of being made available to others (e.g., audit findings reports prepared for the general 
public), none were prepared for the purposes of this study. As such, some amount of social 
desirability bias may be present, but this bias may communicate something interesting about the 
dynamics between stakeholder groups. 
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3.3.1 Population and Sample 
At the start of data collection for this study (2016) four comprehensive repositories had 
been certified by CRL as trustworthy digital repositories: Portico, HathiTrust, Chronopolis, and 
Canadiana.org (Center for Research Libraries, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015). Two other repositories, 
Scholars Portal and CLOCKSS, had been certified as trustworthy repositories for solely their e-
journal content, meaning that only a portion of each repository is certified (Center for Research 
Libraries, 2013, 2014). Table 1 below shows the certification date for each repository, as well as 
a breakdown of the audit report scores. CLOCKSS and Scholars Portal, the two repositories that 
have been certified as trustworthy for only part of their content have received the highest scores. 
Table 1: Overview of CRL Audit Report Scores 
 Canadiana.org Chronopolis CLOCKSS HathiTrust Portico Scholars 
Portal 
CRL 
Certification 
Date3 
7/1/2015 3/1/2012 7/1/2014 3/1/2011 1/1/2010 2/1/2013 
 
Organizational 
Infrastructure 
4 3 4 2 3 3 
Digital Object 
Management 
3 4 4 3 4 4 
Technologies, 
Technical 
Infrastructure, 
Security 
4 4 5 4 4 4 
Total (max 
possible = 15) 
11 11 13 9 11 13 
 
The population for this study consisted of: (1) standard developers (i.e., PTAB board 
members), (2) auditors from CRL, and (3) staff members from the six TRAC certified 
repositories. Interviewees were recruited through a combination of convenience and snowball 
sampling. I was able to identify all of the PTAB board members, and CRL auditors and 
                                                
3 Determined by publication date of Certification Report: https://www.crl.edu/archiving-preservation/digital-
archives/certification-assessment 
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certification advisory panel members, as well as at least one staff member from each repository 
who was involved in the TRAC audit process. I also asked interviewees to recommend others for 
interviews, and through this process was able to recruit three to five participants from each 
TRAC certified repository who participated in the audit in some manner. 
Table 2: Overview of Interviewees 
 Roles (n)  
 
Administration 
Digital 
Preservation IT Total 
Standard Developers 0 8 3 11 
Auditors 4 6 0 10 
Repository Staff 9 6 6 21 
Total 13 20 9 42 
3.3.1.1 Standard Developers 
I conducted 11 interviews with PTAB Board Members and participants from the training 
workshops that they conducted. The PTAB Board consists of individuals who participated in the 
development of the ISO 16363 standard. In addition to developing the standard, they also 
conducted six text audits with the ISO 16363 checklist across Europe and North America. Some 
members of the PTAB Board have conducted training workshops around the ISO 16363 
standard. Included in this study are both instructors and participants from those training 
workshops. In June 2017 the PTAB organization became accredited to conduct audits for the 
ISO 16363 standard.  
Of the 11 PTAB members and trainees interviewed, eight described their current or most 
recent role as being digital preservation-focused, and three as being IT-focused. Two were 
retired at the time of their interviews, two were professors, six described their current positions 
as very senior, although they mostly described their roles as technical rather than managerial or 
administrative, and one was in a mid-level digital preservation role. Ten of the PTAB 
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interviewees described their involvement in repository certification as an opportunity to leverage 
their experience and expertise to give back to the digital preservation community.  
Education information was available for eight of the 11 interviewees in this group. Four 
had doctoral degrees (in information science, information management, history, and theoretical 
physics), three had master’s degrees (in information science, computer science, and history), and 
one had a bachelor’s degree (humanities). Eight were located in the United States, and three in 
Europe. 
3.3.1.2 Auditors 
I conducted interviews with 10 auditors and audit advisory board members from CRL 
who participated in repository audits. Auditors were those individuals employed by CRL, and 
advisory board members were individuals from CRL member organizations who were invited to 
participate in the audit process by reviewing documentation submitted by repositories and 
making recommendations to the auditors. The term auditors will refer to both auditors and audit 
advisory board members throughout this study. Three of the auditors were CRL staff members or 
interns, and two were consultants, and five held management positions in academic libraries. 
Interviewees in this group tended to frame their participation in the TRAC audit process in terms 
of their leadership experience in academic libraries. Of those interviewed, six described their 
current roles as being digital preservation-focused, and four described their current roles as 
administratively-focused. Education information was available for eight of the 10 interviewees in 
this group. All eight had a master’s degree in library and/or information science. Six were 
located in the United States, and four in Canada. 
 68 
3.3.1.3 Repository Staff Members from TRAC Certified Repositories 
My data collection strategy focused on recruiting three to five participants from each of 
the six repositories completing the audit and certification process. I also analyzed publicly 
available documentation including certification reports created by CRL and made available via 
their website. 
From the pilot study as well as previous research and a review of the literature I was able 
to determine that three primary types of repository staff are involved in the TRAC audit process: 
repository administrators, digital preservation staff, and IT staff (Frank & Yakel, 2013). These 
three distinct groups have different types of expertise within the repositories, and these functions 
correspond to different sections of the TRAC checklist, which includes items relating to 
organizational infrastructure, digital object management, and infrastructure and security risk 
management (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012).  
In the pilot study, I was able to interview four repository staff members: a high-level 
administrator, two digital preservation professionals, and an IT manager. These four people 
represented the functional areas that were most heavily involved in the TRAC audit, as reported 
by the administrator, who was the head of the repository and lead manager of the audit 
preparation process. As the person who oversaw the entire process, including coordinating all of 
the work within the repository and also managing all communication with the auditors, the 
administrator was uniquely situated to understand the involvement of repository staff in the 
process. She was also able to provide documentation and correspondence from the time period of 
the audit to support this distribution of labor. These individuals/roles were each able to discuss 
different parts of the process, and each functional area provided a unique perspective about the 
repository’s risk exposure. In total, they covered all parts of the TRAC self-study and actual 
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audit process. Interviews with the two digital preservation professionals addressed overlapping 
content, but since they were at the repository at different times they each had unique experiences 
to discuss.  
Education information was available for all of the interviewees in this group. One had a 
doctorate degree (in mechanical engineering), 16 had a master’s degree (in library and/or 
information science, and atmospheric and/or oceanic science), three had a bachelor’s degree (in 
computer science, mathematics, and English), and one completed some coursework but did not 
have a college degree. 
3.3.1.3.1 Canadiana.org 
Founded in 1978, Canadiana.org is a nonprofit coalition of 40 Canadian memory 
institutions, and since 2005 Canadiana.org has taken a leadership role in digital preservation 
across Canada. In addition to preserving and providing access to digital resources, Canadiana.org 
is an aggregator of metadata from partner organizations and enables search across their 
collections. Available collections include 65 million pages in total as of March 2016 
(Canadiana.org, 2015). Canadiana.org’s mission statement states that through the many 
partnerships with Canadian memory institutions, the organization is able to “spearhead digital 
preservation in Canada” (Canadiana.org, 2015). The organization has a volunteer Board of 
Directors with 10 members who serve two-year terms and is an independent nonprofit 
organization that is able to engage in fundraising activities independent of its partner 
organizations. Canadiana.org is a membership-financed organization with a tiered member dues 
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system. Financial information, including tax returns, for Canadiana.org is available via the 
Canada Revenue Agency for 2011-2015.4 Canadiana.org became TRAC certified in 2015. 
As an organization that focuses on both preservation and access, Canadiana.org manages 
relationships with people and organizations that contribute data to the repository as well as users 
who wish to access and use the data that the repository provides. The web of relationships that 
the repository manages with the memory institutions that compose the coalition, as well as 
partnerships with other Canadian memory institutions, and users introduces many possible 
sources of complexity and uncertainty. Complexity and uncertainty are factors that can influence 
risk perception, and repository staff, members of the Board of Directors, and people from other 
organizations that are affiliated with Canadiana.org may have different types of expertise, which 
is a factor that can influence perceptions of risk, and may have had some bearing on the TRAC 
audit and certification process. Similarly, trust among all of these different people and groups 
may be complicated in ways that could influence their perceptions of risk. Canadiana.org 
represents the interests of a wide array of memory institutions, and the people who manage both 
Canadiana.org as well as its partner organizations are likely to experience vulnerability in 
different ways, which may influence the ways that they perceive and manage risk for the 
repository. Awareness of, or exposure to, the financial management of the repository is one area 
where people are likely to experience differing perceptions of risk. Communication through the 
organization and with TRAC auditors may influence perceptions of risk, either amplifying or 
attenuating those perceptions, depending on a number of factors including information source, 
mode of communication, and the relationships between repository staff and auditors.  
                                                
4 http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/haip/srch/t3010form23sched6-eng.action?b=118833425RR0001&fpe=2015-03-
31&n=Canadiana.org&r=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cra-arc%E2%80%A6 
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3.3.1.3.2 Chronopolis 
The Chronopolis digital preservation network was originally funded by the Library of 
Congress (“About Chronopolis,” 2016). Chronopolis is now managed by three organizations: 
University of California, San Diego Library (UCSDL), National Center for Atmospheric 
Research (NCAR), and University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies 
(UMIACS). Chronopolis is also a node in the Digital Preservation Network (DPN), managing 
ingest and replication for the entire network. Chronopolis focuses on preservation rather than 
access, and “provides services for the long-term preservation and curation of America's digital 
holdings” (“Chronopolis Homepage,” 2016). Financial information for Chronopolis is not 
publicly available, but the organization does provide pricing information for organizations 
wishing to sign up for the service, which indicates that Chronopolis is trying to recoup costs 
through a fee for service model (“Chronopolis Pricing,” 2016). Chronopolis became TRAC 
certified in 2012.  
Chronopolis is a repository that focuses on preservation rather than access. Data 
depositors can request their own data, but the repository does not provide public access to its 
collections. While this simplifies the network of stakeholders with regard to repository users, the 
repository is managed by a network of three institutions, which introduces elements of 
complexity and uncertainty. NCAR in particular introduces both complexity and uncertainty to 
Chronopolis because the center manages classified government data and as such access to some 
of the documentation that a typical TRAC audit would require has some access restrictions. 
Chronopolis is managed by a number of people across several institutions, and it is likely that 
across the different institutions, functions, and departments, repository staff have different types 
of expertise in different areas. Experts in different areas are likely to have different perceptions 
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of risk, and it is likely that people with a variety of different types of expertise participated in the 
TRAC audit and certification process. TRAC places a high value of transparency as a way to 
demonstrate trustworthiness, but at least one Chronopolis institution has government-enforced 
information restrictions. It is possible that perceptions of risk are influenced by these limitations 
with regard to TRAC audit and certification. Chronopolis is managed across three geographically 
dispersed locations: San Diego, CA, Boulder, CO, and College Park, MD. Each of these areas 
faces different environmental and location-based vulnerabilities, which may influence the 
perceptions of risk for members of repository staff at those locations. Repository staff and 
auditors may also have differing perceptions of risk depending on their knowledge of the 
repository’s finances. Reporting structures across Chronopolis as well as within each of the 
institutions that comprise the repository may influence risk perception for people who are at 
different places within those structures. And finally, communication throughout Chronopolis, as 
well as between repository staff and auditors may influence perceptions of risk.  
3.3.1.3.3 CLOCKSS 
CLOCKSS became a nonprofit organization in 2009, and the repository consists of a 
partnership with Stanford University and member organizations that pay a fee to participate. As 
with Chronopolis, CLOCKSS maintains a geographically distributed repository focused on 
preservation rather than access (Center for Research Libraries, 2014). CLOCKSS preserved e-
journal content from publishers, and provides access to the data only if the content becomes 
unavailable from the publishers themselves. CLOCKSS is governed by a Board of Directors 
consisting of 22 members as well as an Executive Director (CLOCKSS, 2015). Financial 
information for CLOCKSS is not publicly available, but the repository does provide pricing 
information for libraries and publishers who may wish to join the network (“Contribute to 
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CLOCKSS,” 2015). CLOCKSS became TRAC certified in 2014 (Center for Research Libraries, 
2014; CLOCKSS, 2014). 
Although CLOCKSS is a distributed digital preservation network with numerous 
locations and participating organizations, the LOCKSS model for preservation is one in which 
most activity takes place at a central hub (i.e., Stanford), with minimal participation from other 
members (Reich & Rosenthal, 2001). While member organizations may experience uncertainty 
about the technical aspects of repository management, the structure of the network reduces their 
exposure to the complexity behind the scenes. Repository staff members are likely to be 
centralized at Stanford, which may reduce uncertainty and complexity with regard to repository 
management – in contrast to a repository such as Chronopolis, which is distributed across three 
locations. This model requires a high degree of trust among member organizations, given their 
low levels of involvement in the repository’s day-to-day operations. Alternately, auditors 
examining the repository for TRAC certification may have a limited view of the repository’s 
overall structure based on their experience communicating with staff at Stanford. Repository 
staff members are likely to have different types of expertise based on their roles and 
backgrounds, which may influence their perceptions of risk for CLOCKSS. Perceptions of risk 
are also likely to vary depending on how repository staff and auditors experience vulnerabilities 
or risk exposure with regard to factors such as the financial sustainability of CLOCKSS, and the 
technical security of the repository. Communication among repository staff, between repository 
staff and member institutions, and between repository staff and auditors may also influence 
perceptions of risk.  
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3.3.1.3.4 HathiTrust 
HathiTrust is a partnership of research institutions and libraries, including more than 100 
partners worldwide (“About HathiTrust,” 2016). Founded in 2008 with 13 institutions, the 
repository contains digitized content from partner institutions, including content from the Google 
Books project (“Beyond Google Books: Getting Locally-Digitized Material into HathiTrust,” 
2015). “HathiTrust is governed by a Board of Governors, composed of six members appointed 
by HathiTrust founding institutions, six elected from the membership at large, and the Chief 
Executive Officer, who serves as an ex officio, non-voting member” (“Governance,” 2016). The 
University of Michigan is the current host institution for the infrastructure of the repository. 
Funding for hardware, software, and services is provided through the University of Michigan 
Library (“Governance,” 2016). HathiTrust has an active mirror backup site in Indiana, which is 
maintained by staff at that location (“Getting Content Into HathiTrust,” 2016). Current 
collections as of April 2016 include 627 terabytes of data, consisting of nearly 14 million total 
volumes (“Statistics Information,” 2016). Like Canadiana.org, the repository focuses on both 
preservation and access to content. Financial information is not publicly available for HathiTrust, 
and the University of Michigan annual budget does not directly mention HathiTrust (U-M Office 
of Budget and Planning, 2016). HathiTrust became TRAC certified in 2011. 
There are several possible sources of uncertainty and complexity for repository staff and 
TRAC auditors with regard to HathiTrust that could influence risk perception. Numerous partner 
organizations and data contributors may create difficulties for repository staff managing 
relationships as well as data for the repository. The fact that HathiTrust staff members are 
embedded within the University of Michigan Library may also create uncertainty about their 
roles or about differentiating HathiTrust from the library itself. People with different types of 
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expertise are likely to perceive risk differently, among repository staff as well as TRAC auditors. 
Trust among repository staff across primary and backup sites may influence perceptions of risk 
as well. Repository staff and auditors may have different degrees of exposure to risk, including 
awareness levels of the financial stability of the repository, and the stability of backup sites. And 
finally communication among repository staff, between repository staff and partner institutions, 
and between repository staff and auditors may also influence perceptions of risk in the TRAC 
audit process.  
3.3.1.3.5 Portico 
Founded in 2002, Portico is a not-for-profit organization that preserves electronic 
scholarly content including e-journals and e-books (ITHAKA, 2015a). Portico focuses primarily 
on preservation rather than access, although access to content that becomes unavailable via the 
publisher can be triggered upon request (ITHAKA, 2015d). This model is similar to that of 
CLOCKSS. Portico is a service of ITHAKA (other ITHAKA services include JSTOR), and is 
overseen by its Board of Trustees, in addition to an advisory committee of librarians and 
publishers (ITHAKA, 2015c). As of March 2016, the repository contained approximately 62.5 
million preserved archival units (ITHAKA, 2015b). Portico is centrally managed, with 
participating organizations acting as customers or clients rather than partners. Information about 
the location of backup sites is not publicly available. Financial information is publicly available 
for ITHAKA, but this may or may not be useful in understanding the economic sustainability of 
Portico. Portico was the first repository to become TRAC certified in 2010. 
Portico appears to have a more centralized, consolidated governance structure than the 
other repositories described here. For this reason, there may be less uncertainty and/or 
complexity for repository staff to contend with. As with the other repositories described here, 
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staff members are likely to have varying types of expertise which can influence perceptions of 
risk, and the same is true of auditors. Perceptions of risk among repository staff and auditors are 
likely to be influenced by their exposure to risk, or their experiences of vulnerability. For 
example, people with greater knowledge of the organization’s financial stability may perceive 
risk in this area to be greater or smaller than those with less knowledge about this aspect of the 
repository. Communication among repository staff as well as between repository staff and 
auditors may amplify or attenuate perceptions of risk depending on factors such as mode of 
communication.  
3.3.1.3.6 Scholars Portal 
Founded in 2002, the “Scholars Portal technological infrastructure preserves and provides 
access to information resources collected and shared by Ontario’s 21 university libraries” 
(Ontario Council of University Libraries, 2014c). The work of the Ontario Council of University 
Libraries (OCUL) is governed by the University Librarians of the 21 member libraries (Ontario 
Council of University Libraries, 2014a). The Scholars Portal team appears to operate primarily 
from the University of Toronto (Ontario Council of University Libraries, 2016). The repository 
includes more than 40 million e-journal articles, 6 million e-books, as well as datasets and 
geospatial data (Ontario Council of University Libraries, 2014b). As with CLOCKSS, Scholars 
Portal is TRAC certified for only e-journal content. Financial information for Scholars Portal is 
not publicly available. Scholars Portal became TRAC certified in 2013. 
Focusing on both preservation and access for digital information, Scholars Portal is a 
repository with many distinct stakeholder groups, including data contributors, users, repository 
staff, other staff from OCUL, and staff from the 21 member libraries. This suggests a high level 
of complexity as well as many possible sources of uncertainty for both repository staff and 
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auditors, which may influence perceptions of risk. Repository staff members are likely to have 
different types of expertise, which can also influence perceptions of risk. Scholars Portal has 
made all of their TRAC documentation available via the website5 with some information 
available only upon request. This degree of transparency is very much in the spirit of TRAC, 
which emphasizes transparency as a measure of trustworthiness. In a model similar to 
HathiTrust, Scholars Portal coordinates across many institutions but is located primarily within 
one (i.e., University of Toronto). It is likely that information about the economic sustainability of 
the repository is tied to the University of Toronto in a similar manner, which may influence 
perceptions of risk for repository staff and auditors depending on their understanding of the 
organization’s finances. 
The six repositories that have been TRAC certified represent a range of governance 
models, with varying degrees of centralization. Funding models across the repositories vary with 
regard to the amount of information available. In each case, it will be important to ask for 
additional information about repository funding and financial sustainability in order to 
understand both repository staff and auditor perceptions of risk with regard to this important 
aspect of TRAC. Certified repositories also vary in their focus on preservation, access, or both. 
Repositories that seek to both preserve and provide access to information manage a more 
complex range of stakeholders, and also a more complex technological environment. The 
different types of expertise required for repository management varies depending on many of the 
factors described above, and this will influence the number and type of staff that each repository 
requires. These factors, along with many others, are likely to influence perceptions of risk for 
repository staff at the repositories as well as auditors assessing each for TRAC certification.  
                                                
5 https://spotdocs.scholarsportal.info/display/OAIS/Document+Checklist 
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3.3.2 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviewing is considered best in situations where the researcher will 
only be able to conduct one interview with each participant. This type of interview allows the 
researcher discretion to follow leads as they arise in the course of the interview, while providing 
a general guide that will ensure that the data generated are reliable and comparable (Bernard, 
2012, p. 182). While interviews have the advantages of allowing the researcher control over the 
line of questioning, the quality of data collected may vary due to the presence of the researcher, 
the fact that not all respondents will be equally articulate and perceptive, and the information 
gathered will be filtered through the views of the interviewees (Creswell, 2009). A semi-
structured interview addressed some of these limitations by allowing me to probe for additional 
information when appropriate during the interviews (Babbie, 2010, p. 277). This was particularly 
important as I experienced some difficulty during the pilot study in eliciting responses that 
uncovered factors influencing risk perception. As a result, the interviews for this dissertation 
were more structured in order to keep participants on topic. Each interview was recorded and 
transcribed for analysis. 
The first half of the interviews focused on a vignette, which was sent to all participants 
ahead of the interview (see Appendix 5). This vignette consisted of a repository description that I 
generated based on the repository site profiles in section Error! Reference source not found. 
bove and the requirements described in the TRAC standard. This was not a description of an 
existing repository, but rather a fictional repository that shared some characteristics with the 
existing TRAC certified repositories. Participants were asked to discuss the vignette, identify 
possible sources of risk for the repository described therein, and suggest ways to address or 
mitigate those sources of risk. The vignette provided common ground for comparing risk 
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perception across participants, as the simplicity of a scenario can help to “identify, clarify, and 
disentangle the complexities of real-world processes” (Hughes, 2004). Notably, they can be 
helpful as an interview strategy when participants are highly visible and/or identifiable within 
their community, as standards developers, auditors, and staff members from TRAC certified 
repositories were likely to be (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). Because vignettes “contribute toward 
understanding people's perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior” but do not necessarily allow 
generalization to understanding real life (Hughes, 2004), participants were also asked to discuss 
their own experiences.  
The second half of the interviews included questions about each participant’s individual 
experiences either as a standard developer, auditor, or repository staff member in order to 
understand perceptions of risk in relation to particular repositories. Participants were asked 
questions that focused on each of the eight factors from my model for the social construction of 
risk, as well as questions about their role in the audit process. Interviews lasted approximately 
one hour. 
In addition to this two-part interview the repository staff member who was responsible 
for coordinating the audit process and acted as the main point of contact for the auditors was 
asked additional questions about the motivation for, and logistics of, the audit and certification 
process. In my pilot study this was the repository manager, and this generally held true for the 
TRAC certified repositories where the audit process was managed by either the repository 
manager, or a digital preservation specialist. Only one person at each repository was asked to go 
through this longer interview, as I found through my pilot study that the other stakeholders did 
not have the same high-level view of the process and asking those questions of each interviewee 
did not yield additional information beyond what the administrator was able to provide. 
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Additionally, I wanted to avoid focusing too much on the logistics of the process and instead 
spend the interview asking questions that focused on how interviewees constructed their 
understanding of risk. 
The pilot study that I conducted included a survey, which was administered to 
participants immediately following their interview. I decided not to include a survey as a data 
collection method here for several reasons. First, I found that it was difficult to obtain complete 
responses from all of the interviewees. In fact, only three of the four participants completed the 
survey, even with multiple reminders. Second, it was impractical to administer the survey as a 
part of the interview because I spoke with some participants in person and others remotely, 
making it difficult to ensure that all would have taken the survey under the same conditions. 
Third, it would have added a substantial amount of time to each interview, and I was already 
asking for a significant time commitment from each participant. Fourth, the sample for this study 
is too small to have any statistical power, and as such a survey with Likert scale questions would 
not yield particularly useful information. Asking these questions during a qualitative interview 
allowed me to discuss these questions in greater depth with participants, and to probe further in 
order to understand the reasoning behind their responses to the questions. And finally, having 
realized that I would not need to ask each interviewee about the logistics of the audit and 
certification process, I chose instead to focus the interviews more narrowly on the social 
construction of risk. Using the survey questions as a guide, I covered this subject matter during 
the course of the interview, which allowed me to ask for clarification about responses, and to 
help ground the questions themselves during the interview. 
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3.3.2.1 Testing Interview Protocol 
I conducted a pilot test of my interview protocol with six subject matter experts as 
recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1991). These subject matter experts were 
representative of the main population of interest for this study (i.e., repository staff), allowing 
this pilot to serve as a test of the content validity. Straub et al. define content validity as “the 
degree to which items in an instrument reflect the content universe to which the instrument will 
be generalized” (Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004, p. 424). This pilot consisted of cognitive 
walkthroughs with the interviews in which participants were asked to use the concurrent think-
aloud technique to verbalize their thoughts while answering the interview questions (Groves et 
al., 2009). They were also asked to reflect on both the interview questions and the vignette upon 
completion of the interview. Pilot test interviews were audio recorded. 
3.3.2.2 Analysis of Interview Data 
Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. They were then coded and analyzed 
using NVivo,6 a qualitative data analysis software package. I employed an open coding 
approach, beginning with an initial set of codes based on my review of concepts from the 
literature, themes that emerged from the pilot study, and themes that arose during the interviews 
(Charmaz, 2006; Saldaña, 2015a). These codes were descriptive, analytic, and thematic. 
Descriptive codes identified points where participants discussed concepts such as interaction 
between repository staff and auditors, specific types of evidence prepared for a TRAC audit, or 
challenges encountered during the audit process, for example. Analytic codes included the eight 
factors that I identified as influencing risk perception: communication, complexity, expertise, 
organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. Analytic coding moves 
                                                
6 http://www.qsrinternational.com/product 
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beyond descriptive coding and allows the researcher to “transcend the local and particular of the 
study to more abstract or generalizable concepts” (Saldaña, 2015a, p. 120). During analysis I 
revisited the interview data to develop additional thematic codes as well (Saldaña, 2015b). (See 
Appendix 6).  
This approach to qualitative data analysis resembles the technique described by Matthew 
B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman (1994). It is not grounded theory; rather, I began with a code 
set developed through my own work as well as a critical review of research literature in relevant 
areas (e.g., risk perception, digital preservation), but also kept an open mind in order to modify 
the code set as needed in response to themes that emerged during data collection and analysis.  
Using the code set that I developed, I coded the interview transcripts in two groups: (1) 
auditors and standard developers, and (2) repository staff members. For each group of 
interviews, I enlisted the help of a second coder. We worked independently coding the same 
transcript, in order to ensure that my application of the code set was consistent and reliable. 
Using Scott’s Pi, a statistic measuring interrater reliability for coding textual data (Holsti, 1969; 
Scott, 1955), we achieved a score of 0.711 for the repository staff, and 0.719 for the auditors and 
standard developers. This step demonstrated that the data I collected, the code set that I created, 
and the data analysis that I conducted were both comprehensible to, and usable by, other 
researchers. This exercise also provided assurance of the reliability of subsequent data analysis. 
3.3.3 Document Analysis  
I conducted document analysis comparing the text of the ISO16363 standard against the 
certification reports provided by CRL, the evidence provided by each repository in support of 
their audit, and publicly available documentation from each repository, where available (see 
3.3.3.1 below for more information about available documentation). This analysis focused 
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primarily on those checklist items that have been identified as affecting risk, but considered the 
checklist and certification reports in their entirety as risk and risk management are foundational 
concepts that underlie the entire checklist.  
Documents are products that are produced by people within social contexts, using 
technologies. Analyzing documents can provide information about the processes and 
circumstances through which they were created, and also about their intended audience (Prior, 
2003). The comparative analysis of these documents looked within each audit to compare the 
evidence provided by repository staff to the response from auditors, and also across repositories 
to compare both the type and amount of evidence provided in response to each checklist item, 
and to compare auditor responses to this evidence and finally the certification scores assigned by 
CRL.  
Drawing from Diane Vaughan’s (1996) research methods, I conducted a preliminary 
round of document analysis with all publicly available documentation ahead of the interviews. 
This helped to provide guidance for the interviews, allowing me to focus the discussion around 
those parts of the audit and certification process that emphasize risk.  
3.3.3.1 Available Documentation 
Document analysis included audit reports, repository prepared responses to the TRAC 
checklist, and publications written by repository staff. CRL certification reports detailing the 
results of each audit were publicly available via CRL. Four repositories have made the 
documentation that they presented to auditors available via their websites (CLOCKSS, 
HathiTrust, Portico, Scholars Portal). Canadiana.org has not made their entire checklist available, 
but provided a selection of preservation policies. Chronopolis has not made any TRAC 
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documentation publicly available. A list of publications written by repository staff was available 
via each repository website. 
Table 3: Summary of Available Documentation, By Repository 
Repository CRL Audit 
Report 
Repository Prepared Responses 
to TRAC Checklist 
Staff Publications 
Canadiana.org ✓  ✓ 
Chronopolis ✓  ✓ 
CLOCKSS ✓ ✓ ✓ 
HathiTrust ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Portico ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Scholars Portal ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Analysis of these documents, as well as publications by repository staff, provided 
additional perspectives about the TRAC certification process, as well as information about the 
repositories more broadly. Document analysis helped to mitigate problems of memory and recall 
arose during the interviews (Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996), as many of the documents 
were been produced at the time of the audit and provided information about the social and 
organizational context in which the audit was conducted (Prior, 2003). In several instances, 
interviewees had difficulty recalling dates and/or timeframes for particular events relating to 
specific audits. I was able to provide information about the dates of the audit from the CRL 
certification reports and repository publications, which they then used to find additional 
information about their own experiences (e.g., looking up old emails, finding events in their 
calendars, etc.). 
3.4 Limitations 
Through the pilot study I ran into difficulty when participants were unable to recall 
events surrounding the audit, which had taken place nearly ten years prior to the interviews. The 
more time that has passed since an event, the greater the likelihood that a person will have 
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difficulty remembering it (Sudman et al., 1996; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). Including 
documentation and publications written by repository staff helped to mitigate this limitation. 
While all of the repositories in my study population have been through their audit more recently 
than the site in the pilot, I found that many had similar difficulties with memory and recall, most 
notably those from the earliest audits. Also, rationalization and sensemaking happen over time. I 
addressed this challenge by including links to each repository’s TRAC certification report in the 
interview request emails, and by suggesting that participants may want to refer back to their own 
notes, documents, emails, or calendars either before and/or during the interview.  
Audit and certification processes for trustworthy digital repositories are a relatively new 
phenomenon and the population that I examined in this study is small. Social desirability effects 
likely arose during interviews both within and across repositories, as well as among auditors and 
standards developers, due to the small size of the community (Bernard, 2012, p. 205). Other 
response effects included the expectancy effect, inaccuracy of self-reporting, and the deference 
effect (Bernard, 2012). In addition to being small, the population for this study consisted of 
individuals who were primarily based in the United States. Maintaining the anonymity of the 
small number of participants who were located outside of the United States. limited the analysis 
that I was able to conduct. For example, potential sources of risk and/or factors from the model 
for the social construction of risk that emphasized political and/or legal issues were likely to 
reveal the nationality and/or location of participants, thereby making them identifiable within 
their professional community.  
In this chapter I have described the qualitative research methods that I employed for this 
examination of the social construction of risk in the TRAC audit and certification process. In the 
next chapter, I present my findings. Chapter Chapter 4: begins with an examination of how 
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individuals understand risk in the TRAC audit process. This is followed by an analysis of 
potential sources of risk that interviewees identified, and concludes with an examination of two 
specific aspects of TRAC certification in order to understand which factors from the theoretical 
model for the social construction of risk in digital preservation are present in the TRAC audit 
process. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I examine how standard developers, auditors, and repository staff involved 
in the TRAC audit process understand the concept of risk for digital preservation, including 
similarities and differences in their understandings of the concept of risk. I argue that although 
the digital preservation community has regarded the concept of risk as a calculable value, it is in 
fact socially constructed. Reliance on a classical definition of risk in the audit process includes 
an assumption that people will behave in rational and predictable ways in response to the same 
information. In terms of TRAC, we see this classical definition in the way stakeholders identify 
risks and mitigation strategies and assume that identification and planning is sufficient to 
demonstrate the ability to preserve content for the long-term. I found that while risk 
identification is the first step toward long-term digital preservation, it is when and how the 
mitigation strategies described are enacted that determines long-term preservation outcomes. 
Therefore, risk perception in the context of TRAC includes what is perceived as being the best or 
most effective risk response. 
This chapter begins with an examination of risk that traces the TRAC audit process, 
including the developers of the standard that governs the process, the auditors who conduct the 
audits, and the repository staff whose repositories undergo audits. My analysis shows that these 
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three groups understand risk primarily in relation to specific threats or potential risks, which I 
have organized into five main categories: finance, organizational governance, legal, repository 
processes, and technical infrastructure. This is followed by an examination of two aspects of the 
audit process: the auditor site visit and process by which repositories maintain certification after 
the initial audit. My analysis focuses on the social factors that influence how standard 
developers, auditors, and repository staff members understand risk in these two areas, and 
emphasizes the importance of communication, expertise, uncertainty, and vulnerability in 
shaping perceptions of risk in the context of TRAC. 
 
Figure 3: TRAC Certification Process 
Overall the results present a nuanced picture of the TRAC audit process as one in which 
the actors involved agree on a classical definition of risk, but differ about whether an audit 
process based on this definition can determine trustworthiness with regard to long-term digital 
preservation. My findings demonstrate that while standard developers, auditors, and repository 
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staff generally share an understanding of the major sources of potential risk that face digital 
repositories, they disagree about whether and how these risks can be mitigated. Individuals who 
are removed from the day-to-day work of the repositories undergoing an audit are more likely to 
accept risk identification and mitigation strategies as sufficient evidence of trustworthiness while 
individuals at the repositories are skeptical that their performance of trustworthiness as 
proscribed in the audit process will translate to actual trustworthiness with regard to long-term 
digital preservation. 
4.2 Risk and TRAC 
ISO 16363 defines a trustworthy digital repository as one that understands threats and 
risks, and that can communicate this understanding to the public in order to engender trust: 
“A trustworthy digital repository will understand threats to and risks within its 
systems. Constant monitoring, planning, and maintenance, as well as conscious 
actions and strategy implementation will be required of repositories to carry out 
their mission of digital preservation.” (ISO 16363, 2012) 
The standard presents a checklist of criteria against which to measure repositories. Many 
of these criteria are accompanied by directions to identify and describe risks and the types of 
documentary evidence a repository might provide to demonstrate risk mitigation. This approach 
treats risk as something that can be identified, and asserts that risk assessment is a necessary part 
of digital preservation. For example, criteria 4.3.1 states: “The repository shall have documented 
preservation strategies relevant to its holdings” (ISO 16363, 2012, p 52). And this item is 
accompanied by an example of ways that a repository can demonstrate it is meeting this 
requirement, “Documentation identifying each preservation risk identified and the strategy for 
dealing with that risk” (ISO 16363, 2012, p 52). If a repository is able to do both of those things 
across all areas of the checklist, they are awarded certification as a Trustworthy Digital 
Repository (TDR).  
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 Interviewees discussed risk in ways that demonstrated an understanding of risk that was 
in line with the classical definition. For example, Repository Staff 18 explained that he did not 
think that his colleagues understood what risk means for digital repositories, and that while it is 
easy to find information about risk mitigation strategies it is more difficult to understand the 
probability and magnitude of consequences of a potential risk. This explanation highlighted his 
view of risk as calculable, but consisting of uncertain elements: 
“Do I think that large amounts of people really understand how risk is 
constructed and what it means? No. … I think it’s relatively easy to get 
information about solutions and how things are implemented, and it’s harder to 
put that in a framework where you’re measuring the likelihood if it happening 
against the potential of it happening, and what the downsides are there, and how 
you tie specific numbers to that.” (Repository Staff 18) 
Similarly, Auditor 10 focused on a definition of risk that relied heavily on numbers and 
probability, and also noted that the TRAC standard does not provide a clear definition of risk: 
“You know, I think that’s the big challenge with this. It’s like, okay, so what if I don’t do this? 
Well, what’s the probability that you won’t? And what’s the probability that this could happen? 
But that isn’t really discussed a whole lot in the standard” (Auditor 10). 
This view demonstrates an understanding of risk for digital preservation that assumes that 
it is important to understand risk as a calculable figure, despite the uncertainty of really being 
able to calculate the risk. Like the classical model of risk, this view is based on an underlying 
assumption that people are rational actors who will understand risk information in similar ways, 
and behave predictably in response to that risk information.  
In this study I found that interviewees identified risk in terms of specific potential threats 
or sources of risk, which I have organized into five main categories: finance, legal, 
organizational governance, repository processes, and technical infrastructure.  
• Finance risk refers to potential threats to the financial sustainability of a repository. 
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• Legal risk includes potential threats relating to rights management (e.g., copyright), and 
liability issues that could arise if a repository fails to sufficiently protect sensitive 
materials. 
• Organizational governance risk refers to potential threats to the stability of a 
repository’s organizational infrastructure, including internal governance structures within 
a repository and how the repository is positioned within larger organizations (e.g., 
universities, consortia, partnerships, etc.). 
• Repository processes can be a source of potential risk to a repository, including metadata 
capture and/or creation, file format management, and the ingest or migration of digital 
content. 
• Technical infrastructure related risk refers to potential threats to the hardware and/or 
software (e.g., servers, databases, etc.) that a repository relies on to manage digital 
content. 
In each of these cases, interviewees identified potential threats or sources of risk to digital 
content as well as repositories as a whole. This understanding of risk for digital preservation is in 
line with existing studies of risk in digital preservation, which have focused on identifying 
specific threats and reporting about how individual repositories or technologies mitigate those 
risks (e.g., Barateiro, Antunes, & Borbinha, 2011; Vermaaten, Lavoie, & Caplan, 2012). In the 
following section, I will examine each category in greater detail. 
4.3 Potential Sources of Risk 
4.3.1 Finance 
Interviewees described financial uncertainty as a potential source of risk to digital 
repositories. They discussed the ways that loss of funding threatens both repositories and digital 
information, and framed their understanding of this threat in terms of long-term business 
planning and risk identification. While auditors and repository staff agreed with the 
conceptualization of risk presented by standard developers, they found that in practice 
repositories fell short of meeting the requirements of addressing risk as articulated the TRAC 
standard, but were still certified as trustworthy.  
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Although all perceived financial risk as significant for repositories, each group 
understood the risk differently. For example, Standard Developer 03 said that financial viability 
was a potential source of risk and vulnerability for digital repositories, because so few have 
managed to secure long-term funding and remain operational, “Well other than repositories that 
are institutionally mandated, a long-term business plan is very difficult to come by. You know, 
there are a few long-lived digital repositories that aren’t institutional repositories, but there aren’t 
many that have lasted very long. So just how do you ensure that you’ve got adequate funding 
over the long-term when people’s interests change so rapidly?” This explanation highlights both 
the importance of long-term funding for digital repositories as well as the difficulty in securing 
that funding without an institutional mandate.  
Uncertainty about funding sources and the lack of stable long-term funding was also 
described as a significant source of potential risk for digital repositories by Standard Developers 
01, 02, 03, 06, 07, 08, 09, and 10, who emphasized that digital preservation requires continuous 
funding, “Money, funding. Long-term availability of the data, depending upon – since long-term 
availability is dependent on containing funds for the data being preserved, for keeping the data 
preserved or at least continuous monitoring of the data” (StandardDeveloper_01). 
Digital repositories require ongoing maintenance and funding in a way that paper-based 
repositories do not, making financial sustainability an especially significant source of risk for 
digital repositories. One standard developer explained that the expertise required to maintain 
digital information over time depends on having financial resources, “Ongoing finances, because 
in a paper based repository you could put stuff in a box and leave it. You can’t do that in a digital 
repository. Depending on your network, how you have arranged either succession or partnerships 
that can help with ameliorate that, I mean, everything really does come down to money … 
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Money buys you expertise, along with servers and stuff. If you don't have expertise, you're not 
going to be very good at this. You have to have money to do that” (StandardDeveloper_10). 
 Among standard developers, relying on grant funding or other forms of soft money was 
not viewed as a sustainable long-term plan for repositories. Standard developers were highly 
critical of the funding model for the repository described in the vignette, which they thought left 
the repository vulnerable because it relied on grants for a substantial portion of its funding, 
“When you're running a repository, the implication is that the repository will be storing and 
providing access to resources over time. How that's going to be accomplished over time when 
there's grant funding for, it's really over a third of their support? That is a concern” 
(StandardDeveloper_02).  
 The perspectives presented by standard developers about financial sustainability as a 
potential source of risk for digital repositories is reflected in the text of the standard itself, which 
governs the audit process. It is through this document that the standard developers developed and 
shaped an understanding of risk that includes threats to financial sustainability, and to set 
expectations about how repository staff could prove to auditors that they sufficiently identified 
and addressed those threats.  
Indeed, the TRAC standard contains several references to financial sustainability, 
including sections 3.1 and 3.4 of the Organizational Infrastructure section, titled “Governance 
and Organizational Viability” and “Financial Sustainability” respectively. Checklist item 3.4.1 
states that, “3.4.1 The repository shall have short- and long-term business planning processes in 
place to sustain the repository over time” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 
2012, p. 30). The supporting text further explains that a repository should be able to “ensure the 
 94 
viability of the repository over the period of time it has promised to provide access to its contents 
for its Designated Community” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 30).  
Similarly, item 3.4.3 states that, “The repository shall have an ongoing commitment to 
analyze and report on financial risk, benefit, investment, and expenditure (including assets, 
licenses, and liabilities)” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 31). 
Supporting text for this checklist item states that a repository should be able to provide a 
documented risk registry detailing potential threats and their corresponding mitigation 
techniques.  
Although the TRAC standard does not specify what length of time would be considered 
long-term, Standard Developer 06 explained that repositories should be thinking about how to 
preserve digital content in terms of centuries rather than years or decades, “Well, your 
Designated Community has to include users who haven't even been born yet. You have to have a 
way in which you can ensure, guarantee, that you can preserve that information a half century, a 
full century, four centuries into the future. There's no way around that” (StandardDeveloper_06). 
 Both of these criteria present financial sustainability as a matter of identifying specific 
threats and documenting strategies to respond to those threats, and argue that a repository must 
be able to demonstrate an ability to provide access to a specific community for the amount of 
time that they have promised. While this may seem straightforward, it presents a view of 
financial sustainability that rests upon several assumptions, including 1) an understanding of 
what constitutes short- and long-term timeframes, 2) that each repository has promised access for 
a specific set period of time, and 3) that identifying threats and initiating mitigation techniques is 
sufficient evidence that those risks will be recognized if or when they arise and that the 
mitigation techniques described will be successfully implemented. The view of risk reflects the 
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perspective of the standard developers, a group consisting of very experienced individuals with 
advanced technical degrees in fields such as physics and computer science, with a shared 
epistemic culture that emphasizes discoverable, calculable phenomena.  
Following the lead of the standard developers, auditors also framed financial 
vulnerability as a source of potential risk for digital repositories. Auditors 01, 03, 04, 07, and 08 
argued that sufficient funding was a basic requirement for repositories engaged in long-term 
preservation of digital content and that without adequate funding repositories would fail, 
“Basically, money is life in this case. If they don't have adequate funding, they're going to fail” 
(Auditor_03). Auditor 02 expressed a similar position, saying that no policy could compensate 
for a lack of funding, “if money dries up it doesn't matter how many policies they have in place. 
They don't have the funding to do it” (Auditor_02). 
For Auditor 01, a digital preservation professional, the biggest potential risk facing digital 
repositories was financial. This interviewee explained that in his experience obtaining sufficient 
funding for long-term preservation has been difficult, even when a parent organization was 
committed to funding a repository, because of the difficulty of communicating about costs, 
“Money. Finances. Being able to get a firm commitment from an organization to pay the cost of 
storage over time can be very significant. Because well, it's something I've seen in my work a 
couple of times of people not quite realizing how much storage can cost, and then trying to find 
ways to lower that cost without your knowledge or maybe with your knowledge but just refusing 
to buy the things that are necessary in a lot of circumstances. Yeah, biggest risk is money and 
funding” (Auditor_01). 
As with standard developers, auditors tended to view financial sustainability as a problem 
of institutional support for the mission of long-term digital preservation. Auditor 10, for 
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example, said that, “the inability for institutions to commit to the costs of digital preservation” 
was a systemic problem in the field of digital preservation (Auditor_10). This digital 
preservation professional went on to explain that the issue of funding and support for digital 
repositories is a potential threat to the entire field, “I think that in the history of academia there 
has been support for brick and mortar, paper, intellectual outputs. So libraries and research 
centers. But there has been a resistance, at the institution level, to support digital collections. And 
there has been some support from repository staff, and services, but I think we have seen a really 
big problem, internationally, in supporting the sole responsibility that academic institutions need 
to take, in terms of preserving content. And I think it's been a problem for decades, and I don't 
think it's been resolved” (Auditor_10).  
The auditors drew upon their experiences conducting audits as well as their own 
professional experiences in library administration and digital preservation, and their shared 
educational backgrounds in Library and Information Science, to characterize financial 
sustainability as an ideal that was difficult to achieve because so many repositories have relied 
on short term grant funding, “It's becoming less so, but a lot of the early efforts around this were 
grant funded, and that's great. It allows you some seed money to develop things, but you need 
long ... This is for long-term, and so you need organizational and financial sustainability for that 
mission to really be solid and strong” (Auditor_08). Similarly, Auditor 04 explained that 
repositories start out with good intentions but the lack of sufficient resources over time prevents 
them from being able to put good policies and processes in place in order to carry out their 
mission of long-term digital preservation,  
“Bottom line is, it's a tremendous amount of resources required to do long-term 
preservation. Organizational commitment to those types of resources often waxes 
and wanes depending on where the organization is situated from a financial 
perspective. A lot of repositories start off with really good intentions and really 
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well-defined ... Well, that's actually not true, but they start off with the goal of 
having defined processes, workflows, and all that sort of stuff, and over time a lot 
of that stuff gets either dropped or the period between things like migration 
activities or even just repository auditing activities expands as the organizations 
are pressed for resources and staff. I think that's sort of the really the biggest 
thing. Everything else from a ... comes down to the challenge of technological 
change, but a lot of the technological change can be mitigated with sufficient 
resources. It's having the resources available to address those things.” 
(Auditor_04)  
 As with the standard developers, auditors recognized financial sustainability as a 
potential source of risk for digital repositories. While the standard developers focused on the 
importance of long-term financial sustainability, auditors focused on how difficult it has been in 
practice for repositories to secure long-term funding and the challenges that arise as a result. 
Auditors, who were tasked with both interpreting and enforcing the TRAC standard, shared the 
view that financial sustainability was crucial for digital repositories but emphasized how few 
repositories have been able to achieve the level of support that the standard sets as its ideal. 
 Repository staff framed financial sustainability as a potential source of risk for digital 
repositories generally, and for their own repositories more specifically. They shared an 
understanding of the importance of funding for their repositories, and the threat that loss of 
funding posed for both their repositories as well as their digital content, but described an 
environment in which resources were scarce, and shifting organizational priorities meant that 
they felt that their budgets were vulnerable and under constant threat, “Funding . . . people don't 
want to pay for preservation at all. The ones that, there's A and B, there's a perception that 
preservation should be cheaper than access storage, and the opposite is actually the case. It's 
always been the money is the hardest, most riskiest challenge” (RepositoryStaff_04). 
They recognized the need for sustainable long-term funding and the importance of being 
able to demonstrate and communicate their financial viability through documentation, such as 
long-term business plans and risk analyses in order to ensure that they were meeting the 
 98 
promises made to their stakeholders. However, they described a wide gap between the ideal set 
forth by the standard developers and what they were able to achieve in their own institutions. 
Repository Staff 09 described the lack of control over her budget as a potential source of risk 
because it left them vulnerable to fluctuations and changes in the complex funding landscape of 
higher education, “the higher education field is complicated and budgets are subject to these 
large changes that really are out of your control for the most part. So I would say that in general 
the most difficult thing to do is to secure the long-term commitment of a certain amount of 
money forever” (RepositoryStaff_09). 
 Repository staff members described a variety of political, organizational, and 
communication issues that posed threats to their long-term funding, including relationships with 
member organizations, staffing changes within their own institutions, competition with other 
repositories, and reliance on short-term funding sources such as grants. In the case of member 
funding, one repository staff member explained that staff turnover at member organizations 
meant that representatives from those institutions often misunderstood the relationship between 
the repository and their own institution, which threatened the repository’s funding as a result: 
“We're member funded. Our members, so we have members that have, the 
institutions have been members of us for a long time. Some of those institutions 
were founding members. But the individual people who are representatives for 
those institutions change fairly often, and one of the things that we're constantly 
dealing with is that we have to reeducate our members as to the fact that they're 
members. They forget that they're members and they think we're a vendor. So the 
biggest problem we have is that the people who fund is think we're a vendor. And 
so we have to constantly go back to them, including some of the very 
organizations that were involved in founding us in the first place, and remind 
them that, ‘No, you founded us to solve this problem. No, we're not a content 
vendor. Don't just sit there and say-‘ So we've had problems where we've had 
people that were on our board that were on the boards of other organizations that 
were negotiating with us to lower our fees. And it's like, why would you even 
negotiate to lower our fees when you should be negotiating to make sure that we 
have strong, long-term, stable funding?” (RepositoryStaff_16). 
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Other repository staff members reported that uncertainty about future funding for their 
repositories were potential sources of risk for both the repository and the digital content that they 
were preserving. For Repository Staff 17, uncertainty about future funding was a threat, “I would 
say, the funding is the greatest threat … we're quite uncertain of our future right now, and that's a 
bit stressful” (RepositoryStaff_17). And for Repository Staff 19, uncertainty about where 
funding would come from at the end of each grant cycle was a potential source of risk, “That was 
probably the biggest one, that was coming up with something that's going to let this live beyond 
the next funding round” (RepositoryStaff_19). 
Repository Staff 04 spoke about his repository at the time of their TRAC audit and 
explained that they were entirely reliant on short-term grant funding. As a result, they received a 
low score from the auditors in the area pertaining to long-term financial sustainability: 
“It's always been the money is the hardest, most riskiest challenge. And that's one 
of the reasons we've pushed hard to make at least a core of what we do in 
[repository] part of our library organization … Whereas previously, when we 
were getting audited, that came all from grant funds. Everything at that time had 
a very finite horizon on it. That is actually one of the lowest scoring category we 
got in the TRAC process, was because of our funding.” (RepositoryStaff_04) 
He went on to explain that this area of the audit was difficult for his repository, because 
they understood the requirements laid out in the TRAC standard, and knew what types of 
documentation the auditors wanted to see, but were unable to meet those requirements in areas 
where his repository was vulnerable:  
“Difficult was the financial stuff, just because honestly, we didn't have a lot to 
say. It was difficult to answer the kind of questions that were being asked. 
Because that was where we were on the shakiest ground … Because we were 
100% grant funded and we knew the grant was going to end. And so we had a lot 
of answers of well, here's what we're going to try. But it was difficult to know 
okay, how do you actually say that without sounding stupid? Or without them 
saying well clearly, this is the way you do it. So that was really difficult to 
answer” (RepositoryStaff_04). 
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Repository Staff 20 and 21 also said that uncertain finances were a problem for their 
repositories at the time of their TRAC audits. For 21, uncertainty about funding sources meant 
that they were unable to demonstrate the long-term viability of the repository, “the far future 
part, who was ensuring that the process will keep going … It was uncertain where the funding 
was going to come from, I guess, that was a big deal, the funding” (RepositoryStaff_21). And for 
20, reliance on their university meant that while their repository may have appeared to have a 
stable funding source, in reality the repository’s funding ran on two-year cycles, “our whole 
financial situation is kind of, you know, we have to come up with a budget every two years and 
justify all the salary and hardware and all the other expenses. And, ask the school to pay for it” 
(RepositoryStaff_20). In both cases, the repository staff understood the risk posed by lack of 
long-term funding for their repositories, but were unable to meet the requirements described in 
the standard to mitigate that risk. 
For repository staff, threats to the financial sustainability of their organizations were 
described as a major source of potential risk. They expressed concern about securing funding for 
their repositories, and frustration about their inability to meet the level of funding and long-term 
security that the TRAC standard described. While many explained that their repository fell far 
short of the requirements described in the standard, their repositories were still certified by 
TRAC auditors.  
With regard to financial uncertainty as a potential source of risk for digital repositories, 
standard developers and auditors, groups composed of individuals with advanced degrees and 
technical expertise whose professional roles include administrative and management 
responsibilities, described the need for stable, long-term funding and acknowledged that securing 
this type of funding is difficult for digital repositories. Auditors agreed with the criteria 
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established by the standard developers that called for repositories to provide evidence of business 
planning processes and financial risk analysis reporting in order to demonstrate risk mitigation in 
this area. Repository staff, a group with greater variety in both their educational backgrounds and 
professional responsibilities, who tended to have fewer advanced degrees than the standard 
developers or auditors, also described financial uncertainty as a potential source of risk for 
digital repositories, but disagreed about whether the TRAC criteria could effectively assess the 
financial sustainability of a repository. 
Uncertainty, vulnerability, and communication surfaced as prominent factors in the 
construction of financial risk for digital repositories. Standard developers, auditors, and 
repository staff all described funding as uncertain, and digital repositories as vulnerable to 
funding sources over which they had little control. Repository staff members, a group that 
consisted of individuals with a variety of roles and responsibilities within digital repositories but 
who mostly shared an educational background, also characterized their efforts to communicate 
with funders and parent organizations about the cost of long-term digital preservation as highly 
challenging.  
While much of the focus on financial sustainability was about ensuring that a repository 
had the resources and plans in place to carry out its mission of long-term digital preservation, the 
TRAC standard also stated that a repository must have a succession plan in place in order to 
ensure the longevity of the digital content in the event that the repository was unable to do so.  
4.3.1.1 Succession Planning 
Checklist item 3.1.2.1 in the TRAC standard specifies that a repository must be able to 
provide credible evidence documenting a succession plan in the event that the repository loses 
funding and must shut down. While this requirement is included here in the financial risk 
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section, it could also fit with the sections about governance and legal sources of risk below. From 
a financial perspective, succession planning is important because a repository that loses funding 
will need a plan to ensure the longevity of its digital content, although repository staff members 
expressed skepticism that another repository would be able to secure funding if the first shuts 
down. Succession plans may also be necessary if a repository loses organizational support, or if 
the goals of the organization shift away from long-term preservation of digital content. And 
finally succession planning relies on legal agreements between organizations, although 
repository staff members interviewed were skeptical that those agreements would be enforceable. 
The text of item 3.1.2.1 provides information about this item, including examples of how 
a repository can demonstrate that it has met the requirement: 
“3.1.2.1 The repository shall have an appropriate succession plan, contingency 
plans, and/or escrow arrangements in place in case the repository ceases to 
operate or the governing or funding institution substantially changes its scope. 
Supporting Text 
This is necessary in order to preserve the information content entrusted to the 
repository by handing it on to another custodian in the case that the repository 
ceases to operate. 
Examples of ways the Repository Can Demonstrate It Is Meeting This 
Requirement 
Written and credible succession and contingency plan(s); explicit and specific 
statement documenting the intent to ensure continuity of the repository, and the 
steps taken and to be taken to ensure continuity; escrow of critical code, software, 
and metadata sufficient to enable reconstitution of the repository and its content 
in the event of repository failure; escrow and/or reserve funds set aside for 
contingencies; explicit agreements with successor organizations documenting the 
measures to be taken to ensure the complete and formal transfer of responsibility 
for the repository’s digital content and related assets, and granting the requisite 
rights necessary to ensure continuity of the content and repository services. 
Discussion 
A repository’s failure threatens the long-term sustainability of a repository’s 
information content. It is not sufficient for the repository to have an informal plan 
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or policy regarding where its data goes should a failure occur. A formal plan with 
identified procedures needs to be in place.” (Consultative Committee for Space 
Data Systems, 2012, p. 22) 
This checklist item provides further evidence that the developers of the TRAC standard 
identified financial sustainability as a potential source of risk for digital repositories, and that 
they agreed that a credible succession or contingency plan would serve as sufficient evidence of 
a repository’s ability to respond to the risk of financial instability. Interviews with standard 
developers confirmed the view that documented evidence of plans to preserve and provide access 
to digital content beyond the life of the repository was a critical strategy for mitigating financial 
threats. For example, Standard Developer 09 found financial viability to be a potential source of 
risk for digital repositories and explained that a succession plan would be needed to mitigate this 
threat:  
“A good repository, even if it's making assumptions about its user base, even if 
it's gone a bit complacent, it would probably notice eventually that things are 
changing and take some steps to act on that. Whereas, risks concerning viability 
— I'm thinking of financial viability — can come out of the blue. I mean, there 
have been instances of repositories simply being closed … I would say that there 
is a case to be made that that's the greatest risk, because it's unpredictable, and it 
could wipe out a whole repository as a stroke, which is why, of course, you need 
succession plans.” (StandardDeveloper_09) 
Despite the emphasis on financial sustainability described in the previous section, 
standard developers also recognized that securing long-term funding was a significant challenge 
for repositories. Standard Developer 07 explained that the requirement that a repository have a 
succession plan was meant to provide an additional or alternative way for repositories to 
demonstrate the longevity of their digital content, “All of those sorts of things, and other 
repositories, the difficulty is the long-term funding, so in OAIS, the 16363, we kind of get 
around that by talking about having a succession plan” (StandardDeveloper_07). 
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In addition to having a succession plan, standard developers argued that the plan should 
be viable and actionable, and that the organization designated to take over the digital content 
should be able to do so. For example, Standard Developer 05 explained that a succession plan 
should be both well-developed and thoroughly documented in order to ensure that it will be 
actionable in the event that it is needed, “Disaster recovery and the succession plan must be well 
documented and, really, very concrete in ensuring the continuity and the persistency. In case of 
failure, in case if the repository closes, in case the company who has the storage system decided 
not to do it anymore and disappear. It happens. It can happen. So, the succession plan must be 
really well, well, well, well developed” (StandardDeveloper_05). She went on to say that a 
succession plan encompasses the other risks that a repository faces, and that a solid succession 
plan is evidence that a repository has addressed other major categories of risk, “The succession 
plan, in some sense, include[s] all the other risks. If you don't have a visible, credible, trustable 
succession plan, you cannot really provide a good – you cannot face your challenge. But the 
succession plan means that all the other things must be there, in some sense” 
(StandardDeveloper_05).  
Standard Developer 10 also focused on the viability of succession plans, and argued that 
the repository in the vignette would need to provide sufficient evidence that the organization 
designated in the succession plan would be capable of taking on the new content, “We’d have to 
know what is the viability of that succession plan, what other place is capable of taking this on” 
(StandardDeveloper_10). 
As with the standard developers, auditors described succession planning as an important 
and necessary measure for repositories to take in order to offset the potential risk of 
organizational collapse and loss of digital content, “I think that, in terms of the organization, they 
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need to develop a succession plan and be very explicit about what's going to happen if their grant 
funding dries up, and if the membership starts to drop” (Auditor_10).  
 Auditors tended to frame their discussion of succession planning in terms of their audit 
experience rather than their digital preservation or repository management experience. They 
described succession plans as necessary for long-term digital preservation, but also said that it 
was uncommon to find repositories with excellent succession plans, “Well first of all these days, 
having a succession plan is really good … I mean it’s pretty rare, actually, for a repository to 
actually have a succession plan. So the fact that they have one is good news” (Auditor_06). 
 Auditor 08 explained that in his experience as an auditor the existence of a viable 
succession plan was a good indicator of the overall state of the repository. This is similar to the 
point made by Standard Developer 05 above, who argued that a succession plan was in some 
ways an indicator of the repository’s overall preparedness to address potential threats. For 
Auditor 08, whose understanding of financial risk and succession planning was shaped by his 
experiences assessing repositories, it was important to see that repository staff recognized the 
potential sources of risk that could threaten the financial sustainability of the organization and 
had made plans for the digital content to ensure that it would outlive the repository itself, “I don't 
think organizations always think of succession planning when they're doing this. From your 
point of view, as say an Executive Director of an organization, you believe in the vitality and 
health of that organization and that it will persist into the future, and doing that planning upfront 
of what happens if we decide to dissolve or we’re no longer organizationally viable, whether it's 
money or personnel or something else? The very best audits thought of those issues, and the ones 
that were most problematic, that wasn't on their radar screen at all” (Auditor_08). 
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 Taking that a step further, Auditor 01 said that while it was important to know that the 
repository had a succession plan in place, it was also necessary for the repository to have tested 
that plan to ensure that transfer of digital content to the new organization would be possible, 
“Then the succession plan that they say that they have. Has that been tested? How many times 
have they tested that? What kind of variety of data have they tested it with?” (Auditor_01). 
 As with the standard developers, auditors described succession plans as necessary tools to 
offset threats to the financial sustainability of a repository. While standard developers 
emphasized the importance of well-documented succession plans, auditors noted how difficult 
and rare it was for a repository to have such a plan. Auditors also highlighted the difference 
between having a documented succession plan and carrying out testing to ensure that it would be 
possible to transfer content to the new repository if the need arose.  
 Repository staff agreed with the standard developers and auditors that financial 
sustainability was a potential source of risk for digital repositories and the content that they 
sought to preserve, “There's always a risk in that, with whatever might happen to that 
organization. Either a calamity, or loss of interest, or will, or funding, or whatever. There is a 
succession plan it says in there, so that's obviously a significant mitigating tool for that kind of 
failure of the organization. I think succession is tricky” (RepositoryStaff_06). 
 Echoing the sentiments of Auditors 06 and 08, Repository Staff 05 said that while 
funding challenges are a common and substantial threat to digital repositories, in his experience 
most repositories do not have a succession plan, “I think a lot of institutions have been facing 
significant funding challenges … if the funding dries up, then support for that repository, you 
know, what happens? You've got that data. Do you even have a succession plan? I think a lot of 
places don't” (RepositoryStaff_05).  
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Repository staff disagreed with standard developers and auditors about whether a 
succession plan was sufficient evidence of risk mitigation. Repository Staff 03, 06, 07, 12, and 
21 all expressed skepticism that having a documented succession plan would ensure the 
longevity of a repository’s digital content, “I wasn't necessarily convinced that writing that down 
necessarily meant that it would sustain it” (RepositoryStaff_03). 
Repository Staff 03 said that his repository was not concerned about succession planning 
at the time of their TRAC audit because the repository was covered by the university library 
within which it was situated, but that as the repository has grown and become more independent 
succession planning has become more complicated and nuanced, “We were never really that 
concerned about succession with major universities. But, I think, this is the case with [repository] 
as well, how that staff entity sits within the university environment has changed due to 
organizational, political realities. Whereas, when we were incubating the whole service, it was 
very tightly tied, almost indistinguishable from library IT, and now it's really starting to become 
more of its own entity. I think that's more of the nature of the succession plan. It's not so much, 
‘Oh my gosh, what happens if the [university] suddenly goes under?’ It's a little bit more 
nuanced” (RepositoryStaff_03).  
Similarly, Repository Staff 21 said that her repository did not have a succession plan at 
the time of their TRAC audit. She explained that she thought they should have one because it 
was included in the checklist and she knew that the auditors would expect it, but that she doubted 
whether a succession plan would meaningfully address the potential risk of financial instability, 
“we didn't really have a succession plan. I don't know if they do now. I'm not quite sure. But at 
the time we didn't have one, and I remember thinking, oh, we probably should have that, even if 
it's just written up. I don't know how meaningful it would have been if we just threw one 
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together, but that was a big deal, because if we lost funding, then what was going to happen to all 
that content?” (RepositoryStaff_21). 
Repository Staff 12 was quite blunt in her assessment of succession planning as a futile 
activity. She argued that succession planning did not make sense because it is unlikely that a 
second repository would be able to muster the funding and support that the first was lacking, 
“What is really going to be the reason repositories are at risk, is almost all around having enough 
money to take care of the material . . . a succession plan to move it someplace else, where the 
community isn’t going to have enough money to take care of it. Or there’s going to be a, 
someone who magically dumps money on the secondary repository. Why couldn’t they dump 
money on the first repository? I mean, it’s just, I don’t know. It doesn't make sense” 
(RepositoryStaff_12). 
Repository Staff 07 went a step further and explained that by their very nature succession 
plans are unenforceable because they are only enacted when a repository fails. He also said that a 
succession plan does not ensure that the successor organization itself will be financially viable 
long-term:  
“It was always about sustainability and succession. It was basically having a 
viable plan for what would happen to the content in the event that we were unable 
to continue operating as an organization and had to wind up, or just couldn't 
support the repository anymore. Having basically succession partners who would 
not only take the content and the infrastructure around it but also operate it. And 
I think that’s still sort of, it’s almost like that's a weak link too because if you have 
a succession by definition you're gone afterwards so you can put a plan in place 
but you're not around to make sure that it's going to be executed. Just like you're 
not around forever your successors aren't necessarily around forever. Our 
successors are primarily universities and government agencies which all claim 
and pretend that they will exist forever, but you can't guarantee that so the 
succession plan doesn't actually spell out what's going to happen from now until 
the end of forever it just says that there's an agreement in place, it's a time limited 
agreement. The idea behind it would be that our successors would agree that they 
would operate our infrastructure and maintain access to the content, and preserve 
it while the next steps were investigated. [repository] itself, as an organization, 
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we don't even have the ability to pretend we're going to be around forever 
because our funding base is much smaller and more fragile than these other 
organizations” (RepositoryStaff_07). 
Standard developers, auditors, and repository staff all agreed that loss of funding and/or 
institutional support was a potential source of risk for digital repositories and their content. 
Interviews with all three groups revealed similar ideas about the likelihood and consequences 
that a repository could lose funding. Standard developers and auditors, two groups whose 
members were likely to occupy professional roles with policy setting responsibilities, 
emphasized the importance of succession plans as evidence that a repository was prepared to 
address this potential source of risk by ensuring the longevity of digital content beyond the life of 
the repository itself. Repository staff on the other hand, a group consisting of members who were 
likely to occupy professional roles in which they would be responsible for carrying out the work 
specified by policies that they did not create themselves, understood the reasoning behind 
succession planning but did not agree that a succession plan provided evidence that the digital 
content would outlive the repository. While they were happy to provide documented succession 
plans in order to achieve TRAC certification, they were performing rather than demonstrating 
trustworthiness.  
4.3.2 Legal 
Interviewees described legal issues, such as contracts, agreements, licenses, and 
copyright as potential sources of risk for digital repositories. While auditors and repository staff 
members agreed with the conceptualization of legal risk presented by the standard developers, 
the auditors were more likely to agree with the standard developers that agreements among 
organizations governing relationships that would impact the long-term preservation of digital 
content should be the primary focus of concern. Repository staff members were much more 
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concerned with intellectual property issues that would threaten the repository itself. It is 
understandable, in this case, that repository staff would be concerned with the ability of their 
own organization to do this work, while individuals external to their organization would be more 
interested in the relationships with other organizations. This echoes the attitudes expressed in 
section 4.3.1.1 about succession planning. Standard developers and auditors believed that it 
would be possible for digital content to outlive the repository, while repository staff were 
skeptical that succession plans would be successful. 
Standard developers framed legal risk to repositories as something that was of particular 
importance to repositories in relation to access. For example, Standard Developer 01 explained 
that the legal repercussions of releasing protected data could threaten the continued existence of 
a repository, “There’s laws in place in the U.S. I don’t know about the rest of the world, but 
certainly in the U.S., depending on what your repository is storing you may have very severe 
penalties imposed on you if you release information that’s supposed to be protected. The HIPAA 
[Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act] is one example. There’s a Title XIII, 
which is census data. Both of those are legal system where keeping the data under security 
controls is tantamount to keeping your organization from being ground by the wheels of justice.” 
Alternately, Standard Developer 07 said that the team of standard developers were not 
concerned with threats posed to a repository by legal issues, but rather to the digital information 
being preserved by that repository, “The problem there is that if the repository could be sued, 
legal action taken against them, then we had a very shorthand way of describing this: that we 
didn’t care if the repository itself was sued out of existence. What we were concerned about is 
that they were sued out of existence before it could hand over its data, its information. It’s the 
speed at which these legal activities, cease and desist operations, can happen.” For this 
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interviewee, the danger to the organization, that a repository would be shut down before they 
could enact their succession plan, was a significant threat to the digital content. 
In order to guard against the legal risks that repositories face, standard developers argued 
that it was important to have clear, well-defined, agreements, “From your Organizational 
Infrastructure an issue is to make clear which kind of agreements you have within the 
organizations involved, other centers they could be in contact with to preserve things, to receive 
things. And, some specific agreement must be done on a very clear basis. The duties, the 
licenses, the risks, the copyright. All these things must be, again, well defined . . . Evidence is 
very important in this area” (RepositoryStaff_05). 
This view of legal risk is clearly described in section 3.5 of the TRAC standard, 
“Contracts, Licenses, and Liabilities,” which states that “The repository shall have and maintain 
appropriate contracts or deposit agreements for digital materials that it manages, preserves, 
and/or to which it provides access” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 
31). Through the process of creating this text the standard developers established an 
understanding of legal risk as one that was a threat to both the repository and the digital content, 
and communicated to both auditors and repository staff members that it was necessary and 
important to “ensure that the repository has the rights and authorizations needed to enable it to 
collect and preserve digital content over time, make that information available to its Designated 
Community, and defend those rights when challenged” (Consultative Committee for Space Data 
Systems, 2012, p. 31).  
Standard developers set expectations for auditors and repository staff that a repository 
could demonstrate that it is meeting this standard by providing documentation, “Properly signed 
and executed deposit agreements and licenses in accordance with local, national, and 
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international laws and regulations; policies on third-party deposit arrangements; definitions of 
service levels and permitted uses; repository policies on the treatment of ‘orphan works’ and 
copyright dispute resolution; reports of independent risk assessments of these policies; 
procedures for regularly reviewing and maintaining agreements, contracts, and licenses” 
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 31).  
Through the text of the TRAC standard, the standard developers crafted and 
communicated a conceptualization of risk with regard to legal issues that focused on the 
longevity of digital content rather than the security of the repository. They were concerned that 
repositories would obtain the appropriate permissions to be able to preserve digital content, and 
that they would have secure enough legal footing to ensure that they would be able to execute 
their succession plan in the event that the repository should fail.  
Auditors did not devote much attention to legal risk during the interviews, but their 
discussions about legal issues tended to express a shared understanding of risk in this area with 
the standard developers. Drawing from their experiences conducting audits as well as their own 
professional backgrounds in digital preservation, they focused on one aspect of the legal risk 
communicated through the TRAC standard. Namely, that it was important for repositories to 
have the appropriate legal agreements in place in order to ensure that their relationships with 
partners and members were secure.  
Auditor 01 said that repositories “should probably have some legal staff on hand” to 
manage contracts among partner organizations because negotiating and executing things like 
service level agreements is complex and time-consuming. He also said that when assessing a 
repository it is important to understand whether those agreements are reciprocal or not in order to 
fully understand relationships among organizations and the potential sources of legal risk that the 
 113 
repository faces, “Is this a reciprocal agreement and what kind of risks does that expose them 
to?” 
Auditors also framed legal risk in terms of the position of the repository with regard the 
hosting of its digital content and support for the mission of long-term preservation, “Just the 
word support is not enough. There needs to be some formality around that and documentation 
agreements” (Auditor_09). They said that it was important to understand how the digital content 
would be preserved in the event that the organization hosting that content decided to withdraw 
from the repository, “What if the founding university decided to withdraw from the project? 
Then they wouldn’t want to host the content anymore, so you need to look into whether or not 
there’s actually any contracts specifically about the university agreeing to host the repository 
infrastructure and content and what they say in the event of there being a disruption or if they 
withdraw” (Auditor_03).  
While standard developers identified legal risks to digital repositories arising from 
copyright issues as significant, they explained that it was necessary for repositories to secure the 
rights necessary for long-term preservation of the digital content. Repository staff, however, 
were more concerned that even if these legal agreements were in place, execution of the access 
permissions and/or restrictions specified in those agreements would somehow fail, “a lot of the 
complexity came from … being able to provide access in the right ways” (RepositoryStaff_01).  
Repository staff presented a view of legal risk that included a great deal of concern about 
copyright and the threat posed to repositories that provided inappropriate access to digital 
content. Repository Staff 06 explained that “the risk of compromise to the content that's in 
copyright” was an area of vulnerability for repositories. For this interviewee, the threat of 
providing inappropriate access to materials with copyright restrictions was a potential legal threat 
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to a repository. He went on to argue that access in general is an area of risk for repositories, and 
that the push to provide repository users with meaningful ways to access and interact with data 
can interfere with the core mission of preservation by pulling resources away from that work, “I 
think access in general is complicated and getting more complicated.” Extending that 
perspective, Repository Staff 01 said that an important question for repositories was, “What is 
your capacity to actually provide someone something they can use within the constructs of law 
that exists?” 
Intellectual property rights were described as a “ticking time bomb” by Repository Staff 
02, who explained that repository cost models were complex sources of potential risk for 
repositories, “The way that national copyright factors into the cost model, which is two-
dimensional and I think very complicated, but it probably needs to be multidimensional more 
than that because of copyright issues.” Despite this concern, he felt that the auditors who 
assessed his repository had an inflated sense of the threat that copyright issues posed to his 
repository. He said that he disagreed with their “sense of risk” with regard to in-copyright 
materials, but “didn’t feel it was worthy of dispute” in the final TRAC audit report. 
Digital content with access restrictions due to copyright were described as a source of 
vulnerability for repositories because if a repository was hacked it could “lead to lawsuits and 
things like that where that could really jeopardize the stability of a repository” 
(RepositoryStaff_05). This interviewee argued that, “You can have a great technological plan 
that can quickly become irrelevant if you haven’t got all of the legal ducks in a row” 
(RepositoryStaff_05). In contrast, Repository Staff 13 said that technical aspects of repository 
architecture could eliminate the need for complex legal agreements regarding intellectual 
property rights because “the fundamental problem we were facing was copyright” and “by 
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throwing large amounts of disk at the problem, we could avoid throwing large amounts of money 
at lawyers.” 
As with the standard developers and auditors described above, a few repository staff 
members were also concerned with agreements governing relationships between repositories and 
partner or member organizations. They described these relationships, and the agreements 
governing them, as complex: 
“One area of complexity is in the legal realm, and in the agreement realm. The 
complexity there is the different regimes that you have to deal with between say, 
private universities and public universities. The different laws of different states. 
The [state] is a complexity. That really is complex, and how to try to simplify that 
into an agreement that someone can actually sign, and that can be uniform across 
your services. That's one degree of complexity. The other, I think it also stems 
from the legal things in a way, is what [repository] was trying to do was preserve 
and provide access. They're very interconnected.” (RepositoryStaff_01) 
Repository Staff 18 explained that the agreements governing his repository were complex 
and required a great deal of time to understand, “The way that [repository] operates is through a 
service provider agreement that seems a bit Byzantine when you first start looking at it … So 
there's a level of service agreement there that's complicated and kind of hard to get your head 
around until you've been in it for a while.” One implication that follows from this description is 
that it could be difficult for an external auditor to understand the legal landscape of this 
repository and to, in turn, assess risk in this area. 
Discussing the TRAC audit process specifically, Repository Staff 19 highlighted the 
importance of organizational factors and argued that an audit would need to look across all of the 
partner/member organizations hosting digital content for a repository, “I would have to say, 
you'd have to put in some agreement as how do you co-audit across them.” Regarding his own 
repository, he explained that the audit team spoke with staff at all of the sites hosting content and 
reviewed documentation but only visited the primary site, “I don’t believe they ever visited the 
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other [number of sites] sites.” Another interviewee from this repository said that he was under 
the impression that auditors had visited at least one of the other sites hosting their content during 
the audit process. In the case of this repository, staff members within the same organization had 
different understandings about whether the auditors had visited partner organizations or not.  
 Several interviewees identified national context as a potential source of risk for the digital 
repository described in the vignette. Of the two standard developers, three auditors, and five 
repository staff members who thought that having a data backup location in a different country 
was a potential source of risk, five were from the U.S., and five were from Canada and Europe. 
Standard developers, auditors, and repository staff agreed that having data storage sites in two 
different countries could endanger or limit federal and/or state funding for repositories, could 
introduce complexity by adding additional laws and/or regulations that a repository must comply 
with, and could create problems for material under copyright.  
While standard developers, auditors, and repository staff all found legal issues, such as 
contracts, agreements, licenses, and copyright, to be potential sources of risk for digital 
repositories, the groups focused on different sources of risk. Standard developers and auditors 
focused on relationships among partner and/or member organizations, and argued that those 
relationships were a potential threat to both repositories and digital content, and that agreements 
were necessary in order to ensure and enforce a commitment to the mission of long-term digital 
preservation. Repository staff, on the other hand, focused primarily on intellectual property 
issues and the threat that violating copyright posed to their repositories. They also spoke about 
the complexity of the legal agreements governing relationships among partner and/or member 
institutions and expressed some skepticism about whether an external party would be able to 
understand the legal landscape of their repositories.  
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Although all three groups involved in the TRAC audit process agreed that legal issues 
were important, the fact that repository staff members focused on a different aspect than the 
standard developers and auditors suggests that individuals who are removed from the process of 
repository management find potential risk in the instability and uncertainty of relationships 
among member and/or partner organizations while the individuals who are in repositories are 
more concerned about potential threats from people and organizations external to the repository 
and its partners. Repository staff were focused on TRAC certification as a marker of whether a 
specific repository could be considered a trustworthy home for digital content, while standard 
developers and auditors focused on certification as a marker of how likely it was that digital 
content could outlive the repository itself. 
4.3.3 Organizational Governance 
Interviewees described organizational instability as a potential source of risk for digital 
repositories. They discussed the ways that internal organizational governance structures and the 
positioning of the repository with larger organizations, such as universities, consortia, or 
partnerships as possible threats to both a repository and its digital content. While standard 
developers focused on the ways that the requirements laid out in the TRAC standard would 
mitigate potential threats relating to organizational instability, auditors and repository staff were 
skeptical about whether policies and documentation could accurately capture actual repository 
practices. Auditors emphasized that a focus long-term digital preservation, and a mission 
statement and policies that reinforced this focus, would mitigate the potential risk of 
organizational instability. However, repository staff described TRAC certified organizations 
without clear mission statements, and where staff members lacked a clear understanding of the 
overall mission of long-term preservation.  
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Section 3 of the TRAC standard focuses on organizational infrastructure and includes 
several sub-sections that specifically target governance, including section 3.1 “Governance and 
Organizational Viability” and section 3.2 “Organizational Structure and Staffing.” The 
Governance and Organizational Viability section specifies that a trustworthy repository should 
have a mission statement that reflects a commitment to digital preservation, as well as a strategic 
plan, a succession plan, and a collection policy that all reflect the mission of long-term 
preservation. The Organizational Structure and Staffing section focuses on the need for 
appropriate staffing to carry out the mission of long-term preservation, “3.2.1 The repository 
shall have identified and established the duties that it needs to perform and shall have appointed 
staff with adequate skills and experience to fulfill these duties” (Consultative Committee for 
Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 23). The standard indicates that in addition to having appropriate 
staff, a repository should have clear documentation communicating the duties that staff should 
perform, evidence that there are enough staff members to carry out the work, and evidence of 
ongoing training and professional development in areas relevant to digital preservation.   
The requirement that a repository provide documented evidence of a mission focused on 
long-term preservation of digital content, along with supporting documentation describing 
policies that align with that mission reflects a belief on the part of the standard developers that 
loss of institutional support for digital preservation and/or shifting organizational priorities are a 
threat digital repositories, “The repository’s or its parent organization’s mission statement should 
explicitly address preservation. If preservation is not among the primary purposes of an 
organization that houses a digital repository then preservation may not be essential to the 
organization’s mission” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 21). 
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Standard developers identified three areas of organizational governance as potential 
sources of risk for digital repositories: (1) institutional support, (2) leadership changes, and (3) 
organizational structure. Loss of institutional support was described by several standard 
developers as a major threat to digital repositories. Standard Developers 01, 02, 05, 06, 08, and 
10 all emphasized the potential risk for repositories and digital content associated with loss of 
support for the mission of long-term digital preservation.  
When discussing the repository described in the vignette, Standard Developer 02 
explained that turnover among board members was a potential source of risk for the repository 
because board members develop knowledge and expertise about the organization over time, new 
members may not understand the ways that their decisions influence the mission of long-term 
digital preservation, “Because the board is possibly all new members at any given time, they're 
not going to necessarily see so much of the change that's taking place and might not even, even if 
they're told about it, they might not understand the implications in terms of the long-term 
objectives for preservation and access. To me, that could be a little risky” 
(StandardDeveloper_02).  
Standard Developer 05 said that uncertainty about organizational structure and staffing 
was a potential source of risk for digital repositories, “I think that the main question of 
uncertainty is related to the low level of organizational infrastructure, more than any other thing. 
Because if you have good people, at the right point, and the responsibility is well developed, the 
uncertainty could be covered” (StandardDeveloper_05). This attitude toward organizational 
infrastructure and the emphasis on appropriate staffing of people with expertise that is relevant to 
the repository reflects the requirements described in the TRAC standard, which emphasize the 
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need for clear policies governing the structure of the repository and ensuring that staff 
understand how their roles support the overall mission of long-term digital preservation.  
 This view of organizational infrastructure and governance as a potential source of risk 
for digital repositories reflects a view of digital repositories as organizations that are at risk of 
losing focus on long-term digital preservation either because of mission scope creep or because 
parent or partner organizations may have goals that differ from the repository. In this sense, the 
standard sets an expectation that repositories will need to defend their focus on long-term 
preservation and that repository staff members should all understand how their role serves that 
mission.  
TRAC auditors reinforced this conceptualization of governance as a potential source of 
risk for digital repositories, focusing on institutional support as the most prominent potential 
source of risk, “the most important aspect of a repository is having an organizational 
commitment with a mission that aligns with the repository” (Auditor_06). Auditors 01, 03, 04, 
05, 06, 07, 08, and 10 described governance and organizational stability issues as both complex 
and uncertain: 
“We don't know if libraries are going to survive. We don't know if universities are 
going to survive. These institutions that support the institution, the repository, are 
also at risk at this point. There's no certainty of anything surviving, so requiring 
that particular content survive into the future, it's really going to be hard to figure 
it out, where to go and who should be supporting this kind of work. Yeah, I do 
think that we don't really know where things are going. We've constructed this 
organizational structure that includes digital repositories, but the content itself, 
whether or not it's protected or not, I don't really know where ... I don't know 
who's going to support it in 50 years. I don't know if it's still going to be a library 
or a university or it's going to be some crowd funded thing. I just don't know, so I 
think that is the biggest risk for almost everything that we're doing now is 
knowing what's going to happen to these institutions because a lot of things are at 
risk right now.” (Auditor_03) 
Auditors expressed attitudes similar to the standard developers when discussing the 
importance of governance in a TRAC audit. Reflecting the requirement described in the standard 
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that digital repositories should have explicit mission statements emphasizing long-term 
preservation, for example, auditors described ongoing organizational support for preservation as 
a challenge for repositories, “Bottom line is it's a tremendous amount of resources required to do 
long-term preservation. Organizational commitment to those types of resources often waxes and 
wanes” (Auditor_05). This auditor went on to say that he thought that the organizational 
infrastructure elements of the TRAC checklist were more aspirational than realistic because in 
practice repositories lack support for long-term preservation:  
“I think certainly the organizational stuff is probably the ... it's the most 
aspirational simply because there are very few organizations who are anywhere 
near in that place that they've got the commitment and the wherewithal and the 
long-term view. In that sense, I'd say the organizational side of it. The reality is 
that there are, for instance, there are very few organizations who have something 
like a formalized digital preservation unit. You have very few organizations that 
have formalized procedures and plans and have those things incorporated into 
let's say their operating goals. That actually is probably addressing a very, very 
small number of organizations who are positioned and capable of getting to that 
place. And typically they're very large. They're your national libraries, they're 
your large collectives. They're at that level, so you're talking about a very small 
number of organizations” (Auditor_05). 
This auditor highlighted the difference between the ideal described in the TRAC standard 
and the reality for digital repositories. The standard states that a trustworthy digital repository 
should have a mission focused primarily on long-term preservation with policies and a staffing 
model designed to support this mission and institutional backing by parent and/or partner 
organizations that share this mission. In practice, auditors described repositories as organizations 
with competing priorities who must continually fight for resources to support long-term digital 
preservation efforts, and whose parent and partner organizations may or may not share their 
commitment to preservation. 
A TRAC audit reflects a snapshot of a digital repository at one point in time. Auditor 07 
explained that securing a commitment to organizational support is an important step, but 
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maintaining that support over time is challenging, “I think things are changing all the time, so it's 
really having the organizational will and money and time to put towards maintaining it. Getting it 
is the first step, but maintaining it is the critical ongoing work.” This view challenges the notion 
that a one-time audit can assess whether a repository is capable of maintaining organizational 
support for long-term digital preservation.  
Other auditors expressed concerns about repository governance that reflected a similar 
attitude, describing organizational support as changeable, “So I guess what I'm trying to illustrate 
is that bad times can come in clusters. It's not just one university saying we can't afford to join 
this year. It could be a bunch, depending on contextual or jurisdictional circumstances. That's a 
major risk for any, being a dues-based membership system organization is a risk that needs to, 
it's not an insurmountable risk, but it's one that I think an organization would need to be aware of 
and would need to disclose in its certification process” (Auditor_09). 
In light of the changeability of organizational support, Auditor 03 said that the audit team 
would want to be alerted to major changes in repository governance over time, “if they were to 
change their governance or if some big change happened, then we would definitely want to know 
so we could discuss it.” This fits with the approach to certification outlined by the auditors – 
namely, that repository staff members are responsible for contacting CRL to notify them about 
major changes to the repository in order to maintain TRAC certification over time. However, 
standard developers and repository staff did not have this expectation. Rather, both standard 
developers and repository staff expected certification to include periodic audits that would be 
conducted on a schedule set by the auditors. Indeed, most repository staff members who were 
interviewed said that they were expecting to be contacted by CRL for a recertification audit at 
some point in the future.  
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 Overall auditors shared the standard developers’ view of organizational instability as a 
potential source of risk for digital repositories. While the standard developers described, through 
interviews as well as in the text of the TRAC standard itself, strategies for a repository staff to 
demonstrate that they had policies and procedures in place to mitigate this risk, the auditors took 
a more circumspect approach to verifying that repositories were mitigating this potential source 
of risk. They described institutional support for digital repositories as changeable and likely to 
decrease over time, and explained that it was easier for repositories to secure initial support for 
digital preservation than to maintain support over time. Auditor attitudes about governance as a 
potential source of risk questions the notion that a one-time audit can assess whether a repository 
should be considered trustworthy in its ability to preserve digital content over the long-term. 
Auditors are enforcing requirements from the TRAC standard in order to certify a repository as 
trustworthy, but they are skeptical about whether long-term trustworthiness with regard to 
governance can be determined in this way. 
As with the standard developers and auditors, repository staff members described 
governance and organizational stability as potential sources of risk for digital repositories, “I feel 
like the funding, the organizational governance, all those things are inherently risky and 
problematic” (RepositoryStaff_02). Like the auditors, these interviewees questioned whether 
TRAC certification could assess the stability of repository governance over time, “I think it 
probably could be quite difficult for any kind of certification program to validate how functional 
a governance system is” (RepositoryStaff_05). Repository staff members described policies and 
practices at their organizations that were complex and continually evolving. 
While all of the repository staff members described long-term preservation of digital 
content as important for their organizations, there was disagreement about whether this should be 
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the central mission of the repository. One interviewee in particular reported that his repository 
did not have a mission statement, and that their long-term goals focused on meeting user needs, 
which happened to include providing long-term access to particular content that was of interest 
to their Designated Community. In the documentation that his repository provided to auditors, 
the goals of their preservation efforts were articulated in the description of their Designated 
Community as providing long-term access to specific digital content for that community, but 
these preservation efforts were not described as part of the repository’s mission. Repository Staff 
18 described the workaround that his repository used to address the criteria in the standard 
without creating a mission statement for the repository that focused specifically on long-term 
preservation:  
“One thing that was interestingly difficult to get was a sort of mission vision 
statement. Which is on some level kind of the most basic of the documents that can 
be. Because it established why you exist in the first place. But it turns out we and 
a lot of other organizations don't have that existing in that form. Rather our 
mandate and our vision comes out of ... well, mandate comes out of the fact that 
the schools continue to pay money to us to exist. And our vision comes from our 
governance structure. So on some level you can say that our vision is to do what 
our community needs us to do. But that's not really useful in the context of the 
audit, so figuring out a way to answer those questions with our strategic plan, 
which we do have, took some time and some conversation” (RepositoryStaff_18). 
This runs counter to the position of the standard developers and auditors, who argued that 
a mission emphasizing long-term preservation was important and necessary for sustainable 
governance and organizational viability, and questioned the central premise of TRAC 
certification by asserting that a repository need not have a mission statement reflecting a 
commitment to long-term preservation of digital content.  
 Several interviewees, including Repository Staff 02, 03, 05, 14, and 15 discussed 
institutional support among partner and/or member organizations as a potential source of risk for 
digital repositories. Repository Staff 02, 06, and 14 explained that institutional support among 
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partners and/or members was a potential threat to the stability of a repository. Repository Staff 
14 focused on political issues such as power struggles within the repository that could arise 
among members with a high level of investment in the organization, “There's a lot of negotiation 
that has to happen and I've seen power struggles with this big organizational infrastructure that I 
don't see on the technical side. Personalities get involved. I think that is the hardest part.” 
Alternately, Repository Staff 02 described problems that could arise when member institutions 
lose their sense of connection to the repository, “the institutional interest are always diffused 
through a governance process, through a prioritization process, through management. All of 
these things can result in the effort feeling less connected to the institution. The institution 
feeling less served by the effort.” Repository Staff 06 explained that the result of this lack of 
connection to the repository could be that participating members lose interest in the repository, 
“There's always the risk of the loss of sort of will or interest of the participating members, or at 
least enough of them. That could be expressed through disinterest in governing it” 
(RepositoryStaff_06). 
 These examples highlight the balance of power that repositories must achieve in 
maintaining the interest and support of their partners and members in the overall mission of long-
term digital preservation, without having any one organization or person take over. Maintaining 
institutional support from founding members was also described as a potential threat to 
repository stability in relation to repository growth over time, “I guess having a governance 
structure that is, we are kind of grappling with this point: How do you take a governance 
structure that has original members and then try and expand that and incorporate new members? 
Is there a tension between those original members and the type of control that they wanted to 
have over it, and the sort of deep engagement that I would imagine that they had as the 
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repository got started, and people who are probably likely to see it more as a service that they are 
paying for?” (RepositoryStaff_15). One interviewee explained that having a large membership 
was one way for a repository to protect itself from the potential threat of losing members, but 
that this approach also had a significant drawback because members would not feel a strong 
sense of responsibility for the repository: 
“I think actually having a large number of organizations involved in paying 
membership dues provides a certain layer of security because you have the ability 
to survive the loss of any one or two particular organizations, but it also possibly 
represents a risk that with such diffused funding there's also a certain diffused 
sense of responsibility. And so if any of those institutions do come under financial 
strain they may feel that the repository can continue to exist without their 
contribution, or with a reduced contribution. Spreading out a funding base 
reduces the importance and impact of any given institution but it also, I think, 
decreases the potential sense of responsibility of each institution towards actually 
continuing to sustain and maintain that commitment.” (RepositoryStaff_07) 
These interviewees depicted institutional support as a potential source of risk to 
repository sustainability because support from partner and/or member organizations was viewed 
as highly changeable and requiring ongoing attention, a position that echoes the attitude 
expressed by TRAC auditors. While institutional support at the time of a TRAC audit may be 
stable, the views described by repository staff members indicate that a one-time assessment of a 
repository will not provide a reliable appraisal of institutional support over time. For example, 
one repository staff member described significant changes to the composition of repository staff 
following their TRAC audit, “That audit was happening, too, during a project where we doubled 
the size of our staff. Then that project’s over, that has shrunk back down, so there are a lot of 
people who joined mid-audit and left either just after or just before the final certification too. Just 
actually thinking back to who was involved there were a lot of people who aren't here now who 
were definitely involved in it” (RepositoryStaff_07). 
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Repository staff described staffing as a potential source of risk for digital repositories, 
and several interviewees either described their repositories as lacking appropriate staffing to 
carry out the work of long-term digital preservation, or described their fellow staff members as 
having a narrow view of the repository based on their roles rather than understanding their work 
in the context of the larger mission of long-term preservation. For example, Repository Staff 05 
described challenges in concentrating IT staff within a repository on the mission of long-term 
preservation and said that his team has tended to lose focus on the larger mission of digital 
preservation, instead focusing on the shorter-term goal of software development, “Sometimes 
there's an argument that arises at times, that we're a software development shop. And, no, we're 
building a library. And we happen to need to make software to do it, right? And that's a hard 
concept sometimes for people to understand. I think their point is that we need everything that a 
software development shop needs. Yes that's true, but let's remember why we're here” 
(RepositoryStaff_05).  
Similarly, Repository Staff 21 described the staffing model of her repository as one that 
was too small to carry out the work necessary for long-term preservation, “It was an issue of 
having not enough staff.” She went on to say that most of her team members did not understand 
the concept of risk in the context of long-term preservation, “I don't think people there really, the 
people on the team aside from a few individuals, really understood that kind of concept of long-
term risk outside of just technical stuff” (RepositoryStaff_21). 
 Repository Staff 17 talked about staffing issues, explaining that staffing, policy, and 
transparency were all driven by available resources, and were therefore notably complex for her 
repository. She described her repository’s TRAC audit as having started their process for 
creating appropriate staffing policies to support the work of the repository, but said that they 
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lacked the financial resources to have appropriate staffing, and to provide necessary training for 
the staff that they did have: 
“I'd say it's staffing, and sort of the roles within the TDR framework. We've had 
like a lot of cutbacks in the last year. I guess again this all relates to funding, but I 
think having the right people working in the right areas and the training that's 
necessary to sort of be really on the ball with all of these areas. I'd say that's a 
challenge. I think that effects, that’s like intertwined in a lot of areas like to be 
really transparent in having policies in place for everything is an area I still think 
that really is complicated for us. I think the TRAC certification really helped us 
start that, like have a foundation, but I still find it a pretty big area that I think we 
could be doing better but we just don't have the resources.” (B17) 
 Repository staff members described organizational instability as a potential source of risk 
for digital repositories, but were skeptical about whether documentation, such as mission 
statements could mitigate this threat. They were also skeptical about whether a one-time audit 
could accurately assess governance issues, which they described as highly changeable over time. 
While repository staff understood the TRAC standard’s requirements in this area, and provided 
documentation to the auditors in response to the checklist items, they also described their 
repositories as lacking in actual governance structures, mission statements, strategic plans, and 
appropriate staffing. For example, although the TRAC standard called for clearly documented 
policies for organizational governance, Repository Staff 03 said that at the time of their TRAC 
audit, his repository had not yet established clear governance processes to manage relationships 
among member organizations, “I think at those times, the process for understanding what the 
members would need and value weren't very sophisticated. A lot of the governance process 
hadn't existed yet. In those early times, I think we were guessing about rules and functionality. 
Then, that turned into a voting process. During the TRAC certification times it was guesswork.” 
This interviewee was from a different repository than Repository Staff 18 above, whose 
organization did not have a mission statement. 
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Standard developers, auditors, and repository staff agreed that organizational instability 
was a potential source of risk for digital repositories. While standard developers and auditors 
agreed that a clear mission statement supported by well-documented policies would offset 
potential threats to repositories and digital content by ensuring that the repository maintained a 
focus on the goal of long-term preservation, repository staff were skeptical about the 
effectiveness of this type of documentation to offset these potential threats. Indeed, repository 
staff members who were interviewed said that they were able to provide the necessary 
documentation to achieve certification despite the fact that their repositories lacked the 
governance structures that they knew the standard was meant to enforce. In the case of repository 
documentation such as a mission statement, the difference between standard developers and 
auditors on one hand, and repository staff on the other, was in part a difference in understanding 
about the function of those policies. Repository staff members disagreed with the standard 
developers and auditors about whether the policies should reflect repository practices, or should 
describe aspirational best practices. Repository staff characterized such policies as ideals that 
their organizations thought they should meet, but also described their repositories as 
organizations that were shaped by power struggles and lacking in the social mechanisms needed 
to meet those ideals. This can be interpreted, in part, as a difference between trustworthiness and 
a desire to be trustworthy. 
Communication, complexity, expertise, organizations, political culture, and vulnerability 
were all factors from my theoretical model that surfaced in relation to organizational governance 
as a potential source of risk for digital repositories. Interviewees described organizational 
governance structures as complex systems in which individuals and organizations with particular 
types of knowledge and expertise come together in order to carry out the work required for long-
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term preservation of digital content. Although standard developers and auditors described 
documentation about repository policies as a way for repositories to mitigate threats relating to 
organizational instability, repository staff were skeptical about whether such documentation 
could stabilize relationships with more powerful institutions.  
4.3.4 Repository Processes 
Interviewees identified processes for digital object management as potential sources of 
risk for digital repositories and digital content. They discussed the ways that metadata creation, 
file format management, and processes, such as content ingest threatened the longevity of digital 
content as well as the ability of digital repositories to carry out their mission of long-term 
preservation. Auditors agreed with the view of risk presented by the standard developers, but 
repository staff argued that the actual work of managing digital content over time was not as 
straightforward as the TRAC standard implies. Repository staff described this section of the 
TRAC standard as one that generated the most disagreement with auditors during their audits, 
but staff members were able to sufficiently communicate their practices and policies, and the 
reasoning behind them, to obtain certification. 
Standard developers discussed repository processes for digital object management, such 
as ingest, transformations, capture/creation and management of metadata, and content delivery as 
potential sources of risk for digital repositories and digital content. Through Section 4 of the 
TRAC standard, “Digital Object Management,” this view of repository processes as a potential 
source of risk is communicated to auditors and repository staff. Sub-sections covering ingest, 
preservation, management, and access of digital content make clear that potential threats exist 
throughout the entire lifecycle of a digital object, and suggest that repositories can demonstrate 
that they have sufficiently identified and addressed those threats through evidence contained in 
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documents including, but not limited to, policies, procedures, agreements, workflows, logs, and 
correspondence. 
Standard developers described the goal of digital object management in a TDR as 
“selecting and preserving the information in a way that will be useful in a long-term 
preservation, as part of the long-term preservation goal” (StandardDeveloper_01). This 
interviewee further explained that digital object management in the context of TRAC was about 
more than “just managing digital formats” (StandardDeveloper_01). Rather, digital object 
management in the context of OAIS and TRAC was “concerned about preserving the 
information content, not just the format” (StandardDeveloper_01). 
Metadata creation, capture, and maintenance were discussed by Standard Developers 01, 
04, 08, and 09. These standard developers explained that it was important for repositories to 
understand their Designated Communities in order to know what type of representation 
information they would need to capture in order to preserve digital content for future use, “if it's 
a long-term repository, preservation for the long-term, then the greatest risk is understanding 
what needs to be captured now so that the data can be understood in the future” 
(StandardDeveloper_04). This interviewee went on to explain that lack of understanding about 
how important metadata are for long-term preservation was a threat to the long-term viability of 
digital content: 
“But all the other areas of which primarily I work in, for example, what metadata 
they have, whether it's representational information or context information, which 
is necessary for the use of data, oftentimes was ignored. The assumption was that 
if you handed somebody a spreadsheet they'd be able to figure it out. And you 
know that's probably true for active archives. But again, if you're talking about 
long-term archives, you know, 30 years from now if people get a spreadsheet 
they'd have no idea how to use it. And of course it gets worse. I mean, if it's one of 
some type of data structure that it would take a programmer to parse it and 
display it, if there's not information about what it means, it's basically useless. 
Sometimes this stuff is almost cryptography trying to figure out what it really 
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meant in the first place. If it's not documented then you can't figure it out. I think 
that's the pattern I found, or I personally observed, was the lack of real 
understanding of what it takes in terms of metadata to make something useful.” 
(StandardDeveloper_04) 
For developers of the TRAC standard, having sufficient, appropriate metadata was 
crucial for long-term preservation of digital content, and this emphasis on representation 
information was reinforced through the standard itself, with several criteria in Section 4 asking 
for information about, and evidence of, metadata capture, creation, and maintenance in order to 
communicate that the repository has identified and addressed this potential threat. 
Another common theme among standard developers was the challenge that file formats 
posed to long-term preservation of digital content, “the more formats that you are taking in and 
using for your AIPs, the more complex that gets, the combinatorics when you start talking about 
multiple file formats, multiple record types, compound records, software dependence of the 
records” (StandardDeveloper_03). Standard Developers 03, 04, 06, and 08 all discussed potential 
threats to repositories and digital content relating to file formats, including potential problems, 
such as file format obsolescence, difficulties in sufficiently documenting unusual file formats, 
and the fact that repositories frequently lack the expertise, staffing, and funding to sustain the 
amount of work that would be necessary to support a large number of different file formats 
within one repository: 
“I think most archives have preferred formats and then they have other formats 
that don't get the support that they need. I think there's a lot of problems with 
long-term missions and funding for archives. That there's a lot of interest in data 
access, but less interest in the long-term preservation of data that, especially data 
that you don't know, whether there's some things that you'll need long-term and 
other things that only get used sporadically. In many archives there's such a low 
access to some pieces of their data, but they'll likely become very important in the 
future. And you find out they haven't been properly preserved in the meantime.” 
(StandardDeveloper_08). 
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Standard Developers 04, 05, 07, 09, and 10 identified repository actions around processes 
to ingest, migrate, and store digital content, as well as actions to verify the fixity or integrity of 
that content as potential sources of risk, “the fixity or the integrity of the data is critical” 
(StandardDeveloper_04). Indeed, Standard Developer 05 explained that a number of factors 
during the ingest process that could negatively impact the repository and/or the longevity of the 
digital content: 
“You have to maintain, as much as possible, the control of what is going to be 
transformed. Some properties [have] to be transformed. And of course in this 
case you can accept the transformation. You must accept. Because the digital 
preservation is dynamic. Formats change, digital signatures cannot be verified. 
So you have to build a documentation system able to document which kind of 
transformations have been done, on which basis. Because many of [these] 
transformation[s] are not reversible. They are forever. You have change and you 
are going to lose the original things and what was.” (StandardDeveloper_05) 
 The standard developers presented a view of repository processes for digital object 
management as one that required substantial amounts of documentation in order to ensure that 
future custodians and users of digital content would be able to access and understand that 
content. While standard developers focused on the potential threat to digital content posed by 
repository staff failing to understand what information to capture, create, and maintain, I found 
that auditors were more concerned that even when repository staff knew what policies and 
practices they should have, repositories would lack the staffing, expertise, funding, or 
organizational will to carry out that work. 
 Interviewees described the work of digital object management as something that takes 
place across different functional areas of a repository, and explained that coordinating and 
managing this work was difficult, “In terms of the actual getting the work done from ingest to 
storage to metadata to access and all that, those functions can be spread all across the 
organization, whatever kind of organization they are. Being able to coordinate those functions 
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and have clear lines of authority about when a policy is put in place, who has to adhere to it, and 
where the responsibility lies, that can be very difficult to do.” (Auditor_01) 
 Auditor 05 argued that repository processes for digital object management were a 
potential source of risk because of the likelihood that they would be abandoned or scaled back 
over time, “they start off with the goal of having defined processes, workflows, and all that sort 
of stuff, and over time a lot of that stuff gets either dropped or the period between things like 
migration activities or even just repository auditing activities expands as the organizations are 
pressed for resources and staff.” 
 Similarly, Auditor 06 described the processes for digital object management over time as 
having uncertain consequences over time, and therefore creating uncertainty about the longevity 
of digital content:  
“Digital preservation is a series of handoffs, probably every five to seven years. 
That you have to continually be touching, and curating, and evaluating content 
and digital collections or else they really will just die. And so the content is 
constantly being moved from server to server, and service provider to service 
provider, and operating among servers with various new operating systems, and 
all of that has effects that we can’t always predict. And so there’s just a whole lot 
of uncertainty around this whole notion of digital preservation that is new and 
different from [physical collections].” (Auditor_06) 
 In terms of errors that could occur in these processes, auditors argued that the stakes were 
high for repositories that focused on long-term preservation because of the likelihood that errors 
would go unnoticed for very long periods of time. For example, one interviewee described 
human error in repository processes for long-term preservation of digital objects as the greatest 
threat to digital repositories:  
“I think human failure, or failure in human-driven processes, which include a lot 
of technical processes. I mean, technical processes are only as good as the 
humans that develop them. The reason that I would distinguish between a 
preservation repository and a general access repository is if something goes 
wrong, if our Sys Admin makes a mistake or an error, introduces an error in an 
access repository, you're likely to know about it right away. Whereas, if a human 
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introduces an error into a preservation repository, you may never know about it 
until it's too late. Until someone 50 years in the future goes to extract that AIP 
and gets something out of it and there's nothing in it.” (Auditor_09) 
 Auditors were concerned with issues relating to file formats, and argued that the 
understandability of different file formats over the long-term was a potential threat to digital 
content: 
“I think that one of the biggest challenges is to get back again to file formats, and 
which data structures have the potential for the longest understandability and 
usability, especially with science, and social science databases. Whether that be 
small surveys, or large, complex, relational databases. You know, how are we 
going to continue to be able to use those over time, and how will we be able to, if 
we will be able to, recover them in the future and make them understandable? 
And I think people are working on this, but I think it is probably the biggest 
challenge, in terms of digital object management” (A10). 
 Overall, auditors understood the view of risk provided by standard developers through 
the TRAC standard, and agreed that repository processes for digital object management were a 
potential source of risk for digital repositories and the content that they were preserving. Yet, 
auditors were more focused on how lack of human resources and human error or loss of 
resources would impact a repository’s ability to carry out the processes necessary for long-term 
preservation, while standard developers were concerned about whether repositories would 
understand the needs of their Designated Communities well enough to capture appropriate 
representation information for preservation and reuse, and whether their workflows and 
procedures were comprehensive enough to capture all of the actions applied to their collections 
over time. Standard developers assumed that addressing this potential source of risk was a matter 
of having enough information and technical knowledge about digital object management, while 
auditors questioned whether that information was knowable and argued that it would not be 
possible over the short term to assess whether a repository’s digital object management processes 
were successful. 
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As with the standard developers and auditors, repository staff members also focused on 
metadata, file formats, and repository processes for digital object management as potential 
sources of risk for digital repositories. Repository staff identified metadata as an area that could 
pose a potential threat to both the repository and the digital content. Repository Staff 03 
explained that poor metadata management practices could negatively impact the usefulness of a 
repository for its users, “The devil’s in the details. You can maintain preservation metadata and 
do it well. Or you could do it poorly. And so risks, I guess, implicit there are if it’s not 
normalized, if it’s not taking advantage of controlled vocabularies or authority, things like that, 
then the quality of the preservation metadata, if it’s poor, could present a risk to the usefulness of 
the repository” (RepositoryStaff_03). In addition to maintaining metadata over time, Repository 
Staff 07 emphasized that metadata objects change over time and it is important for repositories to 
keep pace with the changes to digital objects and their metadata in order to preserve digital 
content, “in terms of the actual content itself what we're finding is that it all changes, and in 
particular the metadata about objects changes a lot more than the underlying objects themselves. 
Both in terms of being enriched and enhanced over time, but also in terms of just being 
corrected.” (RepositoryStaff_07). 
Repository staff agreed with the standard developers that the work of maintaining file 
formats over time could pose a potential risk to repositories because of the amount of time and 
resources required to do that work, “Those that do take heterogeneous content, yet have an 
expectation of format migration or access or even possibly normalization, but they'll take in 
heterogeneous content, anything where it's not as simple as possible, like I think that is 
tremendous complexity on all levels. I mean, sure, there's code to deal with it, and that can be 
hard, but harder than that is policies that you can actually apply and get buy-in and everything at 
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all of the places where your data might be coming from and at the right point” 
(RepositoryStaff_06).  
However, repository staff disagreed that file format obsolescence or lack of expertise 
would be a problem for repositories and argued instead that as long as there was sufficient 
interest and knowledge in the repository or its Designated Community they would be able to 
make sense of the digital content, “So much data is not human readable. I mean you can maybe 
look into a file, but it generally requires software. And data in a lot of ways is almost software 
itself, right? I mean it is in a complex file format can be extremely difficult to parse. We can do it 
now, we have the tools and all that. And if you have enough ... if there's enough of something in 
the world, it's probably going to be all right.” (RepositoryStaff_05). Repository Staff 04 pointed 
to current successes with outdated formats as an example, “You know, we've worried a lot in the 
preservation community about Word Perfect is gone. We can't read Word Perfect anymore or 
these weird file formats are gone and it's actually never been the case. We've never not been able 
to figure out what we've got, as long as we've still got it.” (RepositoryStaff_04). 
Repository Staff 08, 12, and 15 spoke at length about processes to ingest content as costly 
and time consuming, “Ingest of content is the most expensive piece, and it is where almost all the 
resources are spent. And unfortunately, true for [repository], true for everyone, the content that is 
most at risk is the most expensive to ingest.” (RepositoryStaff_12). Similarly, Repository Staff 
08 explained that it was costly to ingest digital content in a way that would support her 
repository’s mission of long-term preservation, “More often, however, the data would come to 
[repository] that had not been very rigorously produced or managed, and so it was expensive and 
time-consuming for us to process it in a way that allowed us to be confident of our preservation 
commitment.” (RepositoryStaff_08). 
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Repository staff painted a picture of digital object management processes as ongoing, 
time-consuming activities that required regular actions but did not guarantee long-term success. 
Repository Staff 07 explained that digital content requires regular attention in order to ensure the 
integrity of each item, and also to ensure that it will be usable for the Designated Community, 
“There's so many items that can simply become obsolete as well as physically degrade and long-
term digital preservation requires handling the data on a regular basis, so that you actually are 
continually testing your assumptions that it's not only still there but still usable and fit for a 
particular purpose.” On the other hand, Repository Staff 11 argued that the practical work of 
carrying out digital object management processes required making compromises in order to 
balance the other priorities of the repository against the amount of time and resources that would 
be needed to meet the ideal standards for digital object management processes, “One of the 
interesting things about being a preservation organization is that on the one hand you often have 
very high lofty ideals, but you have to balance that. There's a risk to meeting them. You have to 
balance that with the practical decisions” (RepositoryStaff_11). 
In contrast to the attitudes expressed by standard developers and auditors, that it was 
difficult for repository staff to meet the criteria set forth in the TRAC standard for digital object 
management, and that the discrepancy between the ideal and what repositories were likely to be 
able to accomplish presented a potential threat to repositories and content. Repository Staff 07 
explained that this was an area of risk for digital repositories because best practices for managing 
digital objects for long-term preservation have yet to be established, “It quickly gets mind 
numbingly complex and we've talked about it a lot and have not come to any really good future-
proof answers that we're comfortable with in terms of identifying objects uniquely, and 
perpetually, and persistently.” (RepositoryStaff_07). 
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This disagreement between repository staff and standard developers and auditors about 
whether meeting the criteria described in the standard would ensure the longevity of digital 
content surfaced during the audit of Repository Staff 04’s repository, “That was an awful lot of 
give and take. Then, there were a lot of revisions we had to do in our technical section because of 
that. I don't mean this as an insult, but they wanted clean, formulaic answers, and there just 
weren't any” (RepositoryStaff_04). He emphasized that the auditors, following the TRAC 
standard, wanted his repository to provide clear responses to the criteria in Section 4, but that he 
found the actual work of managing digital objects to be complicated and messy. Indeed, several 
repository staff members identified this area as one where they disagreed with auditors, or where 
auditors required a substantial amount of additional information before they would agree to 
certify the repository. 
Standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members all described processes for 
digital object management as a potential source of risk for repositories. While standard 
developers and auditors characterized digital object management as relatively straightforward 
and held that clear documentation of digital object management processes would mitigate risks 
in this area, repository staff argued that the actual work of managing digital content over time 
was not as straightforward as the TRAC standard implies. This was the section of the TRAC 
standard that repository staff reported as the most contentious during the audit process, because 
auditors wanted clear documentation communicating repository processes, and repository staff 
members viewed their processes for digital object management as complex and difficult to 
communicate via documentation. 
Communication and complexity emerged as particularly strong factors in terms of 
repository processes for digital object management. All three groups, standard developers, 
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auditors, and repository staff, described digital object management processes as complex, but 
they disagreed about whether this complexity could be mitigated through clear documentation. 
While standard developers and auditors expected repository staff to communicate their processes 
in a clear, straightforward manner, repository staff members said that these processes were 
complex and messy, and did not lend themselves to simplification in the way that the audit 
process demanded. 
4.3.5 Technical Infrastructure  
Interviewees identified threats to the technical infrastructure of digital repositories as a 
potential source of risk. Standard developers and auditors described threats to technical 
infrastructure as identifiable and manageable and argued that repositories who engaged in the 
environmental monitoring required by the TRAC standard would be able to understand and 
respond to these threats. While some repository staff members agreed with this perspective, 
others questioned whether their repositories would be able to identify threats, and if they did 
identify them, thought that they might not have the resources to respond. 
Among standard developers, threats to the technologies upon which repositories are built 
were described as a significant but manageable source of risk for digital repositories and their 
content. These interviewees identified aging hardware and software, costliness of maintenance, 
and the ongoing work required to sustain trustworthy infrastructure over time as potential 
sources of risk with straightforward solutions such as equipment replacement, software upgrades, 
content migration, and up-front investment in infrastructure.  
Standard developers argued that the technical infrastructure of a repository was both 
complex and continually evolving as new digital preservation solutions come along, “The 
already complex world of hardware and software platforms. The concept of the virtual computer 
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has not proven to be very successful yet. We’re stuck right now in, really, taking baby steps in 
terms of our hardware and our software approaches to digital preservation. We’ve got to get 
some kind of more universal, more virtual approach, to how we can preserve all formats of 
digital materials” (StandardDeveloper_06). This complexity, they explained, requires continual 
monitoring in order to keep abreast of changes in the environment, “For example, one of the 
areas of the audit and certification standard is concerned with regular monitoring of changes in 
the environment, and that's complex because it can mean hardware obsolescence” 
(StandardDeveloper_09). 
 The text of the TRAC standard echoes this belief in the importance of ongoing 
monitoring in order to maintain up-to-date hardware and software. Section 5, “Infrastructure and 
Security Risk Management” includes several criteria focused on monitoring different aspects of 
the repository infrastructure, such as 5.1.1.1 which states, “The repository shall employ 
technology watches or other technology monitoring notification systems” (Consultative 
Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 65). The supporting text for this item explains that, 
“This is necessary to track when hardware or software components will become obsolete and 
migration is needed to new infrastructure” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 
2012, p. 65). Through this document, the standard developers frame threats to technical 
infrastructure as identifiable, often predictable, and as something that can be addressed before it 
becomes a problem. 
 While standard developers framed threats to technical infrastructure as manageable, they 
did point out that people were one of the biggest challenges in mitigating these threats, “The 
difficulty is always people. The hardware and software is always going to be much easier” 
(StandardDeveloper_07). For example, while it might be relatively simple to set a timeframe for 
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hardware replacement, it may be difficult to secure the necessary funding to follow that 
replacement schedule, “You can't tell a resource allocator, as you suggested in here, which is a 
reasonable time frame, that you're going to basically wipe out everything and replace it all in 
three years. That what is brand new and spiffy and perfect now will all be gone in three years 
because it will be inadequate. Resource allocators don't like to hear that. They view this stuff as 
more permanent somehow. As more tangible assets, like a brick and mortar building, for 
example” (StandardDeveloper_06). 
In contrast, another standard developer argued that the cost of storage decreases 
exponentially over time, and that securing funding for long-term preservation was more about 
the ongoing work of digital object management rather than infrastructure: 
“So whereas initially [a] petabyte may be on one or two, maybe it's two tapes, in 
three years time it’ll be on a small part of one tape. In another three years, it'll be 
on a tiny part of one tape, and in another three years it'll be next to nothing on a 
tape, and so the management of it will be negligible from then on because it's just 
this much of a tape and that's nothing in terms of the cost of the tape and the 
processing to check these things. So all of that is significant in terms of the costs, 
so then the costs come to actually making sure the data is usable.” 
(StandardDeveloper_07) 
Standard developers framed threats to the technical infrastructure of a repository as 
ongoing and manageable. Standard developers established an understanding of long-term 
preservation in which digital content is expected to survive but the technologies used to store, 
preserve, and access it are not. Through the text of the TRAC standard, they communicated to 
both auditors and repository staff that a trustworthy digital repository should be able to 
demonstrate a firm understanding of the limitations of its infrastructure, and an ability to 
preserve digital content beyond the lifespan of any given part of that infrastructure. 
Auditors were in agreement with standard developers about the importance of technical 
infrastructure and the notion that threats to technical infrastructure were significant but 
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manageable for digital repositories, “A technical infrastructure is not difficult. It may cost you a 
bunch of money, but it's a solvable problem and you kind of assume it's robust given that there 
are processes and checks and all sort of things in place to verify that it's robust” (Auditor_09). 
The expectation that money could solve problems relating to technical infrastructure was 
shared by several auditors, “Everything else from a, comes down to the challenge of 
technological change, but a lot of the technological change can be mitigated with sufficient 
resources” (Auditor_05). Similarly, auditors argued that in addition to having sufficient 
resources, having appropriate staffing with the right kinds of expertise was also important for 
mitigating threats to the technical infrastructure of a repository, “The biggest thing I learned is 
that the human factors are more important than the technology factors. Because the technology 
factors, as long as you have good people and support for the technology, you can do that” 
(Auditor_08). 
Auditor 08 went on to explain that both the hardware and software of a repository require 
specialized knowledge and expertise, but that in general technologies for digital repositories are 
well known, “I think the technology is pretty well known at this point, and there's a variety of 
options that people can use in terms of the technology stack. There's a certain amount of 
specialized skills and knowledge that an organization needs to recruit for its core staff to be 
successful in the technology implementation around this, but you can usually find those people” 
(Auditor_08). Implicit in this perspective is the assumption that with enough resources and the 
right kind of expertise, potential sources of risk to a repository’s technical infrastructure can be 
ameliorated. 
In the context of a TRAC audit, one auditor explained that an important goal of the site 
visit is to inspect the physical infrastructure, including equipment, software, and facilities in 
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order to confirm that the documentation provided by repository staff accurately represents the 
repository, “You're there to gather evidence of facts, so yes, there is a data center and its doors 
are locked and under alarm. There is earthquake monitoring. So you know, one responsibility 
was to see things, okay? And I think that's really important. You see staff, you see equipment, 
you see servers, you're shown auditing software, and audit reports, and system logs, and all kinds 
of things. You see them live. So you're bringing evidence yourself, you're a witness” 
(Auditor_10). Auditor 08 described some of the questions that he has asked himself when 
assessing a repository’s technical infrastructure during an audit: “Looking at the software itself, 
what's the nature of that? Is it proprietary commercial software? Is it community access, open-
source software? What is the strength of the community around that software whether it's 
commercial or open-source, and to what extent does the organization engage with whatever that 
community is? Active engagement shows that the repository organization is close to the further 
development of that technology, which is something you want to see” (Auditor_08). 
One auditor explained that in his view, questions pertaining to the technical infrastructure 
of digital repositories will become easier to manage over time, “That the technical infrastructure 
is going to continue to evolve and the questions, I am imagining, will become more tractable 
over time” (Auditor_04). In contrast, Auditor 05 said that the difficulty of predicting changes to 
technical infrastructure was a potential threat to digital repositories: 
“Probably from a complexity standpoint it's forecasting that technological 
change. There's a lot of expectation since there's fairly rapid change and you 
build your IDs around that, only to turn out that things don't change as quickly as 
you thought they were, which then ... I mean in theory that's a good thing, but it 
means that it's often hard to predict how much effort has to be done which then 
means that when you go back and you're requesting funding for the next cycle, the 
next year, the next whatever and you're asked, ‘Well, you didn't do that,’ and you 
say, ‘Well, because it wasn't necessary. There were no formats of significance 
that changed over that time period.’ Then when you come back and ask for that 
again and it's like, ‘Well, why do you keep including it if it's not happening?’ 
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Conversely, sometimes things happen extraordinarily rapidly, especially in an 
emerging area, and no matter how much you budget for, or no matter how much 
you've planned for it, the speed of change exceeds what you've forecasted. It's 
really the complexity of identifying where those change inflection points are, 
where it can have an impact in terms of loss of data, in terms of inaccessibility of 
the existing data, that kind of stuff. I don't know if there's anyone who's actually 
any good at it.” (A05) 
Overall, auditors were in agreement with the view communicated by standard developers 
that although threats to the technical infrastructure of a repository were serious, they were also 
knowable and manageable. Both standard developers and auditors developed a view of potential 
sources of risk in this area as issues that repositories seeking TRAC certification should be able 
to identify and mitigate. 
While repository staff members were in agreement with standard developers and auditors 
that threats to technical infrastructure were potential sources of risk for digital repositories, 
repository staff expressed mixed attitudes about the manageability of those threats. Some 
repository staff members agreed with the view of technical infrastructure as a potential source of 
risk that was manageable while others argued that technical issues could not be separated from 
other aspects of repository management, such as funding and staffing, and that problems in those 
areas had the potential to make threats to technical infrastructure intractable. 
Repository staff who described threats to technical infrastructure as identifiable and 
manageable framed those issues as complicated but solvable, “Technical problems can all be 
solved” (RepositoryStaff_07). For example, one interviewee explained that technical solutions, 
including responses to scaling issues, were things that a repository could handle, “I feel like there 
are complications on a technical level that you can just kind of deal with. Scaling issues are 
scaling issues, but ultimately you can deal with those with technical solutions” 
(RepositoryStaff_018). 
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In contrast, several repository staff members described examples from their own 
experience where staffing issues compounded potential sources of risk relating to the technical 
infrastructure of their repositories. For example, one interviewee explained that staffing issues, 
including turnover, created instances where repository software was not understood by repository 
staff, “[We have] various generations of software and they've been developed by different 
people. We're not a huge organization, obviously, so it's not that big a deal, but we certainly have 
pieces of software that people are like, I have no idea what that is. Or, I know what that is, but I 
didn't write it. So I think that's really where most of our complexity lies” (RepositoryStaff_04). 
Another interviewee described the stakes for not understanding repository software as 
particularly high in instances where repository staff think that they understand their infrastructure 
and fail to catch problems until it is too late, “So that's a vulnerability. Especially software. You 
think it's doing one thing. Everybody thinks it's doing one thing, and then you find out if it's 
doing something else, and then maybe it's too late. I can't say I've seen that happen, but the 
potential is there” (ReposioryStaff_05). 
Repository Staff 03, an IT manager from a TRAC certified repository, described his 
approach to managing technical infrastructure as being driven by a desire to prevent the 
repository from being affected by a failure, “As far as the technical infrastructure too, I never 
wanted us to be impacted by failures. I never wanted to say, ‘We had some sort of system failure 
but, we think everything's okay.’ Or ‘Service was down for this time because of some unplanned 
thing that we didn't understand.’ I really tried to keep everything to a high bar in terms of those 
kinds of technical considerations. Redundancy for all of the – Also, I didn't want to respond to 
crisis. I didn't want my staff to have to respond to crises. You know?” 
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In addition to questioning whether breakdowns in technical infrastructure would be 
identified, repository staff also argued that repositories could not assume that they would always 
have the staffing to support their infrastructure and respond to potential threats, “We have three 
now. But we're still doing the work that we did when we were seven. So there's things that are 
not happening that I wish were happening. You know, even on a systems side, I haven't done 
these quick operating system upgrades and security patches as we did when we had the staff that 
was dedicated to that. So even though I'm the systems lead, I spend more time writing software 
than managing the systems, just because the software changes are more strategically important 
than some of the other things” (RepositoryStaff_16). 
While most of the interviewees focused on the functionality of the technical infrastructure 
of repositories as crucial for digital object management and long-term preservation of digital 
content, Repository Staff 04 argued that in his experience hardware and software were fragile but 
data were robust, “It definitely influences it on the technical side, because I've seen computers 
fail for 30 something years. They all failed and they all break. They're exceedingly fragile. 
Storage is exceedingly fragile, so that's always in the back of my mind for all those things. At the 
same time, I'm sounding like a broken record, but what has actually been very robust has been 
the data” (RepositoryStaff_04). While most of the risks described in this section were framed by 
interviewees in terms of the longevity of digital content, interviewees tended to discuss technical 
infrastructure on its own terms.  
Interviewees largely identified threats to the technical infrastructure of repositories as a 
potential source of risk that was straightforward and within the power of repository staff to 
address. While repository staff shared the understanding of this potential source of risk as 
communicated through the TRAC standard, they disagreed about whether responding to threats 
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in this area would be as clear-cut for their repositories as the standard developers and auditors 
assumed it would be. 
The factors from my theoretical model for the social construction of risk that arose most 
frequently in this section were complexity and expertise. Standard developers, auditors, and 
repository staff members all described technical infrastructure as complex, they disagreed about 
whether repository staff would be able to identify and respond to threats to digital repositories. 
While some repository staff members agreed with standard developers and auditors in their 
characterization of technical infrastructure as manageable, other repository staff members argued 
that other areas of repository management such as funding and staffing would prevent their 
repository from maintaining the level of expertise needed to identify and mitigate threats to their 
technical infrastructure.  
4.4 TRAC Audit Process and Factors that Influence the Social Construction of Risk 
4.4.1 Site Visit 
Standard developers, auditors, and repository staff described the site visit as an important 
element of the overall audit process. While standard developers and auditors characterized the 
site visit as an opportunity to provide information lacking in a repository’s documentation, and to 
investigate whether the documentation accurately depicts a repository’s day-to-day operations, 
repository staff described the site visit as an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of their 
documentation. All three groups emphasized the importance of face-to-face communication 
between auditors and repository staff members, and reported that the site visit allowed auditors 
to develop a better understanding of the repository as an organization.  
Although the TRAC standard does not provide specific guidance about how the audit 
process should be conducted, several standard developers said that auditors should conduct a site 
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visit as part of their assessment. Standard Developers 01, 03, 08, and 10 all described a process 
whereby the audit team would review documentation provided by a repository, and then visit the 
repository in order to determine whether the documentation was an accurate depiction of the 
repository’s day-to-day practices. For example, Standard Developer 03 explained that the face-
to-face communication during the site visit was crucial for developing a shared understanding 
between auditors and repository staff about the checklist requirements and whether the repository 
staff had sufficiently addressed them, “But then often what you find when you get on-site is, you 
can develop sort of a picture of what a repository is doing from that documentation, but when 
you’re actually there with the folks in front of you and you actually sit down with them and have 
them demonstrate some of the processes that they use you find new questions that you hadn't 
thought of that you need to ask them about.” 
Indeed, Standard Developer 08 also explained that the site visit provided an opportunity 
for auditors to gather information that would fill in gaps in a repository’s documentation, “Then 
when you do the onsite audit portion of the audit, you sort of delve into those areas in a deeper 
way to-and try to talk with the staff and determine whether they just didn’t have enough response 
they could provide at the time, or they didn’t know the right things to put down. Sometimes you 
can help them get to a point where they know what's being asked and they can fill in the pieces.”  
Certification reports produced by CRL for each of the six TRAC certified repositories 
state that the audit process included a site visit by members of the audit team. Auditors explained 
that the activities that took place at each site visit varied, depending on the documentation 
submitted by the repository, “It really depends on what kinds of responses we get from the self-
audit and the documentation what we decide to look at at the site visit, but we need to confirm all 
the things that we had questions about and talk to the right people to help clarify other questions. 
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Then we go back to the panel and talk to them about what we found, and then we come out with 
the report” (Auditor_03). 
Auditor 10 explained that the site visits generally included meetings and presentations as 
well as inspection of facilities, and that direct communication with repository staff was important 
for understanding the people and the organization, and putting the repository’s documentation 
into context, “you have staff meetings, you have presentations, tours of the ... you'd see all the 
hardware, and the servers. You'd check for security disaster plans. You meet with head of the IT, 
of the whole, usually with the person who's in charge of the data centers. Usually you meet with 
people from the organization” (Auditor_10). She went on to explain that the act of observing 
repository practices in-person is an important part of the audit process, and that the site visit 
itself is part of the evidence that auditors should consider during an audit, along with the 
documentation, “You see staff, you see equipment, you see servers, you're shown auditing 
software, and audit reports, and system logs, and all kinds of things. You see them live. So you're 
bringing evidence yourself, you're a witness” (Auditor_10). 
Auditors 05 and 08 explained that while members of the audit advisory panel reviewed 
repository documentation, they did not participate in the site visit. Rather, a small team of 
auditors consulted with the advisory panel before and after the site visit, with the goal of 
developing a deeper understanding of repository policies and practices, and filling in gaps that 
the advisory panel had identified in repository documentation: 
“I think that in our case we were heavily dependent on the auditors to actually go 
to them and clarify some of the issues. Things like the site visit to actually verify 
that their documentation and their behavior were identical. I think for the most 
part the information that the auditors brought back was certainly at least verified 
most of what they were saying. Certainly in the documentation itself, in the 
repository's documentation, there was a number of things that were definitely, 
when we looked at it, more aspirational than actual. This is what they were 
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hoping to do, and they were planning to get there, type of thing. Certainly not all 
the stuff that we looked at were things that had materialized yet.” (Auditor_05) 
Indeed, Auditor 08 explained that the advisory panel relied on auditors to use the site visit 
to further investigate problems that were identified through the documentation, “If we had really 
critical security issues that we brought up, those would translate into [auditor] and [auditor] 
following up when they did their site visit.”  
Auditors described the site visits as a crucial element of the TRAC audit process, and 
stressed the importance of the information that the auditors gathered while on-site at a repository 
for their assessment of each repository, “you come to understand certain policies or decisions, 
when you're on site, that may be a little bit more difficult to grasp from paper” (Auditor_10). In 
some cases, members of the audit advisory panel said that they would have liked to participate in 
the site visit, but acknowledged that it would be financially impractical, “There's probably things 
that I certainly would have liked to have been part of the site visits, for instance. Pragmatically, it 
would have been unrealistic from a cost perspective, but those are the kinds of things where 
you’re aligning the documentation to actual behavior for instance” (Auditor_05). It would also 
prevent the advisory panel from remaining anonymous during the audit process, “The panel 
never really talks to the repository” (Auditor_03). 
Repository staff agreed with the standard developers and auditors that the site visit was 
an important part of the TRAC audit process. While standard developers and auditors described 
the site visit as an opportunity to fill in gaps from the documentation, repository staff largely 
described the site visit as an exercise in confirming that their documentation was indeed an 
accurate representation of a repository’s day-to-day operations, “my feeling about the on site was 
always that it was there just to make sure that everything from what they had been told up to that 
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point actually checked out. And to have some conversations in a slightly higher bandwidth 
environment” (RepositoryStaff_18).  
Repository Staff 07, 11, 13, 16, 18, and 19 all characterized the site visit as a positive 
experience. Repository Staff 11 and 13 both said that their site visits went smoothly because they 
had planned ahead in order to manage the process and keep both repository staff members and 
auditors focused and on-task throughout the visit: 
“We managed the on-site review pretty carefully. We divided it up into sections 
that corresponded to the sections of the readable documentation structure, not the 
16363 one. We prepared presentations and demos for each of those sections. We 
had two, in some cases three, run-throughs with the whole team for each of those 
sections. We had set up visits to the secure machine rooms where the hardware 
was. Things like that. We actually tried to, we tried to control the on-site review 
process as much as possible, and I think that ended up working well, because by 
the time, we gave them time in each of the sections for asking questions, and then 
there was time at the end for them to go away and think about what they'd seen 
and then come back with more questions and we had pretty much answered their 
questions by the time they went away and started to think about other questions to 
ask.” (RepositoryStaff_13) 
Similarly, Repository Staff 16 described the site visit as consisting of both discussions 
and demonstrations, “It was that there was a series of questions, but there was also a bit of a 
show-and-tell.” Repository staff generally characterized the site visits as successful, and said that 
they felt that by the end the auditors understood their repositories, “I think they had a pretty good 
understanding by the end of the meeting … There seemed to be a pretty good understanding of 
how we operated, both at the technology level and governance level” (RepositoryStaff_19). 
 In contrast, Repository Staff 21 said that she found the site visit to be superficial. She said 
that she had expected the auditors to be more skeptical of the repository, and to seek out 
evidence to support the repository’s documentation rather than trusting repository staff members 
at their word, “I just felt, they're not really diving in deep enough. It's just asking surface 
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questions based off of the checklist criteria and not really going in depth in terms of evaluating 
the content” (RepositoryStaff_21).  
Overall, standard developers, auditors, and repository staff were in agreement about the 
importance of the site visit and the value of direct, face-to-face communication between auditors 
and repository staff in establishing a shared understanding of repository policies and practices. 
While standard developers and auditors described the site visit as an opportunity to ask 
questions, gather additional information, and verify the accuracy of repository documentation, 
repository staff described the site visit as a chance to demonstrate the accuracy of their 
documentation and provide auditors with an understanding of their organization in order to 
provide context for their documentation. Auditors, a group whose professional backgrounds 
tended to emphasize administration and management, described a focus on getting answers to 
their questions, while repository staff, a group with diverse professional experience but whose 
roles tended to be focused on hands-on work rather than repository administration, expressed 
mixed opinions about the depth of understanding that auditors were able to reach in just a couple 
of days and in some cases argued that maintaining strict control over the site visit agenda helped 
them to shape the process.  
4.4.2 Maintaining Certification 
Standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members agreed that repositories 
should undergo periodic reviews to maintain TRAC certification. However, they disagreed about 
how frequently such reviews should happen and who should initiate them. The TRAC standard 
does not provide much guidance about how repositories should maintain certification, and 
standard developers did not discuss recertification much, but many auditors and repository staff 
members were under the impression that the TRAC standard called for recertification every three 
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years. This recertification schedule was not supported by the CRL certification reports, nor by 
the auditors who were directly involved in helping repositories to maintain their certification. 
Rather, auditors expected that repository staff members would contact them any time a new 
disclosure and/or inspection was needed, while repository staff members expected that their 
recertification reviews would be initiated by the CRL auditors.  
The TRAC standard states that maintaining certification is an ongoing activity, 
“Attaining trustworthy status is not a one-time accomplishment, achieved and forgotten. To 
retain trustworthy status, a repository will need to undertake a regular cycle of audit and/or 
certification” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 19). While this does not 
specify a schedule, one standard developer explained that certification should entail annual 
audits as well as recertification every three years, “You have continuing audits. You have yearly 
maintenance audits and you have to get recertified … every three years” 
(StandardDeveloper_08).  
CRL issued a certification report for each repository which specified that ongoing 
certification was contingent upon regular disclosures every two years as well as periodic 
inspection as determined by mutual agreement (Center for Research Libraries, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). Interviews with auditors revealed a lack of consensus among one 
another as well as with the text of the audit reports about how repositories should maintain their 
certification. Auditor 03 explained that, “As long as their conditions remain about the same as 
when they were certified, the TRAC certification holds. It doesn't have an expiration” 
(Auditor_03). She added that repositories should notify CRL of any substantial changes, 
“They're supposed to tell us if there's any significant changes within the organization, and then 
we would decide whether or not we needed to review it” (Auditor_03). 
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In contrast, Auditor 06 said that the repositories were told that they would be reviewed 
for recertification after three years, but noted that the three-year reviews have not happened, 
“The findings were issued generally with provisos that they would be revisited in three years. 
That hasn’t happened and I doubt it ever will happen.” Auditors 08 and 10 both agreed that 
repositories should undergo regular audits in order to maintain certification, but were unsure 
about what the schedule should be, “There’s some expectation that once you get audited, you 
renew that audit, that certification, with a subsequent audit. I think one question in the 
community is how often that should occur” (Auditor_08).  
While repository staff shared similarly mixed opinions about the audit schedule for 
recertification, most expected that CRL would initiate the process and several indicated that their 
repositories expected to be contacted for their recertification audit. For example, Repository Staff 
07 said that his repository expected to be revisited by the CRL auditors every two years but at the 
time of the interview had yet to be contacted, “According to the certification report itself they 
require biennial disclosures so the first one wouldn't be due until June. We do internal reviews 
annually where we go through all the documentation process and update them. We did one 
internally last year but according to the conditions of certification they require disclosures every 
two years, so they haven't asked us yet. I'm assuming they will in another month or so but we 
haven't heard anything.” He said that his repository might follow up if they were not contacted 
by CRL, but that he was doubtful about the likelihood of being revisited, “I think if we didn't 
hear anything from them for an extended period of time then we might follow-up and ask. We 
also understand that this is not something that they have a tremendous amount of resources to 
devote to either. I’m not even sure if, it sounds like they might not want to be doing a lot of 
certifications anymore because they found them to be quite onerous.” 
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Similarly, Repository Staff 16 said that he thought his repository was due for a 
recertification review, “We have a renewal coming up.” Repository Staff 04 said that although 
his repository was told that they would have to go through recertification audits every three 
years, he thought that was an impractical timeframe in light of how long the first audit took, 
“When we were going through it, the time period that kept coming up was three years. You 
should get re-certified every three years. There were two issues with that. One is if you take a 
year and a half to certify us, taking every three years, we would never stop being audited.” He 
also noted that the three-year mark had come and gone with no word from CRL about 
recertification, “CRL has never come back to us about recertification.” 
Several repository staff members said that their repositories were updating documentation 
in preparation for their recertification audit, including Repository Staff 16 who said that his 
repository was preparing for another audit despite being unsure what would be required of them 
for recertification, “The impression that I have of the update is that they may ask us questions, 
but they also may not ask us anything. So we’re updating our documentation just as we have 
been. So the idea is that the documentation isn’t supposed to be static. Documentation is 
supposed to be updated to reflect what is current at the time. And so a number of those processes 
have been updated since then. But whether they’ll be reading the documentation and asking us 
questions, I don’t know” (RepositoryStaff_16). 
In contrast, Repository Staff 11 and 17, who were from different repositories, were the 
only interviewees to report that their repositories were in regular contact with CRL in order to 
advise them of major changes. Repository Staff 11 said that her repository would reach out to 
CRL as needed to update documentation, “We actually stay in touch now. As things change or 
shift, we'll reach out to CRL and let them know what we've got going on.” Repository Staff 17 
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was the only repository staff member who described a process of updating documentation and 
notifying CRL of those updates that matched the process described by Auditor 03, “We do an 
annual review that we submit to them. Sometimes they follow up, sometimes they don't. We did 
one last year and that just goes through all of the documentation, anything that's changed, we 
make note of it. So if our standards have been updated, or infrastructure had been changed, 
anything like that. Or staffing. So that's what I’m in charge of this year, so I'm doing TDR review 
for them, it's due at the end of the summer … I'm not exactly sure if we send it or if we just do 
the review and then if they sometimes they ask us for it, and sometimes they don't. So it's more 
of an open ended process, but we just do it anyway.” 
The open-ended statement in the TRAC standard about a regular cycle of audits to 
maintain certification left the actual schedule of review up to the auditing organization, and the 
certification reports indicate that the recertification schedule was left open at the end of the 
certification process as well. The lack of clarity about how repositories should maintain their 
certification and whether CRL would initiate a recertification process after a set period of time 
created a great deal of uncertainty among both auditors and repository staff about the 
certification process, and about the length of time that their certification would last, “If someone, 
anyone, came and said you should take that off your website, you should stop saying you’re 
certified, I’d have a hard time arguing with them. If CRL came and said your period has ended, 
you’re no longer certified, I probably would not disagree with them” (RepositoryStaff_04). 
As with the audit checklist and the anonymity of TRAC auditors, communication was a 
significant factor in this area. Audit reports indicate that an ongoing review schedule would be 
determined by mutual agreement between CRL and each repository (Center for Research 
Libraries, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015), but most repository staff members said that the 
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email they received with the audit results was the last communication that they had with the audit 
team. With the exception of Auditor 03 and Repository Staff 11 and 17, neither auditors nor 
repository staff understood when or how recertification would happen. Even other staff members 
at the same repositories at Repository Staff 11 and 17 did not share their understanding of 
recertification. 
Repository staff members described their organizations as continually changing to meet 
the needs of their stakeholders, and to keep up with new technologies. Most repository staff 
members who were interviewed for this study said that their repositories had implemented 
substantial changes since they achieved TRAC certification. TRAC is a certification system 
focused on demonstrating trustworthiness of digital repositories through a process of external 
review (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012). As such, repositories claiming 
certification but operating under policies and practices that have not been reviewed – even when 
repository staff believe them to be improvements over the versions that were reviewed during 
their audit – calls into question whether external stakeholders can trust claims of TRAC 
certification to tell them anything about the current state of a repository. 
4.5 Conclusion 
My dissertation has demonstrated that individuals involved in the TRAC audit process 
largely understood risk in terms of specific threats to repositories and their digital content. 
Although they described risk as knowable and calculable and expressed the belief that people 
would behave in rational and predictable ways in response to risk information, my analysis 
revealed differences in how each of the three participant groups understood potential sources of 
risk. While standard developers, auditors, and repository staff tended to agree on the major 
categories of potential risk for digital repositories (i.e., finance, organizational governance, legal, 
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repository processes, and technical infrastructure), repository staff often disagreed with standard 
developers and auditors about whether the audit process could accurately assess their ability to 
mitigate those risks and ensure the long-term preservation of digital content. For example, 
repository staff, a group consisting of people with varied educational and professional 
experiences who tended to be less senior than the standard developers or auditors but were more 
likely to be in professional roles where they were directly carrying out the work of preserving 
digital content, expressed greater skepticism about the effectiveness of succession plans as 
mitigation tools for financial risk and their discussion about this topic tended to focus on the 
immediacy of the threat to their organization, their role, and the digital content that they were 
preserving.  
Communication, expertise, uncertainty, and vulnerability were particularly strong factors 
that influenced how auditors and repository staff members understood risk in the context of 
TRAC audit processes. In particular, my findings suggest that these two groups were more likely 
to agree about the process and aims of the auditor site visit, in which auditors were able to 
interact and communicate directly with repository staff than the process for maintaining 
certification, which relied on limited written communication. As with the potential sources of 
risk identified above, repository staff members, who had higher levels of vulnerability or 
exposure to potential risks, were more likely to express skepticism about whether the evidential 
requirements outlined in the TRAC standard and enforced by auditors would ensure the long-
term preservation of their digital content. They expressed doubt about whether the audit process 
could facilitate a thorough understanding of the complexities of their organizations, and concern 
about the expertise of the auditors.  
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Despite these differences of opinion, repository staff understood the requirements of the 
TRAC standard as communicated by standard developers and enforced by auditors, and 
produced the evidence that auditors wanted to see in order to achieve certification. This 
performance of trustworthiness enabled them to achieve their goal of becoming certified as a 
trustworthy digital repository, even when they themselves did not believe that their processes 
were trustworthy or likely to result in long-term preservation of digital content. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion & Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
In the previous chapter I examined how standard developers, auditors, and repository 
staff involved in the TRAC audit process understood the concept of risk for digital preservation. 
I traced the social construction of risk through the eyes of three stakeholder groups involved in 
the TRAC audit process and found that even though the digital preservation community has 
relied on a classical definition of risk and assumed that people behave in a rational and 
predictable way in response to risk information, the results of this study show that repository 
staff members disagreed with standard developers and auditors about whether the risk 
identification and mitigation strategies prescribed in the TRAC standard would translate to actual 
trustworthiness with regard to long-term digital preservation.  
This study was motivated by the following research questions: 
1. How do standard developers, auditors, and repository managers conceptualize risk in 
the context of a TRAC audit? 
2. What are the differences and similarities by which standard developers, auditors, and 
repository managers understand risk as it has been communicated by the TRAC 
standard? 
a) In what ways do these differences and similarities become manifest in the TRAC 
audit process? 
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3. To what degree do the following eight factors which influence risk perception come 
into play in the audit process: communication, complexity, expertise, organizations, 
political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability? 
a) In what ways and why do they emerge when staff and auditors consider risk 
factors articulated in the TRAC standard? 
b) What additional factors, if any, emerge which also influence perceptions of risk in 
relation to the TRAC standard?  
While standard developers and auditors believed that the requirements in a TRAC audit 
could assess a repository’s ability to identify and mitigate potential risks in order to ensure the 
long-term preservation of digital content, repository staff often disagreed with standard 
developers and auditors about whether the audit process could accurately assess their ability to 
mitigate risk and ensure the long-term preservation of digital content. Repository staff members 
from TRAC certified repositories described meeting auditor expectations for certification across 
a variety of criteria, while at the same time disagreeing about whether the criteria themselves 
were an accurate measure of trustworthiness with regard to long-term digital preservation. The 
audit process itself provided the social context necessary for repository documentation to become 
evidence of trustworthiness (Amann & Knorr Cetina, 1988). 
By examining two aspects of the TRAC audit process, auditor site visits and the process 
for maintaining certification, I found that communication, expertise, uncertainty, and 
vulnerability are factors that play a substantial role in the social construction of risk in the TRAC 
audit process. The other four factors from the model (i.e., complexity, organizations, political 
culture, and trust) were also present, but to a lesser degree. Findings from this study demonstrate 
that the factors in this model are not separate, but rather can be found in combinations that both 
amplify and minimize one another. For example, my findings show that poor communication 
about how repositories maintain their TRAC certification increased uncertainty about the audit 
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process itself for both auditors and repository staff members, and decreased trust between 
repository staff members and auditors. 
5.2 Risk in Digital Preservation 
Risk is a foundational concept in digital preservation and the TRAC audit process 
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012; Conway, 1996). In Chapter 2, I 
characterized the classical definition of risk as one that included two elements that were common 
throughout the literature: (1) the probability, and (2) the magnitude of consequences of an event 
(e.g., Gardoni & Murphy, 2013; Hilgartner, 1992; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Leveson, Dulac, 
Marais, & Carroll, 2009; Rowe, 1977; Slovic, 1987). This understanding of risk relies upon the 
concept of a rational actor and assumes that different individuals will understand and respond to 
risk information in predictable ways. In this study, I found that the TRAC standard developers 
assumed that auditors and repository staff would interpret the TRAC standard in the same way, 
and that both groups would understand the risks facing a repository and agree on mitigation 
strategies and actions. Standard developers, auditors, and repository staff discussed the concept 
of risk in ways that demonstrated an understanding that reflected this classical definition. You 
will remember that in section 4.2, Repository Staff 18 and Auditor 10 both described risk as 
consisting of the probability and magnitude of consequences of an event. Both argued that while 
they did not believe that probability and magnitude of consequences were well known or 
understood in their field, that information could be known and people would behave predictably 
in response to it. Yet, the results of this research have shown that this understanding of risk was 
not reflected in their experiences. Instead, I found that individuals across those three groups did 
not share the same understanding of risk and did not agree about the risk mitigation strategies 
that were required for TRAC certification. 
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Interviewees described an audit process in which repository staff interpreted the 
requirements in the TRAC standard, and auditors evaluated the resulting documentation in order 
to enforce their own understanding of the requirements in the TRAC standard. My findings 
demonstrated that while interviewees from all three groups understood risk for digital 
repositories in relation to specific types of threats (i.e., finance, organizational governance, legal, 
repository processes, and technical infrastructure), standard developers and auditors, groups 
whose members described themselves in terms of their seniority, expertise, and leadership roles, 
believed that the TRAC audit process could accurately assess a repository’s ability to mitigate 
those threats. Repository staff members, however, were skeptical. For example, section 4.3.1.1 
demonstrated that standard developers and auditors believed that a succession plan was evidence 
that a repository had taken the appropriate steps to ensure that its digital content would survive if 
the repository were to fail. In contrast, repository staff members, a group whose members 
described themselves in terms of their functional roles within their repositories, did not believe 
that a succession plan was evidence that digital content would outlive a repository because they 
did not believe that the document would be followed or enforced. 
My research demonstrates that identifying threats and describing mitigation techniques is 
a necessary step, but not sufficient in and of itself for digital preservation, because individuals 
have different understandings of risk and of whether and how risks can be mitigated. Although 
the classical definition of risk discussed above assumes that people will behave predictably in 
response to risk information, this study shows that individuals behave differently in response to 
risk information. In order to understand how digital repository stakeholders understand and 
respond to risk information, it is necessary to consider the social factors that influence and 
contribute to the construction of risk in TDR certification. 
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5.3  The Social Construction of Risk in TDR Audit & Certification 
The theoretical framework for this research argued that risk in digital preservation is 
socially constructed and that the following eight social factors influence the construction of risk 
in the TRAC audit process: communication, complexity, expertise, organizations, political 
culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. My findings support the argument that digital 
preservation should treat risk as socially constructed phenomenon and consider how social 
factors contribute to an understanding of risk in the audit and certification of TDRs, and I found 
that communication, expertise, uncertainty, and vulnerability were particularly strong factors that 
influenced how auditors and repository staff members understood risk in the context of TRAC 
audit processes. 
5.3.1 Communication 
Theories of risk perception argue that risk is socially constructed and that communication 
can influence how individuals understand risk information, (e.g., Bostrom, 2014; Chung, 2011; 
Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Konheim, 1988; Lachlan, Burke, Spence, & Griffin, 2009; Renn, 
1991; Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992). My findings show that 
communication was an important factor in risks related to finance, organizational governance, 
and repository processes. As you will recall, in section 4.3.1 repository staff members described 
communication with funders and parent organizations about the cost of long-term digital 
preservation as highly challenging. Similarly, in section 4.3.4 I found that repository staff viewed 
communication about repository processes for digital object management as complex and 
challenging, while standard developers and auditors thought that repository processes could be 
communicated in a clear, straightforward way. 
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Communication also came into play in the site visit (see section 4.4.1). Results from this 
study demonstrate that face-to-face communication was an important factor that enabled auditors 
and repository staff to establish a shared understanding of repository policies and practices 
during, for example, the site visit portion of a TRAC audit. In contrast, information that was not 
a part of the site visit, such as how to maintain certification, was communicated inconsistently. In 
section 4.4.2 I found that the TRAC standard, the audit reports, and individual interviewees all 
communicated different information about the process for repositories to maintain their 
certification and interviewees were largely unaware of these inconsistencies.  
My findings emphasize the importance of communication throughout the TRAC audit 
process, and suggest that both auditors and repository staff members would benefit from a 
process that encouraged more direct communication between individuals in the two groups. 
5.3.2 Expertise 
Research has demonstrated that individuals with different experiences and types of 
knowledge bring different types of expertise to bear on assessments of risk (Pidgeon, 1998), and 
that risk assessment processes should include individuals with different types of expertise and 
different perspectives (Slovic, 1987). This study shows that expertise was influential in how 
interviewees understood potential sources of risk relating to organizational governance and 
technical processes. For example, in section 4.3.3 expertise came up in relation to TRAC 
requirements that repositories have documentation about organizational structure and staffing to 
ensure that they have (1) appropriate staffing levels, and (2) have staff with sufficient expertise 
to carry out the work necessary for long-term digital preservation. While standard developers and 
auditors thought that the required documentation was evidence that a repository had the expertise 
necessary for the work of long-term preservation, repository staff said that there was a big 
 167 
difference between understanding the types of expertise that was needed, and being able to 
sustain sufficient staffing levels to achieve that level of expertise.  
Similarly, in section 4.3.5 repository staff disagreed with standard developers and 
auditors about whether threats to the technical infrastructure of a repository could be identified 
and mitigated. While standard developers and auditors described threats in this area as 
identifiable and manageable, repository staff members were skeptical about whether repositories 
could maintain the necessary staffing levels and expertise needed for that work. 
As previously noted in section 4.4.1, expertise played an important role in the audit 
process during the site visit. For standard developers and auditors, the site visit was an 
opportunity to interact directly with repository staff who were experts in different aspects of 
repository management in order to gain a deeper understanding of repository policies and 
processes. For repository staff, the site visit was challenging because they had mixed opinions 
about whether the auditors who visited their repositories had sufficient expertise to understand 
their policies and processes in just a few days.  
My findings indicate that standard developers, auditors, and repository staff view 
expertise as important for identifying and managing risks within repositories, and also for the 
TRAC certification process. While standard developers and auditors assumed that knowing what 
types of expertise were needed would ensure that repositories would be able to maintain that 
expertise on staff, repository staff thought that knowing what types of expertise were necessary 
for repository management was only the first step toward maintaining that expertise among a 
repository’s staff.  
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5.3.3 Uncertainty 
 Research has shown that perceptions of risk can be influenced by the existence and 
recognition of uncertainty (e.g., Starr, 2003; van Est, Walhout, & Brom, 2012). This study found 
that uncertainty throughout the TRAC audit process influenced the ways that interviewees 
understood risk. For example, repository staff members were skeptical that the risk mitigation 
measures required by the TRAC standard, such as a succession plan, would ensure the long-term 
preservation of their digital content. This skepticism about the requirements for evidence in the 
TRAC standard extended across all five potential sources of risk (i.e., finance, organizational 
governance, legal, repository processes, and technical infrastructure), and demonstrated a 
different understanding of risk between standard developers and auditors on one hand, and 
repository staff members on the other.  
 For example, you will recall that in section 4.3.2, uncertainty came up when standard 
developers and auditors were more concerned with uncertainty about repository relationships 
among member and/or partner organizations as a potential source of risk for digital repositories, 
than repository staff members. Repository staff members discussed uncertainty about external 
organizations but were less likely to consider relationships with their partners as uncertain. 
My findings demonstrate that uncertainty about the TRAC audit process was amplified 
by poor communication between auditors and repository staff members. As previously noted in 
section 4.4.2, information about how repositories should maintain their certification was 
communicated inconsistently, and as a result auditors and repository staff members expressed a 
great deal of uncertainty about what repositories should do to maintain their certification. The 
audit process did include some elements that were intended to improve communication and 
reduce uncertainty, such as the site visit (see section 4.4.1). Both auditors and repository staff 
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described the direct communication that the site visit facilitated as reducing uncertainty by 
providing an opportunity to fill in gaps in repository documentation and/or provide evidence for 
repository policies and processes. 
These findings demonstrate that in areas where standard developers, auditors, and/or 
repository staff are aware of uncertainty, they took steps to reduce or eliminate it. However, 
standard developers and auditors appeared to be unaware that repository staff did not share their 
confidence in the risk mitigation strategies outlined in the TRAC standard. These differences 
suggest that standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members did not share the same 
understanding of the risks that mitigation strategies such as succession planning were intended to 
address.  
5.3.4 Vulnerability 
 Research in the area of risk has shown that lived experience, including exposure or 
vulnerability to risk, can influence risk perception (e.g., Konheim, 1988; Olofsson et al., 2014). 
My findings showed that across all potential sources of risk, repository staff members were 
skeptical that the requirements of the TRAC standard would ensure the long-term preservation of 
their digital content. Standard developers and auditors described the goal of the TRAC audit 
process as a certification of a repository’s ability to ensure the longevity of their digital content 
beyond the life of the repository itself.  
This was quite salient in the area of financial risk (see section 4.3.1). Standard 
developers, auditors, and repository staff all described reliance on short term funding sources 
such as grants as increasing the vulnerability of a repository. Several repository staff members 
said that their repositories fell short of the requirements set forth by the TRAC standard to 
demonstrate mitigation of threats to financial sustainability, but all received TRAC certification. 
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Their views about whether their repositories had sufficiently addressed threats to financial 
sustainability were influenced by their own vulnerability to those risks. Repository staff 
members, who experienced greater vulnerability than either the standard developers or auditors 
to the potential sources of risk facing their repositories, were less likely to view those risks as 
manageable. Additionally, they did not believe that meeting the requirements described in the 
TRAC standard that the auditors were enforcing would make their repository trustworthy in 
terms of their ability to preserve digital content.  
The TRAC audit process assumed that individuals would identify risks and agree about 
the appropriate mitigation techniques regardless of their closeness to the repository and/or digital 
content. Yet, findings from this study indicate that individuals outside of the repository, who 
may not have a strong understanding of a particular repository’s policies and processes and 
whose livelihoods would not be threatened by repository failure, viewed risks as manageable 
while repository staff did not. As previously described in section 4.3.3, standard developers and 
auditors thought that a focus on long-term digital preservation, and a mission statement and 
policies that reinforced this focus, would together mitigate the potential risk of organizational 
instability. In contrast, repository staff members did not believe that policy documents would 
ensure that their repositories were able to maintain, for example, the necessary budget or staffing 
levels to carry out the policies in their documentation. 
The differences between standard developers, auditors, and repository staff suggest that 
the TRAC audit process would benefit from increased communication between these groups in 
order to help auditors to understand the perspective of repository staff members who are 
vulnerable to the potential sources of risk that are detailed in the documentation prepared for 
their audit.  
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5.3.5 Complexity 
Research shows that high levels of complexity in technical and social systems can make 
it difficult to identify probabilities, consequences, and hazards (e.g., Fischhoff, 1983; Perrow, 
1999; Rijpma, 1997; van Est et al., 2012). My findings demonstrate that interviewees across all 
three groups (i.e., standard developers, auditors, and repository staff) viewed the organizational 
and legal structures governing digital repositories as highly complex, and that this complexity 
contributed to the construction of both organizational governance and legal issues as potential 
sources of risk. For example, you will recall that in section 4.3.3, Auditor 03 described 
governance and organizational stability issues as both complex and uncertain potential sources of 
risk for digital repositories.  
In the context of a TRAC audit, interviewees found the organizational, legal, and 
technical aspects of repository management complex. While standard developers and auditors 
believed that the audit process was one that allowed auditors to understand and assess these 
complex policies and practices, repository staff disagreed. In their interviews, repository staff 
described the audit process as one in which they were able to provide auditors with the 
documentation that was needed to achieve certification, but described significant difficulties in 
communicating complex information to auditors. My findings also indicate that communication, 
uncertainty, and expertise interacted with complexity to both amplify and minimize potential 
sources of risk for interviewees. As previously discussed in section 4.4.1, repository staff 
members were skeptical about whether they could effectively communicate their repositories’ 
complex policies and practices to auditors in a short amount of time. However, auditors and 
standard developers thought that the face-to-face communication that took place during the site 
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visit enabled them to gain a deeper understanding of complex repository policies and processes 
than they could achieve through email communication and documentation alone. 
5.3.6 Organizations 
Each TRAC audit was ultimately a risk assessment of an organization. The team of 
auditors themselves represented an organization as well. Previous research has argued that risk 
analysis and risk management are both activities that take place within organizations, and these 
activities rely on social constructions of risk knowledge that are framed within the structure of 
the organization (Hutter & Power, 2005b). The findings from this study demonstrate that the 
standard developers, auditors, and repository staff involved in a TRAC audit represent different 
organizations that develop their own understandings of the concept of risk through the audit 
process. While standard developers and auditors tended to agree on their definitions of risk, 
repository staff members held opposing views about whether and how the risks that they 
identified during a TRAC audit could be mitigated. This difference in perspective largely fell 
across organizational lines – that is, the organization setting the standard and the organization 
enforcing the standard were in agreement about the effectiveness of the measures required, but 
members of the organizations being audited viewed the required risk mitigation measures as 
ineffective for long-term preservation.  
Standard developer, auditor, and repository staff views of organizational instability as a 
potential source of risk for digital repositories were influenced by their views of the complexity 
of the repositories being audited and their documentation. You will recall that in section 4.3.3, 
standard developers focused on the ways that the requirements laid out in the TRAC standard 
would mitigate potential threats relating to organizational instability, auditors and repository staff 
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were skeptical about whether policies and documentation could accurately capture actual 
repository practices. 
The difference in perspective between individuals being audited and those conducting the 
audit that this study has identified echoes findings from previous research about the ways that 
notions of risk are shaped within organizations, and the difficulties or disagreements that arise 
when those views are challenged by external actors such as auditors (e.g., Vaughan, 1996). In the 
case of a TRAC audit, the highly formalized communication process both facilitated and 
hindered communication between the two organizations, and the fact that repositories could 
achieve certification as trustworthy without believing themselves to be trustworthy highlights the 
fact that the TRAC process required repository staff to understand how standard developers and 
auditors view risk but did not require auditors to understand how repository staff viewed risk 
within their organizations.  
5.3.7 Political Culture 
Research about risk and political culture has shown that individuals perceive risks within 
their own cultural and political context, and it is within this same context that decisions about 
how to respond to those risks are formulated and implemented (e.g., Dake, 1991; Jasanoff, 1986, 
1998; Parthasarathy, 2007). Additionally, attitudes about risk reflect feelings of power, or lack of 
power, in relation to potential sources of risk (Jasanoff, 1998). In this study, I found that political 
culture, both in terms of cultural and political context, and feelings of power and/or 
powerlessness in relation to risk, influenced how standard developers, auditors, and repository 
staff understood risk in the context of a TRAC audit. As previously discussed in section 4.3.2, 
interviewees across all three groups (i.e., standard developers, auditors, and repository staff 
identified national context as a potential source of risk for the repository described in the 
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vignette. Specifically, they discussed potential problems for the repository that could arise as a 
result of having data storage locations in two different countries.  
Standard developers and auditors tended to say that well documented agreements and/or 
contracts could mitigate threats in areas where repositories were subject to decisions of more 
powerful organizations, such as institutional support from funding organizations and/or parent 
institutions. However, you will recall that in section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 repository staff members did 
not agree that contracts and agreements would be enforceable, and did not think that this type of 
documentation was evidence of their ability to preserve digital content.  
5.3.8 Trust 
 TRAC certification is a process by which digital repositories demonstrate their 
trustworthiness to preserve digital content long-term. Research about trust and risk has shown 
that information about risks cannot be separated from their contexts. Rather, trust (or mistrust) is 
an important factor in the relationships between individuals and institutions, and can be a guiding 
factor in how risk is defined (Nelkin, 1989; Wynne, 1992). In addition to being a foundational 
concept for the certification itself, trust between auditors and repository staff was a factor in the 
audit process.  
Through the course of a TRAC audit, repository staff members created documentation in 
response to the checklist in the TRAC standard, and auditors assessed and evaluated that 
documentation. The successful completion of each TRAC audit that interviewees discussed 
depended on trust between those two groups that repository staff were creating accurate and 
truthful documentation, and that the auditors were sufficiently expert in their areas of specialty to 
evaluate each repository’s documentation. You will recall that in section 4.4.1, the site visit was 
described by both groups as an opportunity for repository staff to meet and speak directly with 
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auditors, and for auditors to confirm the accuracy of repository documentation. Trust but verify 
was a sentiment that ran through responses from auditors and repository staff, and direct 
communication was the means by which they verified trustworthiness. 
As a foundational concept for TRAC certification, trust was notably problematic in light 
of my findings which show that repository staff used certification to perform the trustworthiness 
that they understood standard developers and auditors wanted to see, without believing that they 
were actually trustworthy with regard to long-term digital preservation. The succession plan is an 
example of this. In section 4.3.1.1, I found that repository staff provided evidence of their 
succession plans in order to demonstrate their repositories’ ability to ensure the longevity of 
digital content beyond the lifespan of the repository, even though they did not believe that a 
succession plan provided evidence that the digital content would outlive the repository. While 
interviews with the standard developers, auditors, and repository staff showed that they trusted 
one another to be honest and accurate through the TRAC audit process, it is troubling that they 
disagreed about the assessment of trustworthiness at the heart of TRAC certification. 
5.3.9 Revised Theoretical Model for the Social Construction of Risk in Digital 
Preservation 
In light of the findings described above, I have revised the theoretical model for the social 
construction of risk in digital preservation to reflect the fact that communication, expertise, 
uncertainty, and vulnerability emerged as particularly strong factors that influenced how auditors 
and repository staff members constructed their understanding of risk in the context of TRAC 
audit processes. In contrast, complexity, organizations, political culture, and trust also influenced 
the social construction of risk in the context of a TRAC audit, but to a lesser degree.  
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5.4.1 The Social Construction of Risk in TRAC Audit and Certification 
In this dissertation, I proposed a theoretical model for the social construction of risk in 
TDR certification that consists of eight factors: communication, complexity, expertise, 
organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. The findings from this study 
have shown that each of the eight factors from the model contributed to the construction of risk 
in the TRAC audit and certification process, and that communication, expertise, uncertainty, and 
vulnerability were the most prominent factors.  
Previous research has examined digital preservation as a technical, economic, and 
organizational phenomenon. The demonstrated applicability of this theoretical model to the 
TRAC certification process shows that risk cannot be examined solely as a discoverable, 
calculable phenomenon that relies on rational actors who behave predictably in response to risk 
information. Rather, my findings indicate that future research about digital preservation should 
consider it to be a social phenomenon. Risk is a foundational concept in digital preservation 
(Conway, 1996), yet it has been largely overlooked by research up to this point. This study has 
demonstrated that different actors in the TRAC certification process do not share the same 
understanding of the concept of risk. Research about digital preservation has largely treated risk 
as knowable and calculable and assumed that different people will behave predictably in 
response to risk information. These findings show that research about risk in digital preservation 
should consider it as a social construct and seek to understand whether and how different 
individuals and/or groups understand risk before proposing risk management solutions for digital 
repositories. 
While this study did show that the factors from the model influenced how participants 
understood the concept of risk in the context of a TRAC audit, there was some difficulty in 
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differentiating social from individual factors. Vulnerability and expertise were factors in which 
social construction was the clearest. For example, you will recall from section 5.3.4 that 
repository staff members experienced greater vulnerability than either the standard developers or 
auditors to the potential sources of risk facing their repositories and were less likely to view 
those risks as manageable. When considering potential sources of risk for a repository in the 
context of a TRAC audit, there is more at stake for staff members than for the standard 
developers or auditors, for whom the audit process is more of a mental exercise without 
immediate personal threats. Interviewees from the group most likely to be directly effected by 
risks to repositories, the repository staff members, expressed skepticism about whether the risk 
identification and mitigation strategies described in the TRAC standard would translate to actual 
trustworthiness for their repositories. Interviewees from groups that were more removed from the 
repositories themselves, the standard developers and auditors, were more likely to view the 
TRAC criteria as sufficient measures of repository trustworthiness. Vulnerability is a factor that 
influenced how the three different groups (i.e., standard developers, auditors, and repository staff 
members), and individual interviewees, constructed their understanding of risk within the TRAC 
audit process. Future research should further disambiguate individual and social factors that 
influence how people and groups construct their understanding of risk in digital preservation. 
5.4.2 Repository Management & Trustworthy Digital Repository Certification 
 My findings indicate that digital repositories can meet the requirements from the TRAC 
standard without the repository staff believing that those requirements will, in fact, ensure the 
longevity of their digital content. Standard developers and auditors were in agreement about the 
types of evidence that would demonstrate trustworthiness for digital repositories, but repository 
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staff members disagreed about whether documentation such as a succession plan was in fact 
evidence of repository trustworthiness.  
Standard developers, a group consisting largely of individuals with graduate degrees in 
highly technical fields such as physics and engineering, established guidelines for repository 
certification that assumed identifying risks and describing policies and processes to address them 
could demonstrate a repository’s ability to preserve digital content for the long-term. This 
approach to risk typified the shared epistemic culture among standard developers that 
emphasized discoverable, calculable phenomena rather than socially constructed phenomena and 
assumed that different people would behave rationally and predictably when presented with risk 
information. Similarly, the auditors enforced this understanding of how to determine repository 
trustworthiness. Their acceptance of the requirements set forth in the TRAC standard, and the 
underlying assumptions about risk identification and policy documents as sufficient evidence of 
repository trustworthiness, reflects the culture and expectations of this group of academic library 
administrators.  
In contrast, repository staff members did not believe that documentation about repository 
policies and processes was evidence of trustworthiness with regard to long-term preservation of 
digital content. Rather, members of this group questioned (1) whether documentation would 
translate into action, and (2) if it did, whether those actions would produce consistent results. 
This group, which consisted of individuals with a variety of educational backgrounds and 
professional experience who were more likely than either the standard developers or auditors to 
be responsible for enacting the policies and processes described in TRAC documentation, did not 
believe that documentation was evidence of a repository’s ability to preserve digital content 
long-term.  
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For example, you will recall in section 4.3.1.1 that standard developers and auditors 
believed that a succession plan was evidence that a repository’s digital content would survive 
beyond the life of the repository itself, while repository staff members did not. The groups 
consisting of individuals with high levels of seniority and leadership experience in their 
professional roles expected that policies and agreements developed by repository leadership 
would be followed, while the more junior group of repository staff members were likely to argue 
that repository policies and agreements would not be followed or enforced. This example 
reinforces the differences between standard developers and auditors, and repository staff 
members, and highlights the ways that their different levels of education, expertise, and 
experience shaped their views of risk in the context of a TRAC audit. 
In the future, repository staff should consider what measures and the corollary evidence 
they think would increase their perception of the trustworthiness of their repository with regard 
to long-term digital preservation and whether/how those measures complement or conflict with 
the accepted best practices for digital preservation and repository management. Rather than 
proceeding with certification under an evidential regime in a standard that they disagree with, the 
results of this research suggest that repository staff should take a more active part in the 
development of the standards themselves and that standard developers and auditors would 
benefit from including the perspectives of this group, which have so far been missing from the 
conversation.  
In this research, I found that communication problems between auditors and repository 
staff contributed to the understandings of risk that each group constructed through the course of a 
TRAC audit. Because external parties such as standard developers and auditors have been shown 
to have different views from people within repositories regarding the effectiveness of risk 
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mitigation techniques, digital repository managers would do well to consider that the views that 
their staff members have of their repositories likely do not match the way that their repositories 
are viewed by standard developers, auditors, and other external stakeholders. Rather than 
maintaining these differing perspectives by maintaining one view of the repository internally and 
presenting another to external groups such as auditors, repository managers should consider 
increasing their involvement in the establishment of digital preservation policy and standards for 
TDRs. 
Including the perspectives of internal and external stakeholders in the development of 
repository certification standards and digital preservation policy, including junior members of 
repository staff who can bring fresh perspectives and may have knowledge about new and 
emerging technologies, will strengthen both digital repositories as well as TDR certification 
processes. 
5.4.3 Digital Preservation Policy 
Transparency is a key tenet of TRAC certification (Reilly, Jr. & Waltz, 2013), yet the 
findings from this study indicate that the audit process lacked transparency, “The TRAC audit 
process is, at least was, not transparent. It was intentionally not transparent” 
(RepositoryStaff_04). For example, in section 4.4.2 standard developers, auditors, and repository 
staff all reported different processes for repositories to maintain their certification. The lack of 
consensus, and lack of clear communication about expectations among the three groups created 
uncertainty among auditors and repository staff about how repositories can remain trustworthy. 
Going forward, repository certification under the ISO 16363 standard should have clear and 
consistent guidelines for maintaining certification.  
 182 
Auditors have presented repositories with reports of their findings, which are also made 
publicly available. Despite the length of the audit process and the detail of the TRAC checklist, 
these reports are brief statements about the overall status of the repository and the conditions at 
the time of the audit (Center for Research Libraries, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). A 
more transparent audit process would produce detailed results showing how the repository had 
met, or failed to meet, each of the checklist items. In contrast, the audit process examined in this 
study was one in which repositories would receive a score in each of the three areas of the 
checklist (i.e., organizational infrastructure, digital object management, infrastructure and 
security risk management), but the scoring system did not have a minimum score necessary to 
pass. Indeed, the scoring system for TRAC certification is such that while a repository can 
receive a low score, it is not possible to fail.  
Increased transparency in the TRAC audit process would help bridge differing 
perceptions of risk among standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members. In 
addition to helping repository staff members understand the audit process itself, including how 
they should go about maintaining their certification over time, increasing transparency in the 
audit process would enable them to work with the auditors in order to find ways to meet both the 
letter and spirit of the TRAC standard. Transparency about the development of the standard itself 
could also provide opportunities for auditors and repository staff members to provide feedback 
about their experiences in order to improve the standard in the future. 
5.5 Future Directions 
This research was motivated by (1) the lack of existing empirical research about digital 
preservation, and about TDR audit and certification processes in particular, and (2) the lack of 
research about the social construction of risk in TDR certification. This dissertation has 
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accomplished those goals and has produced a thorough investigation of the social construction of 
risk in the TRAC audit and certification process. However, more work is needed to understand 
how risk is constructed in other repository certification contexts. My future work will further 
refine the theoretical model that I have developed for the social construction of risk in digital 
preservation by applying it in different social, cultural, and organizational contexts where digital 
information is curated. This initial development and testing of my theoretical model has 
examined the social construction of risk in the context of large, well-resourced digital 
repositories in North America. Next steps for the development of this model include applying it 
to repositories that are at different stages of development and maturity, to repositories of varying 
size and resources, and in different cultural contexts. TRAC certified repositories represent an 
elite group, I would also like to apply this framework to a lighter certification such as the 
recently established CoreTrustSeal certification.  
This study employed a qualitative mixed-methods research design that included in-depth 
semi-structured interviews and document analysis. These methods were appropriate here because 
of the exploratory nature of this research and the small size of the population. A larger study with 
more participants may offset some of the social desirability effects that were present in this 
research. A study with larger groups would also address the challenges encountered in this study 
of examining how groups construct an understanding of risk in contrast to individual perceptions 
of risk. 
Alternately, an in-depth case study of a specific repository audit would address this 
study’s limitations of limited recall and rationalization. Examining an audit as it takes place with 
ethnographic methods would provide a rich picture of how participants construct their 
understanding of risk, and how the factors from the model influence that process. 
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This research focused on three particular stakeholder groups: standard developers, 
auditors, and repository staff. Future research about repository certification should consider the 
perspectives of other repository stakeholders as well. For example, members of a repository’s 
Board of Directors, or those in leadership roles within a repository’s parent and/or member 
organizations may have different perspectives on the need for, and benefits of repository 
certification. Other stakeholder groups that may provide different perspectives on TDR 
certification include repository users, data depositors, clients/customers, and decision makers 
from funding organizations. 
This study showed that the eight factors in the model for the social construction of risk 
influenced how interviewees understood risk in the context of a TRAC audit. However, there 
was some difficulty in differentiating between factors that influenced individual perceptions of 
risk and factors that influenced the social construction of risk. A study that focuses on the 
broader social context of repository certification, including other stakeholder groups as well as 
other data sources, could provide further insight into the question of what factors influence the 
social construction of risk in digital preservation, and which influence individual perceptions of 
risk.  
Finally, the basis of this research can be traced back to the Garrett and Waters report, 
written in 1996, which called for the establishment of a standard for trustworthy digital 
repositories (Garrett & Waters, 1996). While this dissertation has focused on how stakeholders in 
the TRAC audit process construct their understanding of risk, a foundational concept for TDR 
certification, it has also shown that these groups have differing views about the effectiveness of 
the certification. This suggests that the time may be right for a study focusing on the value and 
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effectiveness of TDR certification, which considers whether and how the digital preservation 
community has taken up the recommendations from the Garrett and Waters report. 
This dissertation sought to examine the social construction of risk in TDR certification. It 
was motivated by the need to examine the concept of risk, which is foundational for digital 
preservation but has not been examined thoroughly as a social phenomenon despite extensive 
research in other fields that demonstrate the importance of considering risk as a social construct. 
It has been successful in that it yielded data showing how standard developers, auditors, and 
repository staff involved in the TRAC audit process understood the concept of risk for digital 
preservation. This research traced the social construction of risk through the eyes of three 
stakeholder groups involved in the TRAC audit process and found that even though the digital 
preservation community has relied on a classical definition of risk and assumed that people 
behave in a rational and predictable way in response to the same information, the results of this 
study show that repository staff members disagreed with standard developers and auditors about 
whether the risk identification and mitigation strategies prescribed in the TRAC standard would 
translate to actual trustworthiness with regard to long-term digital preservation. Repository staff 
met the requirements for certification as trustworthy, but did not believe that these requirements 
were an accurate assessment of their ability to preserve digital content long-term. In doing so 
they were performing rather than demonstrating trustworthiness.  
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol for Standard Developers 
Introduction Questions 
1. Please tell me a bit about yourself and your background. How did you come to your 
current role? (OR, how came to be involved in PTAB) 
a. NOTE: e.g., education, previous organizations, previous roles at current 
organization 
2. How would you describe your current role at _______ (name of organization/repository)? 
a. (NOTE: administration, IT, digital preservation, other) 
b. What is your current job title? What was your title at the time of the TRAC audit? 
c. How long have you worked at (name of organization/repository)? How long have 
you been in your current role? 
3. Have you ever been an auditor for any repository assessment? (e.g., Data Seal) 
4. Have you worked for a repository that went through a TRAC audit? (goal is to find out if 
they’ve been on the other side of an audit.) 
a. An audit for any other certification? 
Vignette Questions  
1. What risks, if any, do you see in the first category listed in the repository description 
(organizational infrastructure)?  
2. In the second (digital object management)?  
3. The third (infrastructure and security risk management)? 
4. Of those risks, which is the most significant? 
a. Why is this vulnerability significant? 
b. What steps might Repository X take to address or mitigate this vulnerability? 
c. What challenges do you think Repository X will encounter when they address 
these risks? 
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5. Is there anything about this repository that you think would be problematic if they 
decided to pursue TRAC certification? 
a. What problems might arise? 
b. How could the repository address these problems? 
Interview Part 2: PTAB 
5. Please tell me a bit about yourself and your background. How did you come to be (a 
member of the PTAB board OR a participant in PTAB training)? 
a. For PTAB board 
i. What does your role as a PTAB board member entail? (training auditors, 
conducting audits, etc.) 
ii. Have you been involved in training auditors?  
1. If yes, what is your role in the training process? (e.g., do you 
specialize in one area of repository assessment? one section of the 
TRAC checklist?) 
iii. Were you involved in the 6 test audits that were conducted with 16363? 
iv. Have you been an auditor for repository certification via the ANAB 
certification process? 
b. For PTAB trainees: What did the training session entail?  
i. How will you apply your training as an auditor? 
1. (e.g., conduct audits, support my own repository, consult with 
other repositories, etc.) 
For all PTAB: (use 16363 test audits if appropriate) 
1. What is the greatest risk or threat that digital repositories face?  
a. Why is this risk significant? 
2. What do you see as the area of greatest complexity for digital repositories? Why? 
3. What are the most significant sources of uncertainty for digital repositories? Why? 
4. In what ways does your experience [as an auditor] (or experience as ___role) influence 
your understanding of the risks that repositories face? 
5. As an auditor, how do you identify risks/threats/vulnerabilities when you’re conducing a 
repository audit? 
a. How do you communicate information about them to the rest of the audit team? 
To the repository? 
b. How is information about risks from other members of the audit team 
communicated to you? 
6. How certain are you that you can rely on others in the audit team to tell you about risks 
that they have identified? 
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a. Are they reluctant to talk about risk? 
Wrap-up 
6. Is there anything I haven’t asked about that you would like to discuss? 
7. Is there anyone else from your PTAB training session(s) who I should speak with?  
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol for Auditors 
Introduction Questions 
7. Please tell me a bit about yourself and your background. How did you come to your 
current role? OR How did you come to be involved in CRL’s TRAC audits? 
a. NOTE: e.g., education, previous organizations, and previous roles at current 
organization 
8. How would you describe your role at (name of organization/repository)? 
a. (NOTE: administration, IT, digital preservation, other) 
b. What is your current job title? What was your title at the time of the TRAC audit? 
c. How long have you worked at (name of organization/repository)? How long have 
you been in your current role? 
9. Did you go through training in order to become a TRAC auditor? 
a. Please describe any training activities, etc. that you participated in. 
b. Have you been through PTAB training? 
10. Have you ever been an auditor for any (other) repository assessment? (e.g., Data Seal) 
11. Have you worked for a repository that went through a TRAC audit? (goal is to find out if 
they’ve been on the other side of an audit.) 
b. An audit for any other certification? 
Vignette Questions  
6. What risks, if any, do you see in the first category listed in the repository description 
(organizational infrastructure)?  
7. In the second (digital object management)?  
8. The third (infrastructure and security risk management)? 
9. Of those risks, which is the most significant? 
a. Why is this vulnerability significant? 
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b. What steps might Repository X take to address or mitigate this vulnerability? 
c. What challenges do you think Repository X will encounter when they address 
these risks? 
10. Is there anything about this repository that you think would be problematic if they 
decided to pursue TRAC certification? 
c. What problems might arise? 
d. How could the repository address these problems? 
Part 2: Auditor Experience 
[To follow directly after the Vignette questions.] 
12. What is the greatest risk or threat that digital repositories face?  
c. Why is this risk significant? 
13. What do you see as the area of greatest complexity for digital repositories? Why? 
14. What are the most significant sources of uncertainty for digital repositories? Why? 
15. In what ways does your experience as an auditor (or experience as ___role) influence 
your understanding of the risks that repositories face? 
16. As an auditor, how do you identify risks/threats/vulnerabilities when you’re conducing a 
repository audit? 
a. How do you communicate information about them to the rest of the audit team at 
CRL? To the repository? 
b. How is information about risks from other members of the audit team 
communicated to you? 
17. How certain are you that you can rely on others in the audit team to tell you about risks 
that they have identified? 
a. Are they reluctant to talk about risk? 
Part 3: Recent Audit Experience 
The next set of questions asks about the most recent TRAC audit that the auditor 
conducted. 
18. During the TRAC audit process did you identify any previously unknown risks or 
vulnerabilities for your repository? 
a. How were they identified? 
b. How did you communicate them to the other auditors? To the repository? 
19. Was there any disagreement among auditors about how to assess to the repository? Please 
describe. 
a. How were they resolved? 
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20. Was there any disagreement between repository staff and the CRL auditors about the 
materials that the repository provided to you? Any relating to documents that you 
assessed/evaluated specifically? Please describe. 
a. How were they resolved? 
21. How certain are you that the information provided by the repository for the audit was 
complete and accurate? 
a. Why/Please explain? 
22. How did you communicate the audit results to the repository staff? (who, how, when, 
etc.) 
23. Are there any red flags that you look for when auditing a repository? 
a. Are there markers that you look for in order to identify areas of risk or 
vulnerability for repositories? 
b. Are there certain things that you look for in the documentation that repositories 
provide? In the on-site visit? 
Wrap-up questions 
24. Is there anything I haven’t asked about that you would like to discuss? 
25. Who else in your organization should I speak with about the TRAC certification process? 
a. NOTE: also include people who may have left the organization since then, where 
are they now?  
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol for Repository Staff 
Introduction Questions 
11. Please tell me a bit about yourself and your background. How did you come to your 
current role? 
a. NOTE: e.g., education, previous organizations, and previous roles at current 
organization 
12. How would you describe your role at (name of organization/repository)? (NOTE: if not 
in same role, ask about role at time of audit) 
a. (NOTE: administration, IT, digital preservation, other) 
b. What is your current job title? What was your title at the time of the TRAC audit? 
c. How long have you worked at (name of organization/repository)? How long have 
you been in your current role? 
13. Have you ever been an auditor for any repository assessment? (e.g., Data Seal) 
Vignette Questions  
14. What risks, if any, do you see in the first category listed in the repository description 
(organizational infrastructure)?  
15. In the second (digital object management)?  
16. The third (infrastructure and security risk management)? 
e. Of those risks, which is the most significant? 
i. Why is this vulnerability significant? 
ii. What steps might Repository X take to address or mitigate this 
vulnerability? 
iii. What challenges do you think Repository X will encounter when they 
address these risks? 
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17. Is there anything about this repository that you think would be problematic if they 
decided to pursue TRAC certification? 
f. What problems might arise? 
g. How could the repository address these problems? 
Interview Part 2: repository staff, questions about risk 
18. What is the greatest risk or threat that your repository faces?  
a. Why is this risk significant? 
19. What do you see as the area of greatest complexity for your repository? Why? 
20. What are the most significant sources of uncertainty for your repository? Why? 
21. In what ways does your experience as ___ influence your understanding of the risks that 
your repository faces? 
22. How do you identify risks/threats/vulnerabilities in your area/department? 
a. How do you communicate information about them to the rest of the repository? 
b. How is information about risks from other areas/departments communicated to 
you? 
23. How certain are you that you can rely on others in your organization to tell you about 
risks that they have identified?  
a. Are they reluctant to talk about risk? 
Interview Part 3: repository staff, audit process 
The next set of questions asks about the TRAC audit process, including document 
preparation, the on-site visit, and any communication with auditors before, during, and after. 
24. During the TRAC audit process did you identify any previously unknown risks or 
vulnerabilities for your repository? 
a. How were they identified? 
b. How did you communicate them to the rest of the repository? To the auditors? 
25. Was there any disagreement among repository staff about how to respond to the TRAC 
criteria checklist? Please describe. 
a. How were they resolved? 
26. Was there any disagreement between repository staff and the CRL auditors about the 
materials that your repository provided to them? Any relating to documents that you 
prepared specifically? Please describe. 
a. How were they resolved? 
27. How were audit results communicated to you? (who, how, when, etc.) 
28. How certain were you that you could rely on the auditors to communicate important 
information back to your team at the repository during the audit process?  
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a. How certain were you that you could rely on your team at the repository to 
communicate important information to the auditors? 
Wrap-up questions 
1. Is there anything I haven’t asked about that you would like to discuss? 
2. Who else in your organization should I speak with about the TRAC certification 
process?  
i. NOTE: also include people who may have left the organization since then, 
where are they now? 
ii. ALSO: if interviewee interacted with auditors or any other CRL personnel, 
ask for their names 
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Appendix D: Interview Protocol: Repository Staff, Audit 
Manager 
Introduction Questions 
29. Please tell me a bit about yourself and your background. How did you come to your 
current role? 
a. NOTE: e.g., education, previous organizations, and previous roles at current 
organization 
30. How would you describe your role at (name of organization/repository)? (NOTE: if not 
in same role, ask about role at time of audit) 
a. (NOTE: administration, IT, digital preservation, other) 
b. What is your current job title? What was your title at the time of the TRAC audit? 
c. How long have you worked at (name of organization/repository)? How long have 
you been in your current role? 
31. Have you ever been an auditor for any repository assessment? (e.g., Data Seal) 
Vignette Questions  
32. What risks, if any, do you see in the first category listed in the repository description 
(organizational infrastructure)?  
33. In the second (digital object management)?  
34. The third (infrastructure and security risk management)? 
h. Of those risks, which is the most significant? 
i. Why is this vulnerability significant? 
ii. What steps might Repository X take to address or mitigate this 
vulnerability? 
iii. What challenges do you think Repository X will encounter when they 
address these risks? Is there anything about this repository that you think 
would be problematic if they decided to pursue TRAC certification? 
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i. What problems might arise? 
j. How could the repository address these problems? 
Interview Part 2: repository staff, questions about risk 
35. What is the greatest risk or threat that your repository faces?  
a. Why is this risk significant? 
36. What do you see as the area of greatest complexity for your repository? Why? 
37. What are the most significant sources of uncertainty for your repository? Why? 
38. In what ways does your experience as ___ influence your understanding of the risks that 
your repository faces? 
39. How do you identify risks/threats/vulnerabilities in your area/department? 
a. How do you communicate information about them to the rest of the repository? 
b. How is information about risks from other areas/departments communicated to 
you? 
40. How certain are you that you can rely on others in your organization to tell you about 
risks that they have identified?  
a. Are they reluctant to talk about risk? 
Interview Part 3: repository staff, audit process 
The next set of questions asks about the TRAC audit process, including document 
preparation, the on-site visit, and any communication with auditors before, during, and after. 
41. During the TRAC audit process did you identify any previously unknown risks or 
vulnerabilities for your repository? 
a. How were they identified? 
b. How did you communicate them to the rest of the repository? To the auditors? 
42. Was there any disagreement among repository staff about how to respond to the TRAC 
criteria checklist? Please describe. 
a. How were they resolved? 
43. Was there any disagreement between repository staff and the CRL auditors about the 
materials that your repository provided to them? Any relating to documents that you 
prepared specifically? Please describe. 
a. How were they resolved? 
44. How were audit results communicated to you? (who, how, when, etc.) 
45. How certain were you that you could rely on the auditors to communicate important 
information back to your team at the repository during the audit process?  
a. How certain were you that you could rely on your team at the repository to 
communicate important information to the auditors? 
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Interview Part 4: repository manager questions 
3. When did (name of repository) decide to pursue TRAC certification?  
i. How was that decision made? Who initiated? Who were the decision-makers? 
ii. How was this decision communicated to repository staff? 
iii. Timeline: 
i. How long did the entire process take from the decision to pursue 
certification until CRL posted the audit results? 
ii. NOTE: follow-up for breakdown if necessary: decision to pursue until first 
contact with auditors; working with auditors and preparing materials for 
submission; auditors reviewing documentation & preparing decision 
4. Please describe your role in the certification process. 
iv. Which parts of the process were you involved in? 
v. Which documents/evidence were you involved in preparing? 
vi. Please describe any interaction that you had with the auditors. 
i. Who did you communicate with? How? (i.e., phone, email, etc.) 
vii. How did you coordinate activities among repository staff?  
i. Did you encounter any difficulties while coordinating work among 
repository staff for the audit? Please describe. 
5. Did your repository encounter any challenges or difficulties in preparing materials for the 
audit? Please describe. 
viii. NOTE: follow-up for detail if necessary: 
i. Internal disagreements 
ii. Disagreements with auditors 
iii. Problems interpreting and/or responding to the checklist 
iv. Other challenges 
ix. What were the primary reasons for these challenges? (e.g., communication 
problems, different perspectives about risk, lack of trust, uncertainty, etc.) 
i. How did you overcome them? 
6. Which areas of the TRAC checklist did repository staff spend the most time responding 
to for the audit? 
i. Who was responsible for these areas? 
ii. Why do you think that these areas took longer than others to address? 
7. Which areas of the TRAC checklist do you think are the most important in terms of (your 
organization’s) ability to preserve and provide access to digital information? 
i. Which areas/items, if not addressed, would pose the greatest threat? 
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Wrap-up questions 
8. Is there anything I haven’t asked about that you would like to discuss? 
9. Who else in your organization should I speak with about the TRAC certification 
process?  
iii. NOTE: also include people who may have left the organization since then, 
where are they now? 
iv. ALSO: if interviewee interacted with auditors or any other CRL personnel, 
ask for their names 
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Appendix E: Vignette 
Please read the repository overview below. During the interview, you will be asked 
to identify and discuss potential areas of risk for Repository X. 
Repository X: Overview 
Organizational Infrastructure 
Founded in 2005, Repository X is a nonprofit organization whose mission focuses on 
both preserving and providing access to social science research data. Repository X was originally 
established as a partnership between eight large research universities located across the United 
States and Canada. Beginning in 2008 the repository expanded with a tiered dues-based 
membership system, and currently has 45 members. Repository X is managed by an Executive 
Director as well as a volunteer Board of Directors consisting of representatives from each of the 
original eight partner organizations as well as four external members who serve 2-year terms 
Funding for Repository X comes from a combination of membership dues (~65%) and grant 
funding (~35%) as well as support from the original eight member organizations.  
Digital Object Management 
Current collections include 100 terabytes of data from both the original eight member 
organizations as well as the 45 member organizations. Repository X accepts data in any format 
but provides varying levels of support for different formats. Preferred file formats (e.g., .tiff, 
.wav, .csv. txt) receive higher levels of preservation support, such as file migration, than those in 
other formats (e.g., .png, .mp3, .xls, .rtf), which receive bit-level preservation. 60% of current 
holdings are preferred formats. For those preferred formats, the repository maintains preservation 
metadata in addition to the metadata received from the data depositors.  
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Infrastructure and Security Risk Management 
One of the founding member universities hosts the repository infrastructure, and 
repository staff who manage day-to-day activities are based at this same university in the Pacific 
Northwest. Two active mirror backup sites are located in geographically diverse locations, one 
on the East Coast of the United States and another in Quebec, Canada. Repository X has a 
disaster response and recovery plan, which is updated every three years. The repository’s 
preservation planning includes a succession plan. 
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Appendix F: Interview Data Analysis Code Set 
Parent Code Child Code Definition 
accreditation [none] 
code discussion about accreditation for auditors to administer 
ISO 16363 (16919) 
Audits [none] n/a 
Audits formal audit 
code when discussion is about a specific audit that was 
conducted with the goal of certification 
Audits self assessment code disucssion about repository conducting self assessment 
Audits test audit discussion about test audits conducted by CRL and PTAB 
designated 
community [none] 
code discussion about the concept of designated community - 
they must use the specific term 
documentation [none] 
discussion about documents or documentation in the TRAC 
audit process, documentaiton of repository policies, 
processes, procedures, etc. 
good quotes [none] 
use to capture any short quotes or phrases that are 
particularly good 
governance [none] use to caputure discussion of repository governance 
Interaction [none] 
use code (and all child codes) for any discussion of 
interaction/communication - face-to-face, telephone, email, 
etc. 
Interaction among audit team   
Interaction among repository staff   
Interaction 
between repository 
staff and auditors   
Most Significant 
Risk  [none] 
code Q&A for question: what is the most signification risk that 
digital repositories face? OR what is the most significant risk 
that your repository faces/faced? 
Organizations [none] n/a 
Organizations ANSI anab   
Organizations CCSDS 
code when participant discusses the Consultative Committee 
for Space Data Systems 
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Organizations CLIR   
Organizations CRL code when participant discusses CRL 
Organizations IMLS code when participant discusses IMLS 
Organizations JISC   
Organizations LOCKSS code when participant discusses LOCKSS 
Organizations NASA code when participant discusses NASA 
Organizations PTAB code when participant discusses PTAB 
Participant 
Background [none] n/a 
Participant 
Background Education discussion of participant's education background 
Participant 
Background Other Assessment 
code any mention of participant experience with other 
assessments, either as auditor or working at a repository that 
pursued the assessment 
Participant 
Background Work Experience discussion of participant's work experience 
PTAB training [none] use when participants talk about the PTAB training sessions 
Publishing [none] any time participant talks about publications 
Repositories [none] 
for parent code & child codes, apply to all mentions of 
repository (not just first mention) 
Repositories Canadiana 
any discussion of Canadiana, especially specific mentions of 
the repository 
Repositories Chronopolis 
any discussion of Chronopolis, especially specific mentions of 
the repository 
Repositories CLOCKSS 
any discussion of CLOCKSS, especially specific mentions of 
the repository 
Repositories HathiTrust 
any discussion of HathTrust, especially specific mentions of 
the repository 
Repositories Portico 
any discussion of Portico, especially specific mentions of the 
repository (sometimes but rarely referred to as Jstor or 
ITHAKA) 
Repositories ScholarsPortal 
any discussion of ScholarsPortal, especially specific mentions 
of the repository; may also be called OCUL 
Risk Definition [none]  
code if participant explicitly defines risk or gives clear 
statement of what they consider risk to be with regard to 
digital preservation or digital repositories 
Risk Factors [none] social factors that influence participant risk perception 
Risk Factors communication  
Perceptions of risk vary depending on the way in which 
information about those risks is communicated, including the 
source, method, channel, and means of communication. 
These elements can either amplify or attenuate perceptions 
of risk for different individuals and groups (e.g., Bostrom, 
2014; Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996). 
Risk Factors complexity 
High levels of complexity can make identification difficult with 
regard to hazards, probabilities, and consequences. 
Complexity in systems can also lead to unexpected 
interactions between component parts, often leading to 
increased levels of risk (e.g., Perrow, 1999; Wilkinson, 2001). 
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Risk Factors expertise 
Both expertise and lack of expertise can influence 
perceptions of risk. Experts may have particular knowledge 
that allows them to understand risk in a particular area, but 
they have been found to have a narrow focus based on their 
specialized knowledge, which can influence their perception 
of risk. Individuals who lack expertise in a particular area may 
not have the same nuanced understanding of particular areas 
that experts do, but they have been found to have a greater 
sense of the broad social context within which they are 
operating (e.g., E. Vaughan & Seifert, 1992; Wynne, 1992). 
Risk Factors organizations 
Organizations both produce and manage risk, and 
perceptions of risk vary for people depending on their position 
within an organization. Risk assessment and management 
activities take place within the context of organizations, and 
are therefore influenced by the organizations themselves as 
well as the roles of the individuals within the organizations 
who participate in those activities (e.g., Hutter, 2005; D. 
Vaughan, 1996).  
Risk Factors political culture 
National context influences how risks are defined. 
Perceptions of risk are shaped not only by the political culture 
within which individuals exist, but also by their place or role 
within that culture. These factors can elevate or reduce 
perceptions of risk depending on the position of an individual 
within the culture. Decisions about how to manage and 
respond to risks are shaped by political culture as well (e.g., 
Dake, 1991; Jasanoff, 1986). 
Risk Factors trust 
Organizations and processes that involve cooperation by 
people and groups with different types of knowledge and 
expertise require trust among those actors. Perceptions of 
risk can vary depending on the amount of trust that these 
individuals and groups have for one another (e.g., Nelkin, 
1989; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). 
Risk Factors uncertainty 
In many situations it can be difficult to determine and 
understand risk and its components (hazard, probability, 
consequences). People and groups operating under 
conditions of uncertainty may perceive risks differently 
depending on their level of uncertainty (e.g., Starr, 2003; van 
Est et al., 2012). 
Risk Factors vunerability 
Risk exposure, or vulnerability, influences perceptions of risk. 
People and groups who are able to limit their risk exposure 
may have different perceptions about risk than those who 
lack the ability to manage their exposure to risks. Greater 
vulnerability has been shown to increase perceptions of risk, 
while privilege and the ability to limit or select risk exposure 
has been shown to decrease perceptions of the severity of 
risks (e.g., Murphy, 2006; Olofsson et al., 2014).  
Risk Sources [none] code specific sources of risk discussed by participant 
Risk Sources financial discussion of financial risks or finances as a source of risk 
Risk Sources legal discussion of legal risks 
Risk Sources organizational 
discussion of organizational risks or organizations as a 
source of risk 
Risk Sources people discussion of people as site or source of risk 
Risk Sources processes 
discussion of processes, especially preservation processes, 
as site or source of risk 
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Risk Sources technology discussion of technology as risky or as a source of risk 
Specific 
Certifications [none] n/a 
Specific 
Certifications DRAMBORA Any mention of DRAMBORA 
Specific 
Certifications DSA Any mention of Data Seal of Approval 
Specific 
Certifications ISO 14721 Any mention of OAIS or the ISO standard  
Specific 
Certifications ISO 16363 Any mention of the ISO standard 
Specific 
Certifications ISO 16919 Any mention of the ISO standard  
Specific 
Certifications ISO 27000 Any mention of the ISO standard 
Specific 
Certifications nestor   
Specific 
Certifications TRAC Any mention of TRAC  
TDR 
Certification [none]   
TDR 
Certification Attitudes participant's attitude toward certification 
TDR 
Certification Audit Outcomes code discussion of audit outcomes 
TDR 
Certification Audit Process code discussion of the audit process itself 
TDR 
Certification Benefits discussion of benefits of certification 
TDR 
Certification Challenges discussion of challenges for certification 
TDR 
Certification Site Visit discussion about the site visit of the audit 
Vignette [none] 
use parent code to block code entire set of questions about 
vignette 
Vignette 
2 Digital Object 
Management 
code participant discussion of risks identified in the digital 
object management section of the vignette (2nd section) 
Vignette 
3 Infrastructure and 
Risk Management 
code participant discussion of risks identified in the 
infrastructure section of the vignette (3rd section) 
Vignette 
1 Organizational 
Infrastructure 
code participant discussion of risks identified in the 
organizational infrastructure section of the vignette (1st 
section) 
Vignette Significant Risk code participant discussion of most significant risk for vignette 
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